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Friends of the Earth International argues that EU legislation on mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence (HREDD) must move beyond procedural requirements to establish substantive obligations and strict legal liability. The organization demands that the law cover all company sizes and sectors, include criminal and civil liability for parent companies and their directors, and provide robust access to justice for affected persons, including the reversal of the burden of proof and the creation of legal funds.

Friends of the Earth International argues that the proposed EU corporate sustainability due diligence legislation must move beyond procedural requirements to establish substantive obligations and strict liability for companies. The document asserts that EU law should complement a legally binding UN instrument to end corporate impunity, ensuring that parent companies are held administratively, civilly, and criminally liable for damages caused by their subsidiaries and value chains globally. Key demands include the inversion of the burden of proof, the recognition of the right to free, prior and informed consent for affected communities, and the provision of effective legal remedies in EU courts for victims, including those in the Global South.

Friends of the Earth International argues that EU legislation on mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence (HREDD) must move beyond procedural 'box-ticking' to establish substantive obligations and strict liability for parent companies. The document demands that the law include criminal, civil, and administrative liability for companies and their decision-makers, reverse the burden of proof in legal claims, and ensure that EU national courts are accessible to affected people worldwide. It further asserts that EU law must complement a legally binding instrument at the UN (UN LBI) to eliminate corporate impunity and prioritize human rights over trade and investment agreements.

A Global Witness investigation warns that the rehabilitation of the Lobito Corridor railway in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) threatens low-income residents of Kolwezi with forced evictions. The report highlights a critical gap in legal protections, as the project is governed by the 1977 Law of Expropriation for Public Utility—which only requires compensation—rather than the more stringent 2002 Mining Code. Legal ambiguities regarding land titles, particularly those involving the national rail company (SNCC), and disputes over the width of the railway's buffer zone further expose residents to displacement. The report argues that the EU's Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) could provide a mechanism for accountability for companies like Trafigura and Mota-Engil, provided the law is not weakened by proposed amendments. It concludes with recommendations for the EU, the DRC government, and investors to implement meaningful consultations, independent monitoring, and higher resettlement standards.

The author argues that despite the absence of a functioning Appellate Body, the WTO dispute settlement system remains resilient because panels continue to follow established jurisprudence, which has become an 'informal constitution' for the organization. While the US continues to challenge the system's authority, particularly regarding national security exceptions, other members are experimenting with ad hoc arbitration like the MPIA. The author suggests that a new appellate court could function even without mandatory US jurisdiction and argues that restoring the original system should not be the sole priority given other urgent global trade challenges.

The document identifies three primary areas of potential conflict between the Kyoto Protocol and WTO rules: flexibility mechanisms, domestic policies and measures, and compliance enforcement. It analyzes how emissions trading, carbon taxes, efficiency standards, and subsidies could be interpreted as violations of WTO principles such as the most-favoured nation (MFN) principle or the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). The author argues that while these conflicts are serious, they can be avoided through proactive treaty design and the creation of institutional bridges between trade and environmental governance.

The document examines the tension between the precautionary principle—which advocates for protective action despite scientific uncertainty—and WTO rules that often require risk assessments and the least trade-restrictive measures. It highlights divergent North American and European approaches to risk assessment and discusses how the principle interacts with GATT, the TBT Agreement, and the SPS Agreement. The text argues that the WTO's current framework is ill-equipped for scientific uncertainty and suggests potential guidelines for applying precaution, including proportionality, transparency, and regular review.

The author contends that the environment has secured an established place in the WTO, not through the Committee on Trade and Environment or Doha Round negotiations, but via the Appellate Body's role in filling legal gaps and clarifying ambiguities. The document highlights how the Appellate Body has integrated international environmental law into trade disputes, provided a framework for the precautionary principle, and allowed for certain Process and Production Methods (PPMs) distinctions under General Exceptions. While developing countries remain cautious due to fears of protectionism, the author suggests that the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism has effectively bridged the gap between trade liberalization and sustainable development.

In a referendum on April 21, Ecuadorian citizens voted to maintain Article 422 of the 2008 Constitution, which prohibits the use of international arbitration for disputes between Ecuador and foreign investors. This decision follows negative experiences with the ISDS system, including a 2012 ruling requiring payment of over $1.5 billion to Occidental Petroleum, which represented nearly 9% of the country's 2012 annual budget. The document asserts that ISDS mechanisms have historically hindered climate policies and social justice, particularly in the mining, oil, and gas sectors. The referendum result signals that any future investment treaties must provide adequate protection for the environment, local communities, and climate action.

The Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement aims to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to developing economies and least-developed countries by improving transparency, simplifying administrative procedures, and promoting sustainable investment. While 117 WTO members have participated in the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) to finalize the text, the agreement faces significant hurdles for formal integration into the WTO system. Opponents, including India and South Africa, argue that such plurilateral initiatives undermine the WTO's consensus-based mandate and distract from the Doha Development Agenda. Proponents view the agreement as a way to modernize the WTO's negotiating function through 'variable geometry.' The agreement includes special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing nations, allowing for flexible implementation timelines and capacity-building support.

The document examines the complex interactions between the multilateral trading system, primarily the World Trade Organization (WTO), and international environmental governance, including Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). It analyzes how trade liberalization can both benefit and harm the environment through scale, structural, and product effects. The text details the legal tensions surrounding Process and Production Methods (PPMs), intellectual property rights (TRIPS), and agricultural subsidies, while advocating for the 'mutual support' of trade and environmental goals. It also explores the role of regional trade agreements as laboratories for innovative environmental governance and emphasizes the importance of capacity building and environmental impact assessments in trade policy.

The document analyzes how trade liberalization affects the environment through product, scale, structural, and direct effects. It examines the legal tensions between World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), specifically focusing on Process and Production Methods (PPMs), intellectual property rights (TRIPS), and agricultural subsidies. It argues that trade liberalization does not automatically harm or help the environment, but its outcome depends on the integration of economic and environmental policies.

The joint submission by CIEL, IISD, and ClientEarth asserts that ISDS mechanisms create a 'regulatory chill' that hinders states from implementing climate and environmental policies. It highlights that while investment treaties have negligible effects on promoting foreign direct investment, they impose significant costs on states, particularly in the Global South, by allowing investors to challenge environmental regulations. The authors recommend the termination of old-generation treaties, the carving out of climate measures from ISDS scope, and a shift toward resolving disputes in domestic courts.

The report examines how NAFTA's Chapter 11 shifts international investment law from protecting investors against egregious state acts to creating broad private economic rights. It argues that the current framework lacks transparency and institutional legitimacy, potentially creating a 'regulatory chill' where governments fear enacting environmental or health laws due to the risk of expensive compensation claims. The authors suggest that the 'scale of impact' test used in cases like Metalclad effectively eliminates the traditional 'police powers' rule, which previously exempted non-discriminatory public welfare regulations from being classified as expropriation. The document recommends amending Chapter 11 to include sustainable investment mandates and clearer carve-outs for legitimate public regulation.

The document argues that NAFTA's Chapter XI creates a system of international economic rights for private investors that can override national public welfare regulations. It analyzes key disciplines—national treatment, minimum standard of treatment, performance requirements, and expropriation—concluding that broad interpretations by arbitral tribunals risk creating 'regulatory chill' and undermining environmental management. The author criticizes the lack of transparency and institutional legitimacy in the investor-state dispute settlement process and proposes amendments to promote sustainable investment and protect the state's right to regulate.

The report argues that NAFTA's Chapter 11 has evolved from a defensive mechanism to an offensive strategic tool used by foreign investors to challenge public welfare and environmental laws. It identifies significant substantive uncertainties regarding national treatment, performance requirements, and expropriation, which may force governments to pay damages for non-discriminatory environmental measures. The authors recommend the adoption of a legally binding interpretive statement by the NAFTA parties to clarify these disciplines and a shift toward greater transparency in the arbitration process to restore democratic legitimacy.

The report argues that NAFTA's Chapter 11, while intended to protect foreign investors, has become an 'offensive strategic tool' used to challenge environmental laws in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The authors highlight that broad definitions of 'measures' and 'investments,' combined with a secretive arbitration process (the 'Cone of Silence'), create a 'regulatory freeze' where governments fear adopting new environmental protections due to potential compensation claims. To mitigate this, the report recommends that NAFTA parties adopt a legally binding interpretive statement to clarify non-discrimination and expropriation disciplines, and increase transparency in the dispute process to restore democratic legitimacy.

The document outlines a legal conflict where Canada-based Methanex Corporation sought over $900 million from the United States after California banned MTBE to protect drinking water. It focuses on the IISD's request to the arbitral tribunal for amicus status, oral submission rights, and observer status to represent public interests and sustainable development principles. While Methanex opposed the intervention, the United States and Canada supported it, leading to a January 2001 tribunal ruling that it has the authority to accept written amicus briefs.

The document discusses the effort to end the "culture of impunity" regarding gross human rights violations and international humanitarian law. It specifically examines the impetus for establishing specialised criminal tribunals in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and East Timor, while noting that significant obstacles remain in the path of these proposed legal mechanisms.

The document analyzes the anti-corruption framework in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2003 to 2006, assessing the effectiveness of existing laws and institutions. It identifies factors contributing to their success or failure and highlights gaps in national legislation relative to international legal instruments. The monograph concludes by proposing priority measures to improve the legal and institutional framework for combating corruption.