La protección de los derechos de los inversionistas y del bienestar público: Evaluación del Capítulo XI del TLCAN

The document argues that NAFTA's Chapter XI creates a system of international economic rights for private investors that can override national public welfare regulations. It analyzes key disciplines—national treatment, minimum standard of treatment, performance requirements, and expropriation—concluding that broad interpretations by arbitral tribunals risk creating 'regulatory chill' and undermining environmental management. The author criticizes the lack of transparency and institutional legitimacy in the investor-state dispute settlement process and proposes amendments to promote sustainable investment and protect the state's right to regulate.

• The evolution of investment law, exemplified by NAFTA Chapter XI, has shifted from protecting assets against grave government actions to creating broad international economic rights for private actors that can bypass national legal systems.
• The interpretation of 'national treatment' under Article 1102 is problematic because it lacks clear criteria for determining 'similar circumstances,' potentially allowing investors to challenge general public welfare measures as discriminatory.
• The 'minimum standard of treatment' (Article 1105) has been interpreted broadly by tribunals, as seen in the Metalclad case, where a lack of transparency and failure to follow domestic law were deemed violations of international standards.
• The prohibition of 'performance requirements' (Article 1106) may be used by investors to challenge non-discriminatory general regulations, such as import bans, by arguing they effectively force the use of local substitutes.
• The interpretation of 'expropriation' under Article 1110 has expanded to include 'regulatory takings,' where any government measure that significantly impacts an investor's expected economic benefit may require compensation, regardless of the public interest served.
• The investor-state dispute settlement mechanism lacks transparency and institutional legitimacy, operating largely in secret and allowing parties to select their own arbitrators without a formal appeals process.
• The document suggests that a formal amendment to Chapter XI is necessary, as interpretive declarations are insufficient to provide the institutional solidity or the ability to mandate sustainable investment practices.

APA

Mann, H., & von Moltke, K. (n.d.). La protección de los derechos de los inversionistas y del bienestar público: Evaluación del Capítulo XI del TLCAN. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/investment_ilsd_background_es.pdf

Chicago

Mann, Howard, and Konrad von Moltke. La protección de los derechos de los inversionistas y del bienestar público: Evaluación del Capítulo XI del TLCAN. International Institute for Sustainable Development, n.d. https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/investment_ilsd_background_es.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Mann |first1=Howard |last2=von Moltke |first2=Konrad |title=La protección de los derechos de los inversionistas y del bienestar público: Evaluación del Capítulo XI del TLCAN |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |url=https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/investment_ilsd_background_es.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{mannndproteccin, author = {Mann, Howard and von Moltke, Konrad}, title = {{La protección de los derechos de los inversionistas y del bienestar público: Evaluación del Capítulo XI del TLCAN}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, url = {https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/investment_ilsd_background_es.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }