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The document analyzes the 2026 State of the European Union address, emphasizing that while the EU has made progress in clean electricity, it now faces a critical 'delivery' phase. It argues for a diverse energy mix including clean firm power, the acceleration of grid expansion to resolve connection bottlenecks, and the use of the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank to move projects to final investment decisions. Additionally, it stresses the importance of maintaining strong methane regulations and creating lead markets for low-carbon products to ensure industrial competitiveness and energy security.

The document evaluates the 2013 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), noting that while the share of stocks exploited at or below Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) rose from 50% in 2014 to 63% in 2022, environmental and socio-economic progress remains uneven. It highlights a disparity in the fishing fleet where small-scale coastal fisheries saw net profits grow by 131.9% between 2013 and 2023, while large-scale and distant water fisheries saw profits fall by 244.5% and 90.6% respectively, despite receiving significantly higher operating subsidies. The authors argue that current failures are due to implementation gaps rather than framework flaws, calling for the prohibition of capacity-enhancing subsidies, the protection of 30% of EU seas via a proposed European Ocean Act, and a shift toward low-impact, decarbonised fishing gear.

The paper argues that many large technology companies improperly apply market-based accounting to scope 3 emissions, creating a gap between reported reductions and actual environmental impact. It recommends that location-based accounting remain the primary basis for scope 3 reporting and Product Carbon Footprint (PCF) accounting, while suggesting that market-based accounting—specifically when paired with hourly matching and new Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) on the local grid—should only serve as a complementary ledger.

The document argues that major private credit rating agencies (CRAs) employ subjective, biased, and procyclical methodologies that unfairly increase the cost of capital for African nations. This 'credit rating impasse' hinders debt restructuring, limits the capacity of regional development banks, and obstructs the deployment of climate finance. To counter this, the African Union has endorsed the creation of the Africa Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) in Mauritius. The brief recommends that African states improve data transparency, enhance debt management capacity, and maintain macroeconomic stability to challenge inaccurate ratings and reduce borrowing costs.

The policy brief examines the proposed €100 billion Industrial Decarbonisation Bank (IDB) and argues that to avoid the bottlenecks seen in previous schemes like the Innovation Fund, the IDB must coordinate funding for shared infrastructure, use carbon contracts for difference (CCfDs), and strengthen demand signals for low-carbon products.

The European Central Bank (ECB) will introduce a 'climate factor' on 15 June 2026 to adjust the valuation of marketable assets issued by non-financial corporations used as collateral. The factor penalizes assets tied to high-emission activities based on sector-specific stressors, issuer-specific climate scores, and asset maturity. Reclaim Finance argues the measure is a positive step but suffers from transparency gaps and a flawed annual calculation cycle that may misrepresent risks for short-term assets. The briefing recommends making climate factors public, automating calculations, and extending the framework to credit claims and other asset classes to ensure comprehensive integration of climate risks into monetary policy.

The Canadian Climate Institute asserts that Canada's industrial carbon pricing framework is currently ineffective due to inconsistent rules and market failures. It criticizes the federal government's proposed updates to the national minimum standards (federal benchmark) as inadequate, warning that they could allow non-performing provincial systems to be deemed compliant. The Institute proposes three primary corrections: ensuring a real minimum carbon price of $130 per tonne by 2030, imposing non-negotiable conditions on provincial flexibility—such as strengthening emission performance standards and limiting compliance options—and requiring transparent, credible data on emitter compliance and actual prices paid to monitor performance.

The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) criticizes a $100 million DOE funding opportunity, "Improving Efficiency, Reliability, and Flexibility of Coal-Based Power Plants," for diverting funds from carbon capture innovation to refurbish aging coal plants. CATF asserts this violates the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), which mandates the development of transformational carbon capture technologies. Instead, CATF proposes that the DOE leverage the Office of Hydrocarbon and Geothermal Energy (HGEO) and the Office of Energy Dominance Financing (EDF) to prioritize enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and the build-out of CO2 pipelines. The document highlights that the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) of 2025 has increased the 45Q tax credit for EOR to $85 per ton, creating a timely opportunity for deployment, particularly in Wyoming and North Dakota. CATF recommends using Other Transaction Authority (OTA) and FAST-41 permitting to accelerate infrastructure development and hosting industry convenings in Q1 2026 to better align funding notices with industry needs.

The report advocates for 'Indigenous Healthy Energy Homes'—housing that is energy-efficient, climate-resilient, and supportive of occupant well-being—as a means to improve health outcomes for First Nations, Inuit, and Métis people while contributing to Canada's net-zero goals. It identifies current government solutions as fragmented and disconnected from local realities, often failing to account for long-term health costs and greenhouse gas emissions associated with inadequate housing. The authors call for a shift from one-time project funding to long-term, flexible, and self-determined financial partnerships. Key recommendations include the creation of intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, the co-design of policies with Indigenous leaders, and the implementation of holistic measurement tools to track social, cultural, and environmental impacts of housing projects.

The Canadian Climate Institute argues that Canada's upcoming progress report on its 2030 emissions targets will likely show the country is off track. To make the report a useful tool for correction, the Institute recommends including detailed policy implementation updates, rigorous and recent emissions projections based on real policies rather than backcasting, specific details on additional measures to close the emissions gap, and new progress indicators beyond simple emission reductions.

The Canadian Climate Institute argues that Canada is currently off track to meet its 2026 and 2030 emissions targets. To make the upcoming federal progress report useful, the Institute recommends providing detailed policy implementation updates, using rigorous and recent emissions projections based on actual policy rather than backcasting, offering a substantive assessment of additional measures to close the emissions gap, and introducing new progress indicators beyond simple emissions reductions.

The document advocates for a transition from a representation-based Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda to a substantive feminist approach within ECOWAS. It highlights a gap between existing regional gender-justice frameworks and their practical application, noting that patriarchal power structures continue to drive conflict. The author recommends that ECOWAS institutionalise partnerships with grassroots movements, incorporate intersectionality into its Conflict Prevention Framework, and adopt feminist responses to climate insecurity and security sector reform to achieve lasting social transformation.

The document highlights a critical adaptation finance gap in Africa, noting that the continent requires between $187–359 billion annually but faces an 80% shortfall in adaptation investment. It identifies the South African G20 presidency as a strategic opportunity to shift climate finance from debt-creating loans to grants and concessional funding. Key recommendations include scaling locally led adaptation, implementing debt-for-climate swaps, and reforming Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to ensure at least 50% of climate finance for African Least Developed Countries is provided as grants or highly concessional finance.

The document argues that while WTO rules provide policy space for LDCs to build climate-resilient agriculture, these countries often lack the financial and technical capacity to utilize them. It recommends targeted assistance through Aid for Trade to design compliant subsidies, mapping of climate technologies to facilitate TRIPS-compliant transfers, and the establishment of exemptions for LDCs from food and fertilizer export bans to ensure food security amid climate shocks.

The document argues that Ukraine's post-war recovery, with estimated long-term needs exceeding USD 524 billion, offers a unique opportunity to implement a 'build forward better' approach. It recommends the creation of a unified national green recovery strategy aligned with EU standards, the strengthening of local government capacity, and the coordination of ESG safeguards by international financial institutions. Additionally, it suggests enhancing the Digital Restoration Ecosystem for Accountable Management (DREAM) platform with environmental indicators and emissions calculators to track climate performance.

The document discusses how developing countries can use the results of the first global stocktake to refine their national adaptation plans (NAPs), advocate for implementation support, and contribute to future global assessments to ensure their priorities are represented in the global goal on adaptation.

The briefing highlights the failure of EU Member States to reach target fishing mortality by January 2025 under the Western Mediterranean multiannual plan (West Med MAP). It criticizes the lack of transparency in the 'compensation mechanism' used to reclaim fishing days and calls for robust actions, including strengthened fishing mortality reductions, safeguard measures for critically depleted stocks, and enhanced selectivity and control systems.

The report analyzes the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of climate-vulnerable countries—specifically the Maldives, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Saint Lucia—to provide a blueprint for G20 nations. It highlights best practices such as integrating mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage into single strategies, and prioritizing climate-resilient development over short-term fossil fuel gains. The document urges G20 members to submit updated NDCs by September 2025 that target at least a 43% emissions reduction by 2030 and 60% by 2035, while scaling up financial support to close a $5.8–5.9 trillion financing gap for developing countries.

The document argues that African countries face a precarious development finance landscape due to declining official development assistance (ODA) and a market bias known as the 'Africa premium'. It proposes that South Africa use its G20 presidency to advocate for a technical committee on financing barriers, host a Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable meeting on restructuring, facilitate dialogue with the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions, and coordinate with international conferences to promote a more equitable financial system.

The document examines the differing motivations for green industrialisation between African nations, which prioritise economic diversification and job creation, and high-income countries, which focus on decarbonisation and geopolitical competitiveness. It highlights the financial gap facing developing countries, noting that adaptation finance needs are projected to reach USD 215-387 billion annually until 2030. The author argues that while developed nations use industrial policies to secure critical raw materials and maintain a competitive edge, Africa seeks to transition from raw material exports to value addition. To bridge these gaps, the paper recommends that the G20 facilitate affordable green technology transfer, coordinate non-debt-creating climate finance, and support the establishment of mineral value chains close to their source in Africa.