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The document examines the critical backlogs in interconnection queues in the U.S. and UK, where over 2,500 GW and 750 GW of generation and storage are awaiting connection, respectively. It details a shared shift toward 'first ready, first served' principles, utilizing cluster study approaches and stricter financial requirements to eliminate speculative projects. However, it highlights a key divergence: while the U.S. generally maintains an open-access model based on readiness, the UK's 'first ready and needed, first connected' approach allows the government to prioritize resources that align with national policy targets. The primer also notes the emergence of hybrid models in constrained U.S. regions like California, where the CAISO uses a 'first ready, first scored' system to align connections with state resource plans.

The author contends that Canada needs a strong climate competitiveness strategy to diversify trade beyond the United States and remain competitive in markets like the EU, UK, and China. The text highlights the rapid global decline in costs for solar, wind, and batteries, and suggests specific policy actions for the Canadian government, including strengthening industrial carbon pricing, expanding electricity grids, reducing methane emissions, and maintaining the federal electric vehicle mandate.

The document argues that fusion energy is transitioning from laboratory research to commercial viability, with many U.S. startups projecting grid connection by the first half of the 2030s. It outlines how states can create competitive advantages by implementing specific regulatory reforms, such as becoming an NRC Agreement State to manage radiological licensing, and by adopting legislative tools like explicitly defining fusion as a clean energy source in state statutes. The brief also suggests financial mechanisms including state-level investment tax credits, the creation of dedicated fusion energy funds, and the repurposing of retired fossil fuel sites—termed "fusion brightfields"—to leverage existing grid infrastructure. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of developing specialized workforces and innovation hubs around universities and national laboratories to support the industry's growth.

The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is designed to prevent carbon leakage and encourage global decarbonisation by imposing levies on high-emitting imports. While facing criticism from BRICS nations as a protectionist barrier, the CBAM's design allows for the deduction of carbon prices already paid in the country of origin. This has led several countries, including India, China, Brazil, and Vietnam, to strategically develop or expand domestic carbon markets or taxes to ensure that carbon revenues are retained domestically rather than paid to the EU. Modelling indicates that if domestic prices reach 50% of the EU's price, countries like India could retain EUR 676 million annually.

The document argues that Europe must shift from a research-centric approach to a comprehensive industrial strategy for fusion energy to avoid falling behind global competitors like the US, UK, China, and Japan. It recommends that the EU's first Fusion Strategy prioritise private sector-led net energy fusion demonstration plants by the 2030s and adopt a Key Enabling Technology (KET)-based roadmap to align public funding with commercially relevant R&D. The authors propose streamlining governance by expanding the role of the Fusion for Energy (F4E) Joint Undertaking as the singular public governance body and establishing a cohesive Public-Private Partnership (PPP) programme to remove financing barriers for start-ups. Additionally, the letter calls for the explicit recognition of fusion as a strategic clean technology in EU legislation, including the Green Taxonomy and the Net Zero Industry Act, and the creation of a regulatory framework that distinguishes fusion from fission.

The report outlines a comprehensive toolkit for U.S. states to decarbonize heavy industry, emphasizing a combination of financial incentives, demand-side market policies, and regulatory reforms. It identifies four critical subsectors—petroleum refining, chemicals, cement, and iron and steel—which together account for approximately 40 percent of U.S. industrial emissions. The guide details technology pathways including electrification, CCUS, and alternative production processes, while providing case studies from Missouri, Louisiana, and Colorado to illustrate effective state-level implementation of these strategies.

The Clean Air Task Force urges the European Investment Bank to adopt a more strategic and technology-neutral lending policy for its 2026-30 roadmap. It argues that the EIB should move beyond its limited current support for nuclear fission, fusion, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) to provide patient capital and risk-sharing instruments for these indispensable technologies. The document specifically advocates for funding next-generation geothermal, small modular reactors, and industrial decarbonisation clusters to address hard-to-abate sectors and ensure a reliable, 24/7 clean energy supply for the EU.

The report examines the impact of declining official development assistance (ODA) on Africa's energy sector, noting a 10% drop in ODA flows since 2020. It argues that this funding gap, particularly severe in the energy sector, necessitates a shift toward private capital and domestic savings, which currently stand at 18% in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to a 36% global average. The document identifies structural inefficiencies in state-run utilities—where transmission and distribution losses cost the continent approximately 5 billion USD annually—as a primary barrier to progress. To achieve energy independence and industrial growth, the report recommends strengthening regional integration via the African Continental Free Trade Agreement to expand fragmented energy markets and diversifying away from expensive thermal generation. Ultimately, it calls for an energy agenda led by African nations rather than external funders in Washington, Brussels, or Beijing, treating energy investment as a development multiplier that could unlock market opportunities of nearly 12 trillion USD across four key sectors.

In the first half of 2025, global solar and wind generation grew sufficiently to meet and exceed total electricity demand growth, leading to renewables overtaking coal in the global electricity mix for the first time. Solar generation saw record absolute growth, while total fossil fuel generation declined slightly. Consequently, global CO2 emissions from the power sector fell marginally by 0.2%, although results varied by region, with emissions decreasing in China and India but increasing in the US and EU.

In the first half of 2025, global solar and wind generation grew sufficiently to exceed total electricity demand growth, leading to renewables overtaking coal's share of the global electricity mix for the first time on record. While China and India saw declines in fossil fuel generation and emissions, the US and EU experienced increases due to demand growth outpacing clean energy in the US and unfavorable weather affecting wind and hydro in the EU.

A coalition of organisations and individuals is calling on the UK government to establish enforceable methane regulations for domestic and imported fossil fuels. The signatories argue that current underregulation undermines the UK's commitment to the Global Methane Pledge and risks economic misalignment with the EU Methane Regulation, which will require importers to meet specific performance standards. They propose using the Clean Air Task Force's UK Regulatory Roadmap as a practical framework to reduce emissions and maintain climate credibility ahead of COP30.

A coalition of civil society organisations, including Reclaim Finance and Justiça Ambiental!, condemns the push by companies like TotalEnergies, ENI, and ExxonMobil to advance gas projects in Mozambique. They argue that restarting these projects, specifically the Mozambique LNG project, ignores unresolved community grievances and escalates security risks in Cabo Delgado. The organisations call on over 30 financial institutions, including Crédit Agricole and Standard Chartered, to withdraw support to avoid complicity in human rights abuses and environmental destruction.

Spain has significantly lowered its wholesale electricity prices by decoupling them from volatile fossil fuel costs through the expansion of wind and solar capacity. In the first half of 2025, Spain's wholesale prices were 32% lower than the EU average, with the share of hours where prices were tied to gas costs dropping from 75% in 2019 to 19% in 2025. However, a blackout on April 28, 2025, led to a 'reinforced mode' of grid operation that increased reliance on gas for stability services. This resulted in the cost of grid balancing doubling in May 2025 and renewable curtailment tripling from 1.8% to 7.2% between May and July 2025. The report highlights a lag in investment in battery storage and grid-enhancing technologies, noting that Spain's 120 MW battery fleet is only the 13th largest in Europe despite being the 4th largest power market. To address this, Spain is implementing reforms, including adding eight synchronous compensators to the mainland grid and expanding its battery storage pipeline.

The document examines how the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system enables foreign investors, particularly from the fossil fuel industry, to claim compensation from states for climate policies. It highlights the 'regulatory chill' effect, where the threat of costly awards—which have increased from an average of $25 million (1994-2003) to over $250 million (2014-2023)—deters governments from phasing out fossil fuels. The briefing references July 2025 advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to affirm state duties to regulate polluting conduct. It concludes that current reform efforts, including the EU and UK withdrawals from the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), are insufficient due to sunset clauses and inadequate carve-outs, and recommends coordinated UN-level action to eliminate ISDS threats to climate and human rights obligations.

The report argues that rapid methane abatement is a priority for transition finance due to its immediate impact on limiting global warming to 1.5°C. It analyzes the current financing landscape, noting a significant gap between the USD 9.6bn in private methane finance (2021/2022) and the estimated USD 48bn to USD 100bn required annually by 2030. Through case studies of 20 corporates, the report finds that while oil and gas firms generally integrate methane abatement into short-term strategies, agrifood firms struggle with supply chain tracking and specific targets. To address this, the report promotes the use of Use of Proceeds (UOP) and sustainability-linked instruments guided by Climate Bonds and Methane Finance Working Group (MFWG) criteria to ensure investments contribute to decarbonization without locking in high-carbon assets.

The report examines the financing gap for methane abatement, noting that while significant investment opportunities exist, current funding is limited compared to the estimated $48 billion annual need by 2030. It analyzes the transition plans of 20 major companies, finding that oil and gas firms are more advanced in integrating methane targets than agri-food companies. The document promotes the use of Use of Proceeds (UoP) and Sustainability-Linked Bonds (SLB), supported by new standards from the Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI) and the Methane Finance Working Group (MFWG), to avoid carbon lock-in and ensure scientific alignment with the 1.5°C goal.

The report outlines a framework for sovereign transition planning based on five pillars: robust targets, a whole-of-government approach, green public financial management (PFM), a diverse policy mix, and transparency. It argues that integrating climate considerations into core budgetary processes (green PFM) is essential for coordinating action across all government departments. To address fiscal constraints and debt overhang, the report suggests alternative financing mechanisms, including carving out transition spending from deficit limits, utilizing GSS+ and sustainability-linked bonds, leveraging national development banks and sovereign wealth funds, and employing central bank monetary tools such as green asset purchases and adjusted collateral frameworks.

The report outlines a framework for credible sovereign transition planning based on five elements: robust targets, a 'whole-of-government' approach, green public financial management, integrated policy tools, and transparency. It addresses the challenge of 'debt overhang' in both developed and emerging markets, suggesting alternatives such as excluding transition spending from deficit calculations and utilizing GSS+ bonds. The document also examines the roles of national development banks, sovereign wealth funds, and central banks in mobilizing private capital and providing low-cost financing for climate action.

The document examines the current state of methane abatement financing and provides guidelines for structuring sustainable debt instruments. It analyzes the transition plans of 20 major companies in the oil and gas and agri-food sectors, highlighting a significant gap between the high potential for impact and the current marginal level of private investment. The report promotes the use of Use-of-Proceeds (UOP) and Sustainability-Linked Bonds (SLB) based on new sector-specific criteria from the Climate Bonds Initiative and the Methane Finance Working Group (MFWG) to avoid carbon lock-in and ensure credible decarbonization.

The briefing argues that proposed 'Omnibus I' amendments to weaken or delete Article 22 of the CS3D—which requires companies to adopt and implement 1.5°C-compatible climate transition plans (CTPs)—would contradict the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) July 2025 Advisory Opinion. The ICJ confirmed that States have a binding legal duty to regulate private sector emissions using 'stringent' due diligence. The authors warn that diluting these requirements would increase the liability risks for EU Member States, heighten the legal exposure of companies to climate litigation, and leave the final Omnibus I Directive vulnerable to legal challenges for failing to meet international and EU climate obligations.