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The Kasepuhan Ciptagelar indigenous community in West Java has overcome geographic isolation and market neglect by building its own community-led internet infrastructure. Starting with a partnership in 2018 between Common Room and Awinet, the network has expanded to cover 44 hamlets across 13 villages by 2025, serving up to 2,000 daily users. The 'Ciptagelar Model' utilizes a hybrid backhaul of radio links and fiber optics, funded by a prepaid voucher system that reinvests revenue into the community. This digital sovereignty has enabled the community to fund reforestation—planting 45,000 trees over five years—and document traditional rituals. While successful, the initiative faces challenges including regulatory 'grey zones' in Indonesian law and physical infrastructure damage from extreme weather, such as the collapse of a bamboo tower in late 2024.

Indonesia requires an estimated USD 24 billion to expand its transmission infrastructure by 47.76 thousand circuit kilometers between 2025 and 2034. Because the state-owned utility PLN cannot fund this alone, the report proposes shifting from corporate-level finance to project finance structures using special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and long-term revenue contracts. The evaluated models include leasing, joint ventures, public-private partnerships (PPPs), infrastructure investment trusts (InvITs), and collective investment schemes for infrastructure (CIS-DINFRA). Successful implementation depends on three policy enablers: a dedicated transmission fee, off-balance sheet treatment, and targeted fiscal support.

The US-Israel invasion of Iran in February 2026 has accelerated the global transition to clean energy as 23 countries announced new measures to reduce fossil fuel vulnerability. Clean energy ETFs have outperformed oil and gas ETFs in early May 2026, with renewable energy funds attracting over USD 3 billion in April 2026. Investor sentiment is shifting, with a rise in those ranking renewables top for one-year returns (14% vs 9% in 2025) and a decline in the perceived necessity of natural gas for the transition, particularly in Asia. While the cost of capital remains significantly higher in emerging markets (12.95%) compared to Europe (5.02%), geopolitical instability is prompting a reassessment of risk premiums in favor of domestic renewables.

The report argues that the expanded BRICS bloc is not a coherent actor but a collection of competing interests, where fossil-industrial interests often conflict with climate rhetoric. It categorizes members into five functional actor groups and proposes a five-axis 'Climate and Energy Compass' and a focus on climate finance reform to facilitate a just and sovereign energy transition.

The document assesses the socioenvironmental governance of nickel mining in Indonesia, highlighting the high environmental footprint of laterite ore processing and the reliance on coal-based energy. It notes Indonesia's dominant position in global nickel production and calls for more stringent legislative frameworks to manage tailings and water.

The Philippines could avoid approximately PHP 1.7 billion (USD 28 million) in fossil fuel import costs by achieving its target of 9.5 GW of solar capacity by 2030. This analysis comes amid soaring Asian energy prices caused by the Iran war, which has pushed LNG prices up 54.3% since February 2026. The report highlights that the Philippines has some of the highest electricity prices in Asia due to a heavy reliance on imports. While the Philippines is currently fast-tracking renewable energy and battery storage, the report notes that coal and gas generation are still projected to increase by 2030. Comparatively, other ASEAN nations like Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam are also implementing clean energy measures to reduce reliance on volatile imported fuels.

The report assesses how Indonesia can move from corporate-level financing to project finance to meet a USD 24 billion investment requirement for transmission lines and substations. It analyzes five models: leasing, joint ventures (JVs), public-private partnerships (PPPs), infrastructure investment trusts (InvITs), and collective investment schemes for infrastructure (CIS-DINFRA). While leasing and JVs are easier to implement, InvITs and CIS-DINFRA offer the highest scalability and liquidity. The report emphasizes that success depends on three policy enablers: a dedicated transmission fee, off-balance sheet accounting treatment, and targeted fiscal support.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as new plants are increasingly built for backup reliability rather than primary generation. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting most new demand. While the number of countries developing coal projects fell to 32, political interventions in the US and energy security concerns in the EU have delayed planned closures. The EU continues a terminal decline in coal, with solar and wind producing more energy than all fossil fuels combined for the first time in 2025.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting new demand despite record coal plant commissioning. Globally, the number of countries proposing new coal plants dropped to 32. In Indonesia, coal expansion continues through 'captive' plants for nickel and aluminium industries, reaching 20 GW, while national energy plans (RUKN and RUPTL) are criticized for maintaining fossil fuel dependency and lacking a clear phase-out roadmap despite official net-zero commitments.

The report highlights a growing gap in 2025 where global coal capacity increased by 3.5% despite a 0.6% decrease in generation, signaling a shift where coal serves as a backup rather than a primary power source. While China and India continue to expand capacity for energy security, the total number of countries proposing or building new coal plants fell to 32 in 2025. The document specifically contrasts the policies of South Korea, which has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out and joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, with Japan, which maintains a large coal fleet and focuses on abatement technologies like ammonia co-firing and CCS without a binding national phase-out date.

In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants are increasingly used as backup reserves rather than primary energy sources. This divergence is most acute in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling generation due to the rise of wind and solar power. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects declined from 38 to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Regionally, Latin America reported no new projects, while Russia and Kazakhstan continue to integrate coal into their long-term energy security strategies despite international financing constraints and sanctions.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal is increasingly used as system 'insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While Latin America achieved a 'No New Coal' status in 2025, several countries in the region, including Brazil and Chile, experienced delays or reversals in planned plant retirements. China and India continue to lead global capacity expansions, accounting for 95% of all coal capacity under construction worldwide.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while coal-generated electricity decreased by 0.6%, reflecting a shift where coal serves as backup capacity rather than a primary source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling production due to the rise of renewables. While the number of countries planning new coal projects fell to 32 in 2025, some nations like the US and EU delayed plant closures for energy security. In Turkey, planned coal capacity has plummeted from 57.5 GW in 2015 to 0.7 GW by 2025, though tensions remain between social demand for transition and government policies such as guaranteed purchase mechanisms for coal plants through 2030.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, driven largely by record additions in China and India. These countries are building coal plants for system reliability and energy security, even as renewables displace coal's role in meeting demand. The report notes a geographic narrowing of coal expansion, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants, and highlights the specific challenges facing Ukraine's energy recovery following Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

The document details the global cobalt market, highlighting the extreme concentration of mine production in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and refining in China. It examines the shift toward battery-enabled end-uses, the role of Chinese investment in global supply, and the social risks associated with artisanal mining in the DRC.

The report examines the ESG frameworks of Chinese mining and processing companies, contrasting domestic voluntary standards with international benchmarks like IRMA 2.0 and RRA 3.0. It finds that while Chinese standards are increasingly aligned with international environmental norms, significant gaps remain in social dimensions, particularly regarding Indigenous Peoples' rights and community engagement. Using Indonesia's nickel sector as a case study, the study highlights challenges such as duplicative audits, tensions between transparency and Chinese data security laws, and the transfer of ESG risks from downstream buyers to suppliers. The report recommends aligning Chinese standards with global benchmarks, introducing financial incentives for ESG performance, and establishing bilateral technical cooperation with mineral-rich countries.

The document analyzes the socioenvironmental governance of Indonesia's nickel sector, highlighting the high carbon intensity of laterite processing and the significant ecological and social risks associated with HPAL technology. It identifies critical gaps in the regulatory framework, particularly regarding the lack of mandatory free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) for Indigenous Peoples and insufficient public access to water quality monitoring data.

The document argues that the energy transition within the expanded BRICS bloc is a contest of power between incumbent fossil-industrial interests and emerging green regimes. It identifies a 'grey space' of hybrid compromise where ambitious climate rhetoric masks continued fossil fuel expansion. To navigate this, the authors introduce the BRICS Climate and Energy Compass and a strategic action plan focusing on financial architecture reform, investment in hard-to-abate sectors, and the localisation of climate finance.