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Since 2023, Chinese firms have committed over US$100 billion in outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) across at least 130 major cleantech transactions, spanning solar, wind, batteries, and new energy vehicles (NEVs). This 'going global' strategy is driven by domestic overcapacity, which has caused solar module prices to drop 60% and battery prices 50% year-on-year, and a need to circumvent trade barriers from the US and EU. The report highlights China's dominance in the global battery supply chain, where it holds over 80% of manufacturing capacity, and its expansion into markets like Morocco, Brazil, and Thailand. For Australia, the report notes that Chinese OFDI reached a multi-decade low of US$613 million in 2023, and argues that Australia should clarify its foreign investment rules to attract Chinese private capital for onshore value-adding in critical minerals and renewable energy infrastructure.

The report examines how Chile, Indonesia, and South Africa integrate mining sector decarbonization into their climate commitments. It finds that while mining is economically vital and essential for the energy transition, it is often not explicitly identified in NDCs, making cross-country comparison difficult. Chile is highlighted as a benchmark with sector-specific targets, whereas Indonesia and South Africa largely aggregate mining emissions within broader energy or industrial categories.

The document examines the complementary strengths of China, as a global leader in green technology manufacturing, and Africa, which possesses vast renewable energy potential and critical mineral reserves. It highlights the shift in China's approach toward treating Africa as a business partner and details the specific clean energy commitments made during FOCAC 2024. However, it argues that Africa must enhance its own internal resource mobilization, reduce dependency on external aid, and improve project implementation timelines to fully realize these opportunities.

The report argues that the global push to triple renewable energy capacity must prioritize the quality of investments over quantity to avoid 'green extractivism'. It introduces three core criteria for public finance: driving a 100% renewable future by phasing out fossil fuels, ensuring democratic energy systems through grants and decentralization, and centering human rights and nature. The document criticizes multilateral development banks (MDBs) for continuing to fund fossil gas and relying on debt-creating loans rather than grants. Through case studies in India, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Indonesia, it contrasts the harms of large-scale, profit-driven projects with the benefits of community-led, small-scale renewable energy solutions.

The document examines Africa's potential to enter the solar PV manufacturing value chain, highlighting its abundance of critical minerals like copper and tin and high solar irradiance. It identifies significant barriers, including China's dominance of over 80% of the global value chain, high capital requirements for polysilicon production, and a lack of domestic technological capacity. The authors argue that individual African countries lack the resources to compete and instead recommend a regionalized strategy to pool resources and achieve economies of scale.

The document details a conference focused on the marginalization of Africa within the global economic system, specifically regarding the legacy of structural adjustment and the current lack of representative governance in international financial institutions. It identifies critical barriers to African development, including inflated risk premiums that cost the continent over $74 billion annually and the failure of the Global North to deliver over $1 trillion in promised climate financing. The report proposes a tiered reform agenda: short-term priorities include debt cancellation and increased access to Special Drawing Rights; medium-term goals focus on improving credit ratings through better data and combating illicit financial flows; and long-term goals aim for greater representation in the IMF and World Bank. Additionally, it explores the potential for Africa to leverage its natural capital and critical minerals for the energy transition, while cautioning against new dependencies on China as the world shifts toward a multipolar order.

The document analyzes the potential for African nations to move beyond the "pit to port" model of mineral extraction by building integrated battery mineral value chains. It highlights Africa's significant reserves of cobalt, manganese, graphite, and vanadium, and examines the macroeconomic shift from fossil fuel revenues to transition mineral revenues. The paper identifies Morocco as a leader in integrating automotive assembly with battery material production and discusses the potential for South Africa to act as a regional integrator. It concludes that while a continent-wide strategy is unlikely, sub-regional strategies and national policy instruments—such as strategic non-alignment and targeted industrial policies for e-mobility—can help African countries capture more value from their mineral endowments.

In 2023, Global Witness documented 196 murders of land and environmental defenders, contributing to a total of 2,106 since 2012. Latin America remains the most dangerous region, accounting for 85% of 2023 cases, with Colombia recording the highest number of killings (79). The report highlights a systemic pattern of violence including forced disappearances in Mexico and judicial harassment in Asia. Mining is identified as the primary industrial driver of these killings. The document argues that indigenous peoples, who protect 80% of the world's remaining biodiversity, are disproportionately targeted. It calls for the implementation of the Escazú Agreement and greater inclusion of indigenous knowledge in global climate negotiations.

The document analyzes China's dominance in Africa's critical minerals landscape, highlighting its role as a primary investor and buyer. It argues that while Africa's reserves are vital for the global energy transition, the current model of exporting raw materials without local processing limits socioeconomic benefits and risks environmental degradation. The brief recommends that African governments pursue strategic partnerships, invest in research and development, and build energy infrastructure to move up the value chain, while urging international partners to support technology transfer and local capacity building.

The briefing examines the role of deep sea mining in providing minerals like cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese for clean energy technologies. It concludes that deep sea mining is unlikely to solve immediate supply crunches because the necessary technology for commercial extraction and processing is not yet available, and the steepest growth in mineral demand is expected before 2035. The document highlights significant environmental risks, regulatory uncertainty surrounding the International Seabed Authority (ISA), and the potential for alternatives such as sustainable land mining, recycling, and material substitution to meet demand.

The document analyzes the global race to secure critical minerals, detailing the subsidy-driven strategies of the US, EU, UK, and Canada, and the dominant market position of China in battery production. It argues that African nations can leverage their mineral wealth to drive sustainable structural transformation by adopting a 'climate-resilient developmental regionalism' framework under the AfCFTA, which integrates climate adaptation and mitigation with regional industrialization.

The report examines how fossil fuels correlate with inter-state wars, militarism, and internal violence, while advocating for a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty to manage a just transition to renewable energy. It highlights the 'peacetime-wartime continuum' of violence, noting that fossil fuel revenues often fund conflicts and that extraction sites frequently experience human rights abuses and gender-based violence. The document calls for a treaty based on non-proliferation, a fair phase-out, and a global just transition to prevent the replication of colonial extractivist patterns in the renewable energy sector.

The policy brief argues that the African mining sector is hindered by political and institutional lock-ins, specifically the slow ratification of AMDC statutes. It proposes integrating strategic foresight—a systematic approach to anticipating future trends—into the AMDC's four-pillar mandate to move from reactive to proactive governance. The authors advocate for a 'foresight-led social contract' to ensure mineral wealth benefits local communities and supports the green energy transition. Key recommendations include establishing an anticipatory governance unit, reforming financial architectures to reduce debt dependency, and coordinating regional responses to transnational risks such as deep-sea mining and Global North competition.

The research paper examines the intersection of G7 initiatives, such as the Energy for Growth in Africa Initiative and the Mattei Plan, with South Africa's role as a representative for African climate priorities. It highlights the tension between Western-led green transitions and African concerns over 'green protectionism' (specifically the EU's CBAM), the need for adaptation financing based on the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' principle, and the geopolitical competition for critical minerals. The author argues that the G7 must provide concrete deliverables and respect African agency to effectively bridge its goals with South Africa's upcoming G20 presidency.

The report tracks the shift in China-Africa energy cooperation from large-scale infrastructure and thermal power projects toward 'small and beautiful' green initiatives. It highlights a growing alignment between China's commitment to stop funding overseas coal-fired projects and Africa's strategic priorities for climate finance, renewable energy access, and resilient infrastructure. While China offers technological and financial aid, the report notes that some African priorities, such as critical minerals, remain insufficiently addressed.

The report analyzes the mining sector's impact on greenhouse gas emissions and its essential role in providing minerals for energy transition technologies. It emphasizes the need for strategic management to reduce emissions and prevent biodiversity loss and pollution, while highlighting the specific challenge of fugitive methane emissions from coal mining. The study uses case studies from Chile, Indonesia, and South Africa to provide policy recommendations and explores the industry's use of voluntary disclosures and transparency initiatives to manage its carbon footprint.

The report finds that South Africa's mining sector is in a state of economic decline, with its share of real GDP falling from 11.1% in 1993 to 4.8% in 2023. It argues that the MPRDA has failed to facilitate growth or efficient regulation, contributing to a 'dried up' project pipeline and a global exploration expenditure share that has stagnated below 1% since 2020. Key constraints include institutional capacity gaps at the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE), infrastructure failures in electricity and logistics, and a profound trust deficit between government, industry, and host communities. The report recommends urgent amendments to the MPRDA to address regulatory uncertainties, the formalisation of artisanal and small-scale mining, and the adoption of a new, multi-stakeholder vision for the industry to restore investor confidence.

The document examines the tension between African developmental goals for critical minerals and the geopolitical priorities of external powers, specifically the US-led G7 and China. It highlights China's early-mover advantage in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe, while noting that G7 counter-initiatives often prioritize supply chain security over African local value addition. The authors argue that African nations must develop comprehensive national and regional strategies to avoid repeating colonial extraction patterns and to leverage their resources for sustainable industrialisation.

Japan is transitioning its Africa strategy from Official Development Assistance (ODA) toward private sector-led investment, specifically targeting critical minerals and green energy. This shift is driven by strategic competition with China, particularly regarding supply chain security for rare earth elements and the G7's desire to provide alternatives to Chinese infrastructure loans. While the Japanese government is actively promoting this 'business-based' approach through initiatives like the Green Growth Initiative for Africa and the Minerals Security Partnership, the transition is hindered by high risk perception among Japanese companies.

Africa possesses vast untapped renewable energy resources, including 60% of global solar resources, yet accounts for only 1.6% of global installed renewable capacity. The continent faces significant barriers to energy transition, including a massive financing gap—requiring $557 billion by 2030—and a heavy reliance on imported technologies, with Africa contributing less than 1% of global clean energy patent applications. While the region holds 40% of global critical mineral reserves essential for green technologies, it primarily serves as a raw material supplier. The document advocates for strengthened partnerships with the G20 and Global North to improve climate finance, facilitate technology transfer, and develop local green value chains to move beyond the export of primary commodities.