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The document argues that carbon markets are a continuation of colonial and capitalist systems that allow major polluters to avoid reducing emissions through 'greenwashing'. It explains how carbon credits are generated—often through flawed calculations in nature-based solutions or technological fixes—and details the risks to communities, including land grabbing and the violation of indigenous rights. The guide provides practical advice for communities to identify predatory contracts, exercise their right to say no, and seek alternatives like community forest management and agroecology.

The document argues that carbon markets are 'false climate solutions' that allow major polluters to continue emitting greenhouse gases through 'greenwashing' while causing harm to Indigenous Peoples and local communities. It describes how carbon credits are generated from projects—including nature-based solutions and technological patches—and warns that these often lead to land grabbing, human rights violations, and the failure to actually reduce global emissions. The guide provides a framework for communities to identify predatory contracts, demand Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), and organize international solidarity to oppose the financialization of nature.

The document outlines various carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies, categorising them into natural/biotic and technological/abiotic approaches. It highlights the United States' leadership in the sector, supported by billions of dollars in public investment and tax incentives, while noting a significant gap between current trajectories and midcentury needs.

The report evaluates the integration of permanent carbon removals—specifically BioCCS and DACCS—into the EU ETS. It identifies a critical tension: while direct integration can drive deployment and maintain market liquidity as the emissions cap approaches zero, it risks 'abatement deterrence' where removals substitute for necessary emissions reductions. The authors warn that without supply controls, BioCCS deployment could exceed sustainable biomass limits, potentially harming biodiversity and LULUCF carbon sinks. To mitigate these risks, the report recommends a gradual integration strategy that maintains the gross emissions cap, implements technology-specific supply controls, and introduces differentiated allowances. It also emphasizes that the EU ETS alone is likely insufficient to incentivize high-cost technologies like DACCS or to achieve net-negative emissions post-2050, necessitating additional public funding tools and long-term policy frameworks.

The document outlines a two-step process for choosing climate scenarios that effectively guide greenhouse gas emission reductions. It advises avoiding scenarios produced by entities with conflicts of interest, such as oil and gas companies, and instead prioritizing independent sources like the IEA and IPCC. A robust scenario must have at least a 50% probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C with low or zero 'overshoot' and must rely on limited negative emissions to avoid risking irreversible climate tipping points.

The guide outlines a two-step process for choosing climate scenarios that accurately reflect the requirements for climate mitigation. First, it advises avoiding scenarios from entities with conflicts of interest, such as oil and gas companies, in favor of independent bodies like the IEA or IPCC. Second, it mandates that a robust scenario must have at least a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or low temperature overshoot to avoid irreversible tipping points. Finally, the guide warns against scenarios that rely heavily on negative emissions technologies, such as BECCS and CCS, suggesting specific IPCC feasibility thresholds (e.g., 3 Gt CO2/year for BECCS by 2050) to filter out unrealistic pathways that may delay the phase-out of heavy emitting industries.

The document examines how discrepancies between NDC accounting and IPCC standards lead to an overestimation of land-based carbon sequestration, potentially reducing the global carbon budget by 15-18%. It highlights that current NDC pledges for land-based removal involve approximately 1 billion hectares, which the author claims is impossible without threatening food security and biodiversity. Furthermore, the briefing critiques IPCC Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) for ignoring land tenure, human rights, and the declining ability of natural sinks to store carbon under rising temperatures, suggesting that sustainable removal potential is up to 79% lower than IPCC estimates.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the EU's net carbon sink is declining rapidly and that the current LULUCF Regulation contains loopholes, such as offsetting flexibility and reliance on forest biomass, that undermine climate goals. The organization recommends removing offsetting mechanisms, preventing double counting between national inventories and corporate claims under the Carbon Removal Certification Framework (CRCF), limiting forest harvesting for bioenergy, and strengthening synergies between LULUCF targets and the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) and Nature Restoration Law.

The document defines carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as the physical extraction and permanent storage of atmospheric CO2. It argues that CDR must supplement, not substitute, deep emission reductions of over 90%. The handbook evaluates six negative emissions technologies and practices (NETPs)—biochar, BioCCS, DACCS, enhanced weathering, afforestation/reforestation, and soil carbon sequestration—detailing their technical readiness, permanence, and environmental trade-offs. It emphasizes the need for robust 'cradle-to-grave' carbon accounting, separate targets for reductions and removals to avoid mitigation deterrence, and the integration of the Planetary Boundaries framework to ensure Earth system stability. The text also critiques current EU legislation, such as the Carbon Removal Certification Framework (CRCF) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), for lacking ambition and failing to distinguish between permanent and temporary storage.

The document defines carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as the physical extraction of CO2 from the atmosphere and its permanent storage. It argues that CDR must be a complement to, not a substitute for, aggressive emission reductions (over 90%). The guide evaluates six negative emissions technologies and practices (NETPs)—including Bio-CCS, DACCS, and biochar—while critiquing current EU policies for failing to distinguish between permanent removals and temporary biological sequestration. It advocates for a diversified portfolio of CDR methods, rigorous life-cycle accounting, and a governance framework based on the 'planetary boundaries' to avoid ecological trade-offs.

The Nigeria Energy Transition & Investment Plan Update (ETIP 2.0) outlines a pathway to net-zero emissions by 2060, requiring a total installed power capacity of 277 GW and an additional capital investment of approximately $500 billion USD above business-as-usual levels. The plan emphasizes a massive shift toward solar PV, which is projected to reach 209 GW by 2050, and the phasing out of diesel decentralized generators by 2030. In the transport sector, the plan envisions a transition where electric vehicles make up at least 80% of the fleet by 2050, while the cooking sector aims for universal access by 2030, eventually transitioning to e-cooking. Despite the high upfront costs, the transition is projected to result in fuel savings of $686 billion USD. Key barriers identified include high initial costs for EVs and e-cooking, unreliable grid supply, and a skills gap in green technologies.

RMI has launched the State CDR Atlas, a tool designed to help the 50 US states scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) by assessing their unique geographies, infrastructure, and regulatory landscapes. The Atlas evaluates states across eight CDR approach categories using two primary ratings: an Opportunity Rating based on natural resources and infrastructure, and an Enabling Policy Rating based on the current regulatory environment. Using Virginia as a case study, the document illustrates how the tool identifies specific gaps—such as Virginia's lack of government procurement programs for CDR—and provides guidance on Terrestrial Enhanced Weathering (TEW) as a specific CDR approach. The tool is intended as an orientation and prioritization resource rather than a final siting mechanism.

The author contends that temporary carbon sequestration, such as carbon farming, is unsuitable for market-based mechanisms because it cannot store CO2 for the century-long timeframe required to meet Paris Agreement goals. The text criticizes the EU's proposed Carbon Removal Certification Framework for failing to exclude offsetting and double counting, while highlighting the technical inaccuracies of current monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) techniques. Instead of 'nature credits', the document proposes rewarding sustainable land management through a reformed Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and a dedicated EU fund for nature restoration.

The report provides a 'Bank of Evidence' detailing the failures and risks of geoengineering, categorized into carbon removal and solar radiation management. It highlights specific project failures in carbon capture and storage (CCS) in Australia, the UAE, and Canada, and critiques the ecological risks of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and direct air capture (DAC). The document also examines speculative solar radiation management (SRM) experiments in the US, UK, and Mexico, and various marine geoengineering attempts, asserting that these 'false solutions' often benefit the fossil fuel industry while threatening biodiversity and human rights.

The report documents the negative impacts and risks associated with various geoengineering 'false solutions,' including carbon capture and storage (CCS), bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), direct air capture (DAC), solar radiation management (SRM), and marine geoengineering. It provides specific examples of project failures, environmental hazards, and social injustices across Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and Latin America, asserting that these technologies often perpetuate the fossil fuel economy rather than solving the climate crisis.

The document provides a comprehensive critique of geoengineering, categorizing it into carbon removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM). It details specific failures and risks of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS/CCUS), Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), Direct Air Capture (DAC), and marine geoengineering across various global regions, emphasizing that these 'false solutions' often facilitate continued fossil fuel extraction through Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) and pose significant ecological and social threats.

The report summarizes a survey of 699 CDR researchers, finding that while experts predict multi-gigaton-scale removal by 2050, they identify market costs and policy gaps as primary barriers. Bioenergy Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and forest-based methods are expected to provide the largest shares of removal by 2075, with forest-based removal being the most cost-effective. Despite predicting a need for over 12 Gt of CDR to reach net-zero by 2075, respondents project actual removal levels to be significantly lower, suggesting a gap between necessity and expected implementation.

The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) urges the USDA to implement a high bar for quality when listing carbon credit protocols under the Greenhouse Gas Technical Assistance Provider and Third-Party Verifier Program. CATF argues that low-quality credits undermine market integrity and financial returns for landowners. They propose a framework based on four core competencies: non-permanence risk reduction, additionality and baseline establishment, quantification and monitoring, and leakage accounting. CATF specifically warns against listing soil carbon protocols due to durability and monitoring issues and suggests that the USDA provide information on non-offset mechanisms for climate-smart practices.

In 2023, solar and wind power continued to grow, with solar producing a record 5.5% of global electricity and wind reaching 7.8%. China was the primary driver for both, accounting for 51% of solar growth and 60% of wind additions. Conversely, coal generation reached a record high of 10,434 TWh (35% of the global mix), largely due to droughts in China reducing hydropower output, which fell by a record 88 TWh. Fossil gas remained the second-largest source at 23%, with growth driven by the US. Nuclear generation saw a slight rebound to 9.1% of the mix, while bioenergy reached a record 697 TWh (2.4%). The report notes that while solar and wind are on a positive trajectory, coal and gas must decline sharply, and nuclear and hydro must accelerate growth to meet IEA Net Zero Emissions targets by 2030.

The report argues that the EU is not on track to meet its 2030 and 2050 climate goals and must shift to an 'option-based' approach that integrates a broad range of low- and zero-carbon technologies. Key recommendations include scaling up carbon capture and storage (CCS), diversifying the energy mix with small modular reactors (SMRs), superhot rock geothermal, and fusion energy, and implementing a rigorous methane import standard. It emphasizes the need for a comprehensive green industrial strategy, a dedicated climate fund to replace the Recovery and Resilience Facility, and international cooperation to set global clean-tech standards.