Search Climate Insights Directory

The research paper argues that South Africa's military involvement in the Central African Republic (CAR) is driven by a desire to contest Western influence and secure resource interests. It highlights the CAR's wealth in diamonds, uranium, and potential oil, which has attracted Chinese investment and caused friction with France. The author notes that South Africa's efforts to resist 'western interference' have been undermined by a lack of regional diplomatic support and insufficient intelligence infrastructure, leading to a 'humiliating experience' in the face of more established international rivals.

The author argues that BRICS is primarily a geopolitical vehicle designed to resist G-7 dominance, which makes a comprehensive trade agreement unlikely due to 'destructive competition' and internal trade disputes. While the group has successfully collaborated on multilateral WTO negotiations and 'low politics' issues like customs procedures, deep integration is avoided to prevent polarising debates. The document also notes South Africa's attempt to position itself as a 'gateway to Africa' within the BRICS framework.

The research paper analyzes Senegal's strategic relationship with Guinea-Bissau from 2000 to 2012. It argues that under President Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal exercised a policy of patronage and influence over its smaller neighbor to secure military cooperation against the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC). This influence was built on Senegal's relative economic power, diplomatic networks, and direct financial support to Guinean leaders and military officials. However, the document notes a decline in Senegalese influence after 2009 due to the deaths of key allies and the emergence of Angola as a primary diplomatic and financial partner for Guinea-Bissau.

The document analyzes Senegal's foreign policy since 2000, noting a transition from 'classic' diplomacy to a 'technicized' approach where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost its monopoly to specialized ministries and non-state actors. It highlights the 'hyper-power' of the presidency, the marginalization of the legislative and judicial branches, and a strategic shift toward emerging economic partners like China and Dubai. The paper concludes that while President Abdoulaye Wade's tenure was marked by high personalization and pan-Africanist ambitions, the 2012 election of Macky Sall signaled a return to more traditional diplomatic relations, particularly with France and neighboring states.

The document analyzes Senegalese foreign policy under President Abdoulaye Wade (2000–2012) and the transition to President Macky Sall. It highlights a shift from 'classical' diplomacy led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs toward a more technical, economy-centered approach involving non-state actors and specialized ministries. The paper emphasizes the 'hyper-power' of the presidency over the legislature and judiciary in external affairs. Key trends include a realignment toward emerging economic powers like China and Dubai, a revival of Pan-Africanist goals through the African Union and Nepad, and a high degree of personalization in diplomacy under Wade. Following the 2012 election, the author notes a return to traditional diplomacy, characterized by restored ties with France and improved relations with neighbors like Gambia and Mauritania.

The document examines the evolving relationship between France and Senegal, highlighting a shift from exclusive ties to a more diversified partnership under President Abdoulaye Wade. While France remains the primary economic partner and donor, the paper details periods of diplomatic tension, the reduction of French military presence, and a renewed cordiality following the 2012 elections of Macky Sall and François Hollande.

The research paper investigates whether the South African Customs Union (SACU) is ready to transition from a Common Monetary Area (CMA) to a full monetary union. Using Southern African Development Community (SADC) convergence criteria, the authors find that while there is strong convergence in inflation, national debt, and reserve holdings, significant volatility and lack of discipline in fiscal deficits—particularly in Lesotho and Swaziland—remain a primary hurdle. The study suggests that a monetary union would be beneficial and that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) could continue to lead monetary policy, provided fiscal coordination is improved.

The document examines Brazil's shift in foreign policy from traditional non-intervention toward a more active role in UN peacekeeping and the development of the 'Responsibility while Protecting' (RwP) concept. It argues that these diplomatic shifts are driven by Brazil's ambition to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The author analyzes the practical application of 'non-indifference' in Haiti and the theoretical framework of RwP, which emerged as a response to perceived excesses in the 2011 military intervention in Libya. The paper concludes that RwP is a refinement of the existing 'Responsibility to Protect' (RtoP) framework, focusing on the accountability and monitoring of those authorized to use force.

The document examines the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the global transition to clean energy, arguing that they are essential for motivating the private sector to innovate and lower costs. While acknowledging that IPRs can be a barrier for least-developed countries (LDCs) that rely on imitation, the author contends that the benefits of IPRs generally outweigh the costs. The paper highlights the concentration of clean energy patents in the US, Japan, and Germany, while noting China's rapid growth in the sector. It proposes a shift in terminology from 'technology transfer' to 'technology diffusion' and suggests a combination of IPR protection, public funding for basic research, and global finance mechanisms for demonstration projects to close the innovation gap in developing nations. A case study on the Kimberley Mechanism in South Africa illustrates how patenting can enable the development of low-cost concentrating solar power (CSP) components.

The G-20 is not fully satisfying any of the five parts of the test, and therefore fails to reach its full potential as a global economic governance actor.

South Africa has based its BRICS membership on national interest, regional integration, and infrastructure development, viewing the latter two as essential for the continent's growth and its own economic fortunes. While critics argue South Africa represents its own national interests rather than the continent's, the document suggests South Africa can provide a platform to reframe Africa's trade relations with emerging economies away from commodity exports. The text notes that BRICS-Africa trade has grown tenfold since 2002 to approximately US$340bn, and emphasizes that South Africa's leadership must be complemented by bilateral engagement with other regional anchors like Nigeria to be successful.

The statement analyzes South Africa's role in the BRICS forum and its aspirations for global governance reform, while cautioning that domestic instability and military setbacks in the Central African Republic may undermine its international prestige and leadership in Africa.

The 2013 BRICS Youth Communiqué outlines a series of recommendations for the proposed BRICS Development Bank (BDB), advocating for an independent institution that is inclusive of all member nations regardless of financial status. The youth propose locating the bank in either Shanghai, China, or South Africa, utilizing the Chinese Renminbi (Yuan) as the primary currency, and establishing branches in each member state. The communiqué emphasizes a focus on the developing world, suggesting a phased approach starting with pilot projects within BRICS nations and the creation of a dedicated youth programme funding area for education and employment.

Mozambique faces significant development hurdles despite high economic growth, primarily due to a severe domestic skills shortage and uncompetitive business environment. The report suggests that the government should leverage regional resources and liberalise foreign labour regulations to facilitate skills transfer and economic growth.

The 2013 Kenyan elections occur under a new 2010 constitution designed to reduce ethnic polarisation by requiring presidential candidates to secure broad geographic support across 47 counties. Despite these reforms and the introduction of biometric voter registration to prevent rigging, significant risks remain, including endemic ethnic politics, high youth unemployment, and land disputes in the Coast Province. A primary source of instability is the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments against Jubilee Coalition candidates Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, which have strained relations with the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, and could lead to Kenya's withdrawal from the Statute of Rome.

The policy brief examines South Africa's role as a 'gateway to Africa' within the BRICS group, arguing that the country must move from rhetoric to a concrete commercial diplomacy strategy to secure tangible economic gains. It highlights the growth of BRICS-Africa trade and investment, while noting that engagement remains largely bilateral and continues a pattern of Africa exporting raw materials and importing manufactured goods. The author recommends that South Africa prioritize bilateral relations with key African states and utilize development finance institutions to support regional integration and infrastructure.

The document argues that Uganda's current legal framework, specifically the Companies Bill of 2009 and the Petroleum Bills of 2012, is insufficient for the governance of its proposed national oil company (NOC) because it focuses on shareholders rather than a broader range of stakeholders. By contrasting this with Norway's model—which utilizes the Department of State Ownership to enforce transparency, performance targets, and independent board control—the author recommends that Uganda enact mandatory corporate governance guidelines for SOEs and establish a central supervisory institution to prevent corruption and government interference.

The document finds that while trade among BRICS nations has grown, intra-BRICS FDI remains low and lacks strategic policy direction. Most BRICS countries rely on traditional investors from the EU, US, and Japan, though China, India, and Brazil have increased resource-seeking investments in Africa. The briefing recommends collaborative research, comparative studies of investment frameworks, and improved statistics to foster sustainable, development-oriented FDI within the bloc.

The Platinum Sector Peace and Stability Accord aims to end violence and lawlessness at South African platinum mines by committing signatories to denounce intimidation and forbid weapons on mining property. While it provides a framework for managing conflict and addressing the 'winner-takes-all' union recognition system—which has fueled rivalry between the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU)—it does not address systemic industry crises. The sector faces stagnant global demand, oversupply, and rising input costs, with electricity prices increasing by 238% since 2007. Consequently, the industry faces grim short-to-medium term prospects, including potential large-scale job losses through restructuring at companies like Anglo Platinum.

The document outlines the regional expansion of Capricorn Investment Holdings (CIH) from Namibia into Botswana and Zambia, detailing the regulatory, fiscal, and infrastructural challenges encountered. Key barriers identified include the absence of double taxation agreements with Zambia, skill shortages in Namibia, and the high cost of compulsory IT system localisation. CIH advocates for a regional currency within SADC to reduce exchange rate volatility and suggests that Southern African countries should specialise in specific services to foster genuine regional integration.