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The document outlines requirements for the EU's proposed carbon border adjustment measure, asserting that it must replace all existing industry protections, such as free pollution permits, to avoid being mere protectionism. It proposes that foreign producers buy pollution permits under the EU carbon market to strengthen carbon prices and incentivise innovation. The author suggests targeting the most polluting sectors—specifically steel, cement, and bulk chemicals—while exempting Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Finally, it argues that all revenues generated should fund climate action, either through EU innovation funds or as climate finance for developing nations.

Carbon Market Watch criticizes the EU's 2021-2030 state aid guidelines for compensating electricity-intensive industries against 'indirect costs' from the EU ETS. The author contends that the final rules expand the list of eligible sectors—including oil refineries and plastic producers—via an opaque 'qualitative assessment' and remove stringent climate conditions. The document further claims that the formula for calculating aid is weakened, ignoring the decarbonization of the power grid and risking windfall profits for industry while undermining the EU Green Deal.

A coalition of NGOs argues that a proposed compromise at the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships (ISWG-GHG) would undermine the IMO Initial Strategy and the Paris Agreement by delaying the enforcement of carbon intensity measures for ships until 2029/2030, potentially allowing shipping emissions to rise for another decade.

An open letter from Bellona Europa, Carbon Market Watch, and Fern arguing against the European Commission's proposal to combine emission reductions and carbon removals in the EU's 2030 climate target. The authors contend that such a 'net target' approach risks diluting mitigation efforts, lacks democratic legitimacy, and ignores the inherent uncertainties and reversibility of carbon removals, particularly from natural sinks.

Carbon Market Watch proposes ten principles for the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Measure (CBAM), arguing that it must replace free allocation of allowances in the EU ETS to adhere to the 'polluter-pays' principle. The organization recommends that CBAM cover direct and indirect emissions in high-emitting sectors like steel, cement, and bulk chemicals, and be implemented as an extension of the EU ETS. Key social and diplomatic recommendations include exempting Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), recycling revenues into climate action, and using the mechanism to complement international climate diplomacy and product requirements.

Carbon Market Watch argues that including road transport and buildings in the EU carbon market would fail to reduce emissions and instead provide an excuse for inaction. For transport, the author suggests CO2 standards for new vehicles are more effective, while for buildings, they advocate for energy efficiency standards and deep renovations. The document warns that adding these sectors would risk market instability by increasing the number of pollution permits and potentially undermining existing regulations.

A joint letter from civil society organisations advocating for the inclusion of the shipping sector in the EU Emissions Trading System and the implementation of a -40% GHG efficiency target by 2030 to address rising maritime emissions.

The document asserts that National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) are essential for the EU to achieve its 2030 climate targets and the goals of the European Green Deal. It notes that current measures are insufficient to meet the 40% greenhouse gas reduction target and that the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed policymaking and plan submissions in several member states. The author calls for higher ambition, better policy coherence, and increased stakeholder involvement to ensure a green recovery and climate neutrality by 2050.

The document argues that the ETS Innovation Fund should be scaled up by recycling auctioning revenues instead of providing free emission allowances. It recommends prioritising transformational projects in industrial clusters, mandating additionality for renewable electricity to avoid grid-emission accounting errors, and limiting CCS funding to non-abatable process emissions while excluding fossil-based hydrogen and gas.

The aviation sector has successfully lobbied the ICAO Council to change the CORSIA baseline to 2019 levels, effectively postponing the start of emission offsetting until at least 2024 due to the 2020 drop in flights. The author contends that this change is unnecessary given the low cost of offsets and that governments are failing by providing billions in bailouts—approximately 30 billion euros in the EU and 50 billion in the US—without binding environmental strings. The text calls for regional and national actions, such as kerosene taxes and the EU carbon market, to replace the failing global scheme.

The report by WWF and Carbon Market Watch argues that the EU Industrial Strategy lacks the specific targets, timelines, and governance structures necessary to achieve climate neutrality in energy-intensive industries. While it welcomes the focus on circularity and the Just Transition Mechanism, the authors highlight critical gaps regarding emission performance standards, the phase-out of free carbon allowances, and the lack of civil society inclusion in new industrial alliances.

The document distinguishes between cap-and-trade systems and offsetting mechanisms, arguing that the latter are often a zero-sum game incompatible with net-zero goals. It critiques the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for lack of additionality and local safeguards, and warns that Article 6 of the Paris Agreement risks repeating these failures through 'hot air' trading and double counting. The guide also assesses the limitations of the CORSIA aviation scheme and the voluntary carbon market, ultimately advocating for a shift from offsetting toward direct climate finance for the zero-carbon transition.

The document distinguishes between cap-and-trade systems (ETS) and offsetting mechanisms, arguing that the latter often fail to provide real climate benefits. It critiques the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for lack of additionality and local safeguards, and warns that Article 6 of the Paris Agreement must avoid 'hot air' and double counting. It also examines the limitations of CORSIA for aviation and the integrity issues surrounding REDD+ and voluntary markets, ultimately advocating for a shift from offsetting toward direct climate action financing.

The document explains the fundamental differences between emissions trading systems and offsetting mechanisms, evaluates the failures of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation, and details the challenges facing the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. It specifically addresses risks such as 'hot air' trading, double counting, and the lack of environmental integrity in forest-based offsets (REDD+), while also examining the CORSIA aviation offsetting scheme and the voluntary carbon market.

The document explains the difference between cap-and-trade systems and offsetting mechanisms, detailing the failures of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the risks associated with the Paris Agreement's Article 6. It highlights issues such as 'hot air' credits, double counting, and the lack of local safeguards. It also assesses the CORSIA aviation scheme and the voluntary carbon market, arguing that the global community must move beyond offsetting toward direct climate finance to achieve net-zero emissions.

Carbon Market Watch calls for the European Commission to revise non-financial reporting directives for companies with over 500 employees. The organization advocates for mandatory disclosures on climate risks, decarbonization pathways, state aid, 'Just transition' efforts, and lobbying expenditures. Additionally, it seeks greater transparency on the use of the EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS), including internal CO2 pricing and the use of carbon offsetting, to ensure investments align with the European Green Deal.

The policy brief examines the gap between the EU Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) and the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), noting that the IED's exclusion of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions limits its effectiveness. It argues that the IED and ETS are complementary rather than duplicative, and recommends that the European Commission remove the exclusion of GHGs from the IED and introduce binding energy efficiency standards to drive industrial decarbonisation.

A group of carbon market stakeholders argues against a proposal by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) to change the CORSIA baseline to 2019-only levels. The authors contend that such a change would eliminate offsetting requirements for several years, undermining the scheme's integrity and discouraging the long-term investments necessary to address the climate crisis.

The document exposes lobbying efforts by large polluters and the aviation industry to undermine climate action during the pandemic. It details attempts by groups like BusinessEurope and national trade associations in France, Germany, and the Netherlands to delay legislation and carbon taxes. It specifically critiques the aviation industry's push for unconditional bailouts and efforts to weaken the CORSIA carbon market baseline. The author argues that the pandemic should be used to accelerate a green recovery rather than return to business-as-usual, recommending the phase-out of free pollution permits and the introduction of fuel taxes.

The author contends that the EU carbon market (ETS) fails to drive industrial decarbonisation because over 90% of industrial emissions are covered by free allowances, leading to stagnating emissions since 2012 and windfall profits for companies. To address this, the document proposes that the upcoming revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) should remove the explicit exclusion of greenhouse gases (Article 9.1), allowing carbon emission limits to be integrated into environmental permits based on 'best available technology' (BREFs).