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The paper argues that SADC's integration efforts have been hindered by weak leadership, a lack of enforcement powers in its Secretariat, and a reluctance by member states to cede sovereignty. It suggests that President Ramaphosa's background in mining could drive a future-oriented regional mining strategy, particularly regarding minerals for renewable energy batteries, and that strengthening the SADC Parliament is necessary to ensure regional policies are domesticated into national laws.

The document evaluates Morocco's readiness for Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to adopt its national systems for procurement and environmental safeguards. It highlights that while Morocco has made significant progress in public financial management and has been a pioneer in adopting the African Development Bank's UCS, gaps remain in complaint-handling mechanisms and the inclusion of climate change in environmental impact assessments. The paper recommends that MDBs leverage the local banking sector and establish local offices to better integrate with national systems.

The policy brief examines the decline of human rights as a cornerstone of South African foreign policy, contrasting the country's strong domestic human rights framework with its controversial voting record at the UN Security Council and UN Human Rights Council. The author contends that this 'de-norming' undermines South Africa's role as a bridge-builder and normative leader in Africa and the Global South. To reverse this trend, the document recommends a three-point action plan: reconceptualising human rights diplomacy through a national 'indaba', strengthening bilateral ties with human rights-promoting nations, and increasing civil society pressure for government accountability.

The document analyzes the institutionalization of 'Xi Jinping Thought' and its impact on China-Africa relations, highlighting five trends: the centrality of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), support for UN reform, an expanded global military role, and stricter internet governance. It warns that while China offers development alternatives to the West, these trends may increase debt burdens, promote illiberal internet regimes, and increase the militarization of the continent.

The document analyzes the difficulties in establishing the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) compared to the Global Compact on Refugees, citing domestic political pressures, populism, and a lack of UN leadership. It highlights the unequal nature of migration negotiations between the African Union and the European Union, where the EU prioritizes border control while African nations focus on development. The author critiques the GCM's zero draft as a non-binding 'wish list' that lacks accountability mechanisms, though it notes the potential of its proposed capacity-building mechanism to support African regional migration goals.

The research paper evaluates South Africa's foreign policy during the presidency of Jacob Zuma, highlighting the shift toward emerging powers like China and the BRICS grouping while noting a decline in human rights commitments and strained relations with the West. It contrasts Zuma's multilateral approach with the 'African Renaissance' focus of his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, and argues that domestic issues like xenophobia and the Marikana Massacre have damaged South Africa's continental leadership and global image.

The author identifies three critical areas for reform under President Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership: restoring the rule of law to combat state capture, reforming the management of state-owned enterprises to spur economic growth, and investing in education to address a 39% youth unemployment rate. The text highlights the potential of South Africa's chrome and manganese deposits for the 'Fourth Industrial Revolution' and suggests that domestic stability will allow the country to reassert its regional influence and leverage memberships in groups like BRICS.

The statement outlines a roadmap for South Africa's recovery, emphasizing the need to combat state capture and corruption to restore the rule of law. It specifically highlights the necessity of restructuring Eskom, finalizing renewable energy contracts, and leveraging critical minerals for the Fourth Industrial Revolution to drive economic growth and job creation.

The document argues that while there is significant overlap between G20 initiatives, the AU Agenda 2063, and the UN 2030 Agenda, the G20 can further support Africa by addressing gaps in regional economic integration, infrastructure financing, and inequality. It recommends that African G20 participants, particularly South Africa, prioritize areas where the G20 adds value to the African development agenda and advocate for a development-focused global dialogue on inequality.

The paper argues that a SACU development fund could transition the union from a simple revenue-sharing mechanism to an active agent of regional economic integration. By analyzing the EU's ESI Funds and the CARICOM Development Fund (CDF), the author suggests that such a fund could address critical trade barriers—such as infrastructure deficits in energy and water, and lack of standards harmonization—while providing a more accountable alternative to direct budget transfers to member states. Key recommendations include adopting a clear, measurable mandate, implementing a nuanced classification of member states' development levels for equitable resource allocation, and incorporating private-sector representation in governance.

The document examines Bangladesh's cautious approach to plurilateral trade agreements (PTAs) against the backdrop of its planned graduation from LDC status by 2024. While the government remains neutral and prefers the inclusive multilateral system, the private sector sees PTAs as a way to build global alliances and prepare for the loss of LDC preferences. GTAP CGE modelling suggests that Bangladesh would benefit most from joining the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), while gains from the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) and Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) would be marginal, and the Information Technology Agreement II (ITA-II) would offer the least benefit.

The research examines the fragmented nature of migration regulation across three African regional economic communities (RECs)—SADC, EAC, and Comesa—and their integration into the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). While the EAC has made significant progress in ratifying and implementing protocols for the free movement of labour and persons, SADC and Comesa suffer from low ratification rates and a tendency to treat economic migration as a national security threat. The document highlights that the TFTA, which covers 26 states with a combined GDP of $1.2 trillion, requires the removal of migration barriers to achieve its market integration goals. Case studies of Tanzania and Rwanda illustrate the tension between regional liberalisation and domestic protectionism, as well as the benefits of an economically driven migration policy. The authors argue that for the TFTA to succeed, RECs must move beyond a security-centric approach and link migration policies to economic imperatives.

The document examines Chile's trade policy, highlighting its preference for bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) over certain plurilateral agreements. It details Chile's strategic shift toward services trade to compensate for a diminished manufacturing base and analyzes the economic rationale behind its participation in the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) and its non-participation in the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), and Information Technology Agreement (ITA-II).

The document examines Malawi's position regarding four plurilateral trade agreements: the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), the Information Technology Agreement II (ITA-II), and the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA). While government officials suggest that TiSA and ITA-II could boost industrialization and competitiveness, GTAP modelling indicates that overall gains from participating in these negotiations would be very small or non-existent. Malawi currently faces significant challenges, including an undiversified export base dominated by tobacco, high costs of doing business, and limited human and financial capacity within the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism to engage effectively in complex WTO negotiations.

The report examines why developing countries and LDCs often avoid plurilateral trade agreements (PTAs), specifically the TiSA, GPA, EGA, and ITA-II. While quantitative modelling shows small positive aggregate gains in GDP, investment, and welfare for participants, qualitative findings reveal that these are often outweighed by a desire to maintain policy space, a lack of technical capacity, and distrust of agendas set by developed nations. The report argues that the stagnation of the WTO Doha Development Round (DDR), particularly regarding agriculture and non-agricultural market access, further discourages participation.

The document argues that the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system is flawed due to a lack of representation for the Global South, a lack of checks and balances, and jurisprudential incoherence. It examines 'revolutionary' European proposals like the Investment Court System (ICS) in the TTIP and CETA, which introduce permanent judges and appellate mechanisms. It also analyzes the more ad hoc responses of India, which introduced a model BIT requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies, and South Africa, which replaced BITs with the Protection of Investment Act 2015 to shift toward state-to-state arbitration. The author recommends that African nations avoid purely domestic remedies and instead pursue regional, institutionalized court systems—such as an AU-EU or China-Africa Investment Court—to ensure fair representation and legal coherence.

The paper examines the decline of internet freedoms in Africa, noting that at least 10 states shut down internet access or social media in 2016 to curtail political mobilisation. While technology can improve government transparency and service delivery—as seen in Kenya's e-government initiatives—it is also used for surveillance and censorship. The author argues for a balanced regulatory approach that addresses cybercrime, which is growing rapidly in Africa, without infringing on civil liberties. The document highlights a lack of binding continental or regional frameworks, noting that most existing instruments are non-binding templates.

The workshop, organised by SAIIA and IPPR, provided training to over 50 civil society members on the APRM's structure and the importance of early engagement. Key recommendations included the formation of a civil society working group and the development of a detailed written submission to influence the national review. Participants identified critical national issues for the submission, including land ownership, urban housing, the informal economy, education, and youth unemployment. The report also highlighted lessons from other African nations, noting that while the APRM can drive policy changes, such as women's rights in Lesotho, its impact is often limited by poor implementation of National Programmes of Action.

The document examines Resource-for-Infrastructure (RFI) agreements, which allow resource-rich but credit-constrained developing countries to secure infrastructure funding by securitizing future mineral or oil revenues. Using the Sicomines deal in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a case study, the author highlights the benefits of rapid investment and reduced embezzlement risks, while warning against high costs, poor quality, and a lack of transparency. The brief recommends increasing supply-side competition, implementing third-party quality controls, and adopting conservative risk calculations to improve the outcomes of such deals.

The report argues that SADC countries can reduce processed food trade deficits and mitigate climate change risks by shifting from national industrial policies to regional value chains (RVCs). It identifies a significant opportunity for Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique to replace South Africa's deep-sea soya oilcake imports with regional production. However, it notes that the sugar sector is hindered by protectionist policies and the market power of dominant firms, which keep industrial sugar prices high and stifle downstream confectionery processing. The author proposes practical interventions, including a regional transportation information system to solve 'backhaul' constraints and the harmonisation of quality standards to facilitate intra-regional trade.