Sans appel mais pas sans attrait : le règlement des différends de l’OMC sans l’organe d’appel

The author argues that despite the absence of a functioning Appellate Body, the WTO dispute settlement system remains resilient because panels continue to follow established jurisprudence, which has become an 'informal constitution' for the organization. While the US continues to challenge the system's authority, particularly regarding national security exceptions, other members are experimenting with ad hoc arbitration like the MPIA. The author suggests that a new appellate court could function even without mandatory US jurisdiction and argues that restoring the original system should not be the sole priority given other urgent global trade challenges.

• The WTO dispute settlement system has not collapsed despite the absence of the Appellate Body, as members continue to submit a steady stream of disputes to the panel process.
• WTO panels have largely maintained legal stability by continuing to apply the precedents and jurisprudence established by the former Appellate Body, effectively treating them as an 'informal constitution'.
• The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) serves as an institutionalized ad hoc alternative for appeal, involving over two dozen members including China, Japan, and the EU.
• The United States has consistently maintained that the national security exception under GATT Article XXI is determined unilaterally and does not require justification, leading the Biden administration to repudiate panel decisions against the US on this ground.
• The author proposes that a new appellate court could achieve legitimacy even if the US does not accept its mandatory jurisdiction, similar to how the International Court of Justice operates.
• Restoring the original dispute settlement system is not the only priority for the WTO, as other issues such as fisheries subsidies, special and differential treatment for developing countries, and trade finance are equally urgent.

APA

Howse, R. (n.d.). Sans appel mais pas sans attrait : le règlement des différends de l’OMC sans l’organe d’appel. International Institute for Sustainable Development. https://www.iisd.org/fr/articles/policy-analysis/sans-appel-mais-pas-sans-attrait-le-reglement-des-differends-de-lomc-sans

Chicago

Howse, Robert. Sans appel mais pas sans attrait : le règlement des différends de l’OMC sans l’organe d’appel. International Institute for Sustainable Development, n.d. https://www.iisd.org/fr/articles/policy-analysis/sans-appel-mais-pas-sans-attrait-le-reglement-des-differends-de-lomc-sans.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Howse |first1=Robert |title=Sans appel mais pas sans attrait : le règlement des différends de l’OMC sans l’organe d’appel |publisher=International Institute for Sustainable Development |url=https://www.iisd.org/fr/articles/policy-analysis/sans-appel-mais-pas-sans-attrait-le-reglement-des-differends-de-lomc-sans |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{howsendsans, author = {Howse, Robert}, title = {{Sans appel mais pas sans attrait : le règlement des différends de l’OMC sans l’organe d’appel}}, institution = {International Institute for Sustainable Development}, url = {https://www.iisd.org/fr/articles/policy-analysis/sans-appel-mais-pas-sans-attrait-le-reglement-des-differends-de-lomc-sans}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }