Search Climate Insights Directory

Following the 2024 elections, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its majority, leading to the formation of a 'government of national unity' (GNU) comprising 10 parties, including the Democratic Alliance (DA). While the ANC retains key portfolios like the presidency and foreign affairs, the coalition faces significant internal ideological tensions regarding economic policy and international relations, particularly concerning BRICS, Russia, and Israel. The document highlights a critical disconnect between South Africa's economic reliance on the EU and its political leanings toward the West's adversaries, suggesting that foreign policy will be the primary test of the coalition's stability.

The paper analyzes e-government in Mauritius, South Africa, Seychelles, and Tunisia, arguing that a modular approach focusing on user experience can bypass the slow progress of traditional 'whole-of-government' strategies.

The report analyzes the competition between Western and Chinese narratives in Africa, specifically debunking the 'debt-trap' narrative and arguing that African states exercise strategic agency by viewing both the US and China as viable partners rather than choosing one in a zero-sum game.

The report examines the alignment between national climate policies and local adaptation practices in Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. It argues that while these nations have developed NDCs and adaptation plans, the effectiveness of these measures is hindered by a lack of recognition for locally-led adaptation (LLA), significant funding gaps, and weak institutional capacities. The document emphasizes that integrating indigenous knowledge and empowering local actors—particularly women—is essential for building sustainable climate resilience in West Africa.

The report analyzes Senegal-Germany bilateral relations between 2012 and 2022, noting that while German imports of Senegalese goods tripled, they remain small compared to France's. It highlights a shift from donor-recipient dynamics toward trade partnerships, exemplified by the Compact with Africa and Just Energy Transition Partnerships. However, German foreign direct investment in Senegal remains low compared to other West African nations like Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, and significant data gaps persist regarding service exports and product granularity.

Nigeria is implementing a variety of regulatory tools and national plans to reduce methane emissions from its oil and gas sector, which accounted for approximately 41% of the country's total greenhouse gas emissions in 2020. While the country has reduced natural gas flaring by about 70% since 2000, it remains among the top 10 global gas flarers. National targets include reducing fugitive methane emissions by 60% by 2031 and achieving a 61% reduction in short-lived climate pollutants by 2030. However, progress is hindered by technical data gaps, inadequate leak detection infrastructure, and high mitigation costs.

The author examines the tension in German foreign policy between corporate profit interests and a values-based rhetoric, specifically regarding its engagement with Africa. Historically, Germany's approach has been 'economistic,' focusing on raw material imports and machinery exports. The paper argues that current geopolitical shifts and the need for critical minerals provide an opportunity for Germany to move away from post-colonial models. It suggests that instead of merely securing cheap resources, Germany should support a pan-African industrial policy, the mobilization of domestic resources, and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to foster sustainable development and reduce Africa's dependence on raw material exports.

The European Union has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to secure critical raw materials (CRM) essential for green and digital transitions. These agreements aim to reduce the EU's heavy reliance on imports from quasi-monopolistic suppliers, particularly China. However, the paper identifies significant obstacles, including the DRC and Zambia's lack of comprehensive national CRM policies, high levels of corruption and political instability, and the continued dominance of Chinese mining interests in both countries. The author argues that for these partnerships to succeed, the EU must prioritize industrial and economic alignment over geopolitical security agendas and find ways to de-risk investments for the European private sector, potentially by strengthening state-owned mining companies in the partner countries.

The author examines the "end of development" narrative—the idea that income gaps between developed and developing nations may never close—and its implications for Africa. The text highlights a decline in traditional aid from the UK, EU, and Canada, alongside a drop in Chinese infrastructure loans. It identifies critical gaps in infrastructure ($68-$108 billion annually) and climate adaptation ($453 billion this decade). To counter this, the author urges the African Union to reduce aid dependency, prioritize the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and improve the bankability of projects to attract investment rather than relying on dwindling global generosity.

The document analyzes the constitutional crisis in Senegal following President Macky Sall's decision to postpone the February 25, 2024, elections. It argues that the move is illegal and unconstitutional, reflecting a trend toward authoritarianism and 'hyper-presidentialism'. The text details the roles of key political figures like Ousmane Sonko and Karim Wade, the repression of civil society, and the potential for regional instability in West Africa if the impasse is not peacefully resolved.

The document examines the Global Shield (GS) and other climate insurance initiatives in Africa, arguing that they are insufficient substitutes for a well-funded Loss and Damage Fund (LDF). It highlights systemic failures in parametric insurance, such as 'basis risk' and the inability of poor populations to afford premiums, while critiquing the technocratic and paternalistic nature of these schemes. The authors conclude that insurance should only be a complementary tool, and that equitable climate finance must be based on historic emissions rather than market-based premiums.

The document analyzes COP 28 outcomes for Africa, noting a gap between high-level agreements and the actual financial resources provided for adaptation and loss and damage. While it highlights the historic agreement to transition away from fossil fuels and new food system initiatives, it argues that the scale of funding remains insufficient for Africa's urgent needs.

The document examines the integration of locally-led adaptation (LLA) into Senegal's climate strategy, specifically focusing on the alignment between community-driven initiatives and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Through case studies in agriculture, coastal zones, and health, the research demonstrates that while local actions are often consistent with national priorities, they are hindered by a lack of government recognition, limited technical capacity, and poor access to climate finance. The paper argues for a shift from top-down approaches to a model that empowers local communities to ensure sustainable and effective climate resilience.

The document examines the disconnect between Nigeria's top-down climate adaptation frameworks and the bottom-up initiatives already being implemented by local communities. It highlights that while national policies like the NDC and NAPF are comprehensive, they often exclude frontline stakeholders and lack clear implementation plans. Through case studies in Ogun and Anambra states and Lagos, the brief demonstrates how local actors use indigenous knowledge and nature-based solutions to combat deforestation, fisheries collapse, and gully erosion. It concludes that scaling up LLA can enhance national resilience if the government addresses critical gaps in finance, capacity building, and technology access.

The document examines the gap between Ghana's national climate policies and the implementation of adaptation actions at the community level. It argues that transitioning from top-down dynamics to locally-led adaptation (LLA)—which empowers local actors to define and lead their own resilience strategies—can improve the effectiveness and sustainability of climate actions. Through three case studies in the Savannah, Upper East, and coastal regions, the brief demonstrates how LLA initiatives, such as organic shea processing, climate-smart agriculture, and nature-based coastal defenses, align with Ghana's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) while addressing local vulnerabilities. It highlights significant funding gaps, noting that Ghana's NDCs estimate adaptation costs between US $9.3 billion and US $15.5 billion by 2030, with the government able to provide only a quarter of this amount. The brief recommends that the Ghanaian government and international partners prioritize LLA to unlock climate finance and leverage local knowledge for more sustainable development.

The Lobito Corridor is a 1,300 km railway line in Angola, extending into the DRC, designed to transport minerals to the EU and US. While several MoUs have been signed to secure critical raw materials (CRMs) and EV battery value chains, the author argues the project faces significant risks due to China's established supply chains, the TAZARA railway alternative, and the EU and US's lag in EV technology. The paper suggests that the EU and US should move beyond raw material extraction to support comprehensive industrialization across Africa.

The author argues that Germany is struggling to balance its 'exportist' economic model and corporate interests with a more recent emphasis on a 'rules-based order' and human rights in its foreign policy. Historically, German engagement in Africa has been characterized by a light footprint and a focus on extracting raw materials, such as oil and minerals. The paper suggests that Germany should move away from this extractivist approach and instead support African-led initiatives for domestic resource mobilisation and regional complementarities, particularly through the AfCFTA, to foster a more just and green transition.

The 2023 elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo are marked by high voter registration but significant concerns over electoral fraud, institutional corruption, and insecurity in the east. The National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) faces accusations of lack of transparency and poor quality voter identification. Security forces have reportedly cracked down on opposition candidates, and the presence of armed groups like M23 in North-Kivu and Ituri threatens to disenfranchise millions. Internationally, the outcome is linked to the control of strategic minerals, particularly cobalt, with China and the West competing for influence, and regional tensions with Rwanda and Angola complicating the political landscape.

The document details the friction between developed and developing nations over the design, governance, and funding of the Loss and Damage Fund established at COP27. Key disputes include whether the fund should be a standalone UNFCCC entity or hosted by the World Bank, who should contribute (with the EU suggesting wealthier developing nations like China and Saudi Arabia), and whether the finance should be grants or loans. While a recommendation for a World Bank-hosted Financial Intermediary Fund was proposed, the US abstained due to concerns over legal liability and 'reparations', and the text lacks committed financial targets from developed countries.

The report examines the intersection of Africa's industrialization goals under the AfCFTA and the global shift toward sustainability. It highlights that while Africa contributes minimally to global emissions, adopting green practices early can provide a competitive advantage and safeguard market access against regulations like the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. However, the continent faces massive financial shortfalls, including an annual trade finance gap of USD 81 billion and a USD 90 billion gap for energy transition. The author proposes a synergy of climate and trade finance through Green Bonds, Public-Private Partnerships, and a 'Sustainable Trade and Investment Code' to guide the transition without creating punitive barriers for SMEs.