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The Common Position of Latin America and the Caribbean on Climate Change and Health outlines a multisectoral framework to center health in climate governance. It identifies critical gaps, such as the fact that only 11 countries in the region have national health and climate change plans and only 11.6% of Green Climate Fund investments in the region address health. The position advocates for six pillars: protecting health from climate impacts, mitigation with health co-benefits, climate justice and equity, adaptation and health system resilience, health leadership, and financing.

The document critiques the current financial mechanisms of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, highlighting how the Global Environment Facility and private finance models perpetuate biodiversity loss. It identifies the role of banks in funding extractive industries and the 'predatory debt' cycles that force developing nations into nature-destroying exports. The author rejects biodiversity offsets and green bonds as 'false solutions' and calls for direct funding mechanisms for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs).

The document details the progress of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) toward a global plastics treaty, highlighting the divide between 'upstream' production controls and 'downstream' waste management. It discusses a 'non-paper' proposed by the chair to resolve 1,500 brackets of disagreed-upon text from INC-4, while noting that critical issues like plastic production, trade, and financial mechanisms remain unresolved.

The document examines the role of social protection—including contributory insurance and non-contributory transfers—in mitigating the economic shocks of climate change in Africa. It highlights the African Risk Capacity (ARC) and Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) as key models, while urging the use of international funds like the Loss and Damage Fund and Green Climate Fund to finance these systems.

The document examines how social protection—comprising non-contributory assistance, contributory insurance, and labour-market interventions—can mitigate the economic shocks of climate change in Africa. It highlights the African Risk Capacity (ARC) for sovereign risk pooling and Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) as key models for resilience. The author emphasizes that while climate change threatens to push 130 million people into poverty, leveraging multilateral funds like the Loss and Damage Fund and Green Climate Fund can finance the necessary social protection systems to protect the continent's most vulnerable.

The document uses the example of international firefighters collaborating to fight Canadian wildfires as a metaphor for the necessary global cooperation required to address climate change and biodiversity loss. It highlights recent multilateral successes, such as the Convention of Biological Diversity COP15 agreement, the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund, and the UN Treaty of the High Seas, as evidence of a positive trend in environmental diplomacy. The author emphasizes the ecological importance of the boreal forest, which contains 20 percent of the world's carbon, and calls for continued partnership between governments, Indigenous Peoples, and civil society at the Seventh GEF Assembly.

A coalition of development, faith-based, and environmental organizations requests that the U.S. government maintain $64.5 billion for foreign assistance in FY23 and maximize international climate finance to meet a $11.4 billion commitment. The letter specifies funding targets for bilateral programs, including adaptation and renewable energy, and multilateral funds such as the Green Climate Fund. The authors argue that such investments are essential for U.S. national security, global stability, and international credibility.

A coalition of development, faith-based, and environmental organizations is calling on the U.S. House of Representatives to maintain $64.5 billion for foreign assistance and maximize international climate finance for FY23. The group advocates for funding levels that align with President Biden's $11.4 billion commitment, specifically requesting $1.275 billion for bilateral environment programs and $2.485 billion for multilateral assistance, including $1.6 billion for the Green Climate Fund.

A coalition of environmental, faith-based, and policy organizations is calling on the U.S. Senate to maintain $64.5 billion for foreign assistance and maximize international climate finance to meet President Biden's $11.4 billion commitment. The letter specifies funding targets for bilateral programs, including adaptation and renewable energy, and multilateral funds such as the Green Climate Fund. The authors argue that these investments are essential for U.S. national security, global stability, and international credibility.

The briefing outlines a strategic framework for the Biden Administration to reengage in global climate action through four priorities: fulfilling and doubling the U.S. pledge to the Green Climate Fund, contributing to other multilateral institutions like the Adaptation Fund, integrating climate considerations across all development funding, and pushing multilateral development banks to align with the Paris Agreement.

The document argues that while the world possesses sufficient global financial assets to fund sustainable development, a significant financing gap and a persistent digital divide hinder the achievement of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. It traces the history of UN efforts from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration to the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, highlighting the critical need for technology transfer and financial mobilization for developing countries. The text notes that developed countries have struggled to meet the USD 100 billion annual climate finance goal and identifies barriers to technology diffusion, including intellectual property rights and insufficient absorptive capacities. It concludes by calling for better alignment between development cooperation and climate action to ensure financing does not undermine sustainable development.

The briefing argues that the Biden administration can reclaim U.S. climate leadership by submitting a robust national climate commitment (NDC) of 45-50% emissions reductions by 2030, increasing financial support for developing countries through the Green Climate Fund and other mechanisms, and integrating climate change as a core foreign policy issue through strategic bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

The chemical industry, with 2017 sales of US$5.7 trillion projected to reach US$11 trillion by 2030, does not pay for the health and environmental costs of its products. The document argues that the public currently bears these costs, including a global disease burden of 1.6 million annual premature deaths from chemical mismanagement. To address this, the authors propose a coordinated 0.5% fee on basic chemicals (feedstocks), which could raise US$11.5 billion annually. This funding would support the development and enforcement of laws and infrastructure for chemicals management, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, and would implement the 'polluter pays principle'.

The report examines how different climate funds can be combined to achieve results that exceed the capacity of any single mechanism. It identifies several types of synergies, including the scaling up of pilots, continuity of action, and the blending of qualitatively different financial instruments (e.g., grants and loans). The analysis highlights that while convergence of funding is common, synergies are often hindered by administrative misalignments, such as diverging approval processes and time gaps between project phases. Key drivers for success include strong national coordination, the use of country investment plans, and the role of 'local champions' and Direct Access Entities. The report recommends strengthening country-driven investment planning, harmonizing fund procedures, and improving cross-fund information sharing to maximize the effectiveness of climate finance.

The 2019 Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference, the longest in UNFCCC history, failed to reach a consensus on the operationalization of Article 6 regarding market and non-market mechanisms. While the conference achieved progress on the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage and the Lima Work Programme on Gender, it was marked by significant disconnects between scientific demands for ambition and the limitations of multilateral negotiations. Key unresolved issues, including long-term climate finance and common time frames for NDCs, were deferred to future sessions under Rule 16.

The meeting established the organizational framework for the Green Climate Fund's (GCF) first formal replenishment, including the adoption of rules of conduct and a workplan leading to a pledging conference in October 2019. Key outcomes include the definition of the Global Facilitator's role, the agreement to invite the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as an observer, and the initiation of analysis regarding minimum contribution thresholds for participation in consultations. The process will be guided by a performance review of the GCF and a strategic programming document focusing on mitigation and adaptation scenarios.

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) asserts that current financing for the sound management of chemicals is insufficient and overly dependent on a small number of international donors. CIEL highlights a stark disparity in Global Environment Facility (GEF) funding, noting that only 13 million was dedicated to SAICM implementation compared to 541 million for a smaller set of substances. The statement argues that the chemical industry, with a global turnover of 4.1 trillion per year, should contribute directly to financing rather than claiming that tax payments and regulatory compliance constitute active financial participation. CIEL suggests that a levy of 0.1% on industry turnover would generate 4.1 billion annually, far exceeding current GEF contributions to SAICM.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) offers developing countries a one-time grant of up to USD 3 million through its Readiness Programme to support country-driven adaptation activities and catalyze larger investments. To improve the quality of proposals, the GCF Secretariat identifies ten key criteria: clarifying focus (national, sectoral, or local), using country-specific impacts and vulnerabilities rather than templates, building private sector ownership, designing an adaptation investment vision, articulating a 'Theory of Change', avoiding duplication of existing assessments, integrating gender and social dimensions, engaging stakeholders including civil society and sub-national governments, aligning with other funds like the GEF and Adaptation Fund, and utilizing a phased approach for multiple proposals over time.

The paper examines climate finance for 15 Pacific Island states from 2010 to 2014, finding that 748 million USD was committed, primarily as grants and project-based support. Adaptation received the largest share of funding (59%), with bilateral channels providing 72% of the total. While the Global Environment Facility was the dominant multilateral source through 2014, the Green Climate Fund and Pilot Program for Climate Resilience have provided significant allocations since 2015.

Between 2010 and 2014, US$748 million in climate finance primarily targeting climate change was committed to 15 Pacific SIDS, predominantly as grants. The funding was split between adaptation (59%) and mitigation (36%), with 72% sourced through bilateral channels, led by Australia. The vast majority of support (86%) was project-based, with a heavy concentration in creating 'enabling environments' and renewable energy. The analysis notes that Polynesian countries were more successful in attracting diverse funding than Micronesian countries, and highlights significant differences in flexibility and transaction costs between bilateral and multilateral funding sources.