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The report examines 'the Alliance,' a coalition formed in April 2026 within the 'Com Network' that coordinates fragmented groups of nihilistic violence. The Alliance is characterized by an emphasis on offline violence, operational sophistication, and a shared goal of creating 'Chaos.' The author identifies several indicators of possible Russian state sponsorship, including financial incentives for violence, advanced technical infrastructure, and coordinated propaganda. While the broader Com remains an organic youth ecosystem, the Alliance represents a shift toward professionalized, potentially state-linked hybrid warfare using 'disposable agents' for arson and sabotage globally.

The report identifies a shift in jihadist online propaganda toward 'Slop Jihad,' characterized by low-quality generative AI content that prioritizes memetic resonance and the glorification of violence over traditional ideological messaging. This trend is primarily driven by younger supporters and is most prevalent on TikTok, where AI templates like fan-cams and dance videos are used to feature terrorists. The report classifies the producers into three groups: Purist Slop Jihadists, Total Christian Death (TCD) supporters, and Shitposting Slopagandists. These groups often overlap in their veneration of mass-casualty attackers, such as Zahran Hashim, and use AI-generated content to troll victims and 'enemies.'

The policy brief argues that the UK's current response to antisemitism is fractured and overly focused on physical security, failing to address the complex interplay between online ecosystems and offline violence. It calls for a holistic strategy led by the Prime Minister's Office that integrates the Online Safety Act, updated counter-terrorism frameworks focused on behaviors rather than just formal groups, and scaled-up prevention and education efforts to combat the 'national emergency' of rising antisemitism.

The document analyzes a 68 percent increase in antisemitic social media content following military strikes on Iran in February 2026. It identifies a shift toward narratives of Jewish political control and backlash against Israel, noting that this online escalation coincided with at least eight offline antisemitic attacks in March 2026 across five countries.

The toolkit establishes a 'Harms Taxonomy' to classify the continuum from online misogyny to violent extremism, identifying online harassment, sexual extortion, and online impersonation as the categories most likely to intersect with extremist activity. It advocates for a public health-based, gender-transformative approach to prevention rather than pure securitization. The document analyzes legal frameworks in Canada, Jordan, and Kenya, noting gaps such as the lack of standalone TFGBV laws in Canada and concerns over vague cybercrime laws in Jordan and Kenya. It provides sectoral guidance for government, civil society, and platforms to ensure coordinated, rights-respecting responses to gendered harms.

The document details an Iranian-linked information operation, Storm-2035, that deployed four X accounts impersonating Northern Irish residents between August 2024 and February 2026. These accounts used AI-generated content and 'hashtag hijacking' to promote Irish reunification and narratives supportive of the Iranian regime and Palestine. Despite low engagement, the operation demonstrates Ireland's vulnerability to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), particularly as it prepares for the EU presidency in 2026.

The document analyzes how the Iranian regime and its allies used an 'axis of amplification' to frame nationwide protests as foreign-backed riots. It details the roles of state actors, regional proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis, and Western far-right and far-left accounts in spreading disinformation, promoting antisemitic tropes, and accusing the US and Israel of orchestrating the unrest to justify state repression.

The briefing asserts that authoritarian regimes, specifically Russia, China, and Iran, are using hybrid warfare to undermine trust in democratic institutions and divide liberal societies. It argues that current government responses are too siloed and reactive, failing to deliver results. To counter this, the author proposes three strategic pillars: establishing a comprehensive counter-hybrid doctrine that includes asymmetric and offensive capabilities, reorganizing government structures to enable holistic coordination and multi-stakeholder coalitions, and prioritizing strategic communications to outcompete authoritarian narratives both domestically and internationally.

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) found that hundreds of English-language websites, including major news outlets and academic institutions, link to the pro-Russia Pravda network. Over 80% of reviewed citations treat the network as a credible source, often failing to contextualize it as a Russia-aligned information operation. This pattern of linking increases the network's perceived legitimacy and its likelihood of appearing in search engine results. To combat this, ISD developed a browser extension for Chrome and Edge that alerts users when they visit Pravda network sites.

The report documents a surge in anti-LGBTQ+ hate crimes, book bans, and restrictive legislation in Western countries, noting a convergence of extremist ideologies. It highlights how tech platforms exacerbate these harms through the rollback of protections, the overmoderation of LGBTQ+ content via AI and safety legislation, and the rise of coordinated harassment campaigns like 'transvestigation'.

The report analyzes how the 'Romanian scenario'—a conspiracy theory alleging that the EU, intelligence services, and courts can rig elections—was used by far-right and far-left political actors, alternative media, and Russian-affiliated channels to undermine trust in Czechia's 2025 parliamentary elections. The narrative evolved from the actual annulment of a Romanian election round in December 2024 into a broader claim of institutional manipulation, often linking the EU's Rapid Response System (RRS) to 'censorship'. The study identifies a transnational pattern, noting similar narratives in Poland and Croatia, and highlights the role of pro-Kremlin propaganda in amplifying these claims to foster democratic distrust.

The report addresses the definitional ambiguity of 'systemic risks' in the Digital Services Act (DSA) by proposing a structured research agenda. This framework operationalises risk assessment through six dimensions: severity (scale, scope, and remediability) and likelihood (platform characteristics, historical patterns, and contextual factors). Using asymmetric amplification of political content during elections as a case study, the authors demonstrate how a plurality of observational and experimental methods is necessary to generate the evidence required for regulatory decisions. The report concludes that current data access constraints, including limited API functionality and restrictive Virtual Computing Environments, hinder the ability of researchers to fulfill their legally recognised role under the DSA.

The report identifies three primary typologies of online hate speech in Jordan: gender-based abuse, religious hate speech (primarily targeting Shia communities), and exclusionary nationalist discourse. It highlights how regional conflicts in Gaza and Syria act as trigger events for spikes in hostility and notes that users exploit 'Arabizi' to bypass inadequate Arabic-language moderation. The study also criticizes the 2023 Cybercrime Law for lacking precise definitions, leading to potential over-criminalization of expression.

The research paper argues that hybrid threats—combining hostile state operations with extremist violence—require a 'whole-of-society' prevention approach. It suggests adopting a 'public health' model of prevention, categorised into primary (building resilience), secondary (targeted vulnerability efforts), and tertiary (minimising acute harm) interventions. The authors emphasize the need to break down government silos between domestic and foreign security, avoid the over-securitisation of communities, and integrate gender and intersectional analysis into threat assessments.

The document analyzes the correlation between real-world violence in Suweyda and the surge of anti-Druze hate speech on social media, highlighting the role of international accounts and AI-generated misinformation in inciting further conflict.

The document argues that online misogyny is a global challenge that fuels gender-based violence (GBV) and technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) while simultaneously harming boys and young men by promoting hypermasculinity and emotional restriction. It identifies algorithmic amplification, influencer economies, and regulatory gaps as key drivers. The brief recommends a coordinated strategy combining 'Safety by Design' in platform architecture, gender-transformative education, community-based interventions in sports and faith spaces, and sustainable funding for long-term behavioural change.

Anti-migrant mobilisation in Ireland has shifted from localised protests to a structured, cross-border movement. This evolution is marked by tactical collaboration between Republic-based nationalist activists and Northern Irish Loyalist networks, overriding historical sectarian divisions. The movement is further amplified by British far-right groups, North American influencers, and Russian-aligned propaganda outlets, which integrate local incidents into global 'Great Replacement' narratives and transnational far-right discourse.

Twenty years after the 7/7 bombings, Islamist extremism remains a significant security threat in the UK, though it has shifted from top-down, group-organised attacks to grassroots, self-initiated actions by loosely connected individuals. The landscape is now characterised by a mix of traditional ideologies and hybridised forms of extremism amplified by social media. While some global movements have transitioned toward nationalist local governance, others, particularly in Africa, are expanding. A critical emerging trend is the radicalisation of minors, with a significant portion of recent terrorism convictions involving children and a rise in Prevent referrals for youth.

In June 2025, Northern Ireland experienced eight nights of violent unrest, centered in Ballymena, targeting Roma and Romanian migrants following an alleged sexual assault. Social media platforms, particularly Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube, were used to spread hate speech, doxx the locations of families seeking shelter, and livestream violence for profit. The report argues that platforms failed to mitigate these risks in real-time, potentially violating the UK's Online Safety Act (OSA), and calls for a coordinated government response to bridge online and offline risk monitoring.

Operation Overload is a high-volume Russian influence campaign that impersonates over 80 organisations, including media outlets and universities, to sow division in democratic nations. In early 2025, it targeted 10 countries—primarily Germany, France, and Ukraine—using AI-cloned voices and forged logos to spread narratives against Ukraine and destabilise domestic politics. While most content had limited organic reach, one video claiming USAID paid celebrities to visit Ukraine garnered over 4.2 million views. The operation relies on bot networks and commercial services to amplify its content and frequently tags research organisations to distract them with debunking requests.