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The submission argues that the GHCS was developed without sufficient transparency or civil society participation and warns against over-investing in a speculative green hydrogen export market at the expense of addressing South Africa's urgent electricity crisis. It calls for a strict definition of 'green hydrogen' based on additionality, comprehensive cost-benefit analyses, and robust safety and environmental regulations before public funds are committed.

The report argues that embarking countries face significant human and financial resource constraints when establishing the regulatory infrastructure required for nuclear licensing. To address this, it proposes the creation of an International Technical Support Organization (ITSO)—an independent body funded primarily by vendor nations—to provide technical reviews, inspection assistance, and training. Additionally, it advocates for a streamlined licensing model where embarking countries voluntarily accept design reviews conducted by other competent regulators to avoid duplicative processes and preserve the economic benefits of modular reactor standardization.

The report exposes how the used-clothing trade is used by the Global North to export plastic waste to Kenya. It estimates that over 300 million items of synthetic, unsellable clothing are exported to Kenya annually, leading to severe environmental pollution in the Nairobi River and at dumpsites like Dandora. The investigation highlights the failure of sorting at the source and the role of recycling companies that claim circularity while exporting waste. It recommends the implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) schemes, eco-design requirements, and a virgin plastic tax to curb overproduction and the export of synthetic waste.

ClientEarth is pursuing a 'world-first' derivative action in the High Court of England and Wales to hold Shell's Board of Directors personally liable for mismanaging climate risks. The claim argues that Shell's energy transition strategy is insufficient, as its net-zero targets are not reflected in budgets and its reduction targets focus on 'carbon intensity' rather than absolute emissions. ClientEarth asserts this mismanagement breaches the UK Companies Act, specifically Section 172, which requires directors to promote the company's long-term success. The action is supported by various institutional investors from the UK, Sweden, France, Belgium, and Denmark.

The Kappahl pilot project aimed to increase supply chain visibility for organic cotton baby apparel by mapping suppliers from farm to retail. Using the SupplyShift platform, the project successfully mapped three tiers down to spinners or ginners for four garment lines, enabling the collection of data on greenhouse gas emissions, water consumption, and wages. Key opportunities identified include the ability to identify climate-related supply risks and build trust with suppliers. However, the project faced challenges with data quality and low participation from middle-tier suppliers (Tiers 2 and 3) due to technical barriers and 'information request fatigue'. The study concludes that combining top-down and bottom-up mapping, leveraging Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSSs), and using flexible technology are essential for achieving end-to-end transparency.

Reclaim Finance proposes a framework for credible corporate climate transition plans, arguing that access to green financing should be contingent on plans that cover all emission scopes, set absolute targets aligned with 1.5°C scenarios, and include sector-specific 'red lines'. The framework emphasizes the exclusion of carbon offsets from targets, the integration of climate performance into executive remuneration, and the requirement for lobbying activities to be transparent and consistent with climate goals.

The document argues that current green and sustainable debt instruments rely on non-binding standards and proposes a stricter framework. For green bonds and loans, it suggests requiring exclusive use for green activities (referencing the EU Taxonomy or Climate Bond Initiative) and an 'entity-level' criterion, such as excluding harmful sectors or requiring a certified 1.5°C-aligned transition plan. For Sustainability-linked bonds (SLB) and loans (SLL), it proposes mandatory prior adoption of a certified transition plan and KPIs linked to material emission reductions. Additionally, it recommends banning the use of green debt for refinancing and implementing significant financial penalties for failing to meet environmental targets.

The policy brief proposes that the European Central Bank (ECB) use monetary policy to create a cost-of-capital differential between 'green' and 'brown' activities. It suggests a green financing facility providing preferential refinancing rates to banks that fund renewable energy and energy-efficient building renovations. The author argues this would ensure credit availability, incentivize banks to meet environmental commitments, and support long-term price stability without increasing public spending, urging France to use its influence via the Banque de France to promote this agenda.

The document argues that ENGIE's transition plan is incomplete and incompatible with a 1.5°C scenario, as the company targets a "well below 2°C" world and continues to expand its fossil gas and LNG infrastructure. While ENGIE has significantly reduced its coal capacity and set ambitious renewable energy targets for 2030, the briefing highlights a lack of transparency in capital expenditure, accounting practices, and the feasibility of its 2045 gas decarbonization goal.

The document examines the gap between EU Green Public Procurement (GPP) targets and actual implementation in eight Member States. It identifies systemic barriers—including fragmented governance, lack of standardized data, and limited procurement officer capacity—while highlighting successful local and national initiatives in Sweden, France, Germany, and others. The brief argues that the EU must harmonize reporting, institute mandatory requirements for high-emitting sectors, and provide better technical support to leverage public spending for climate goals.

The report finds that Green Public Procurement (GPP) in the EU is characterized by a fragmented approach with few binding requirements and significant gaps between national climate targets and actual procurement practices. While some regions like Catalonia and cities like Berlin show high ambition, most Member States rely on voluntary guidelines. The construction and road transport sectors are highlighted as high-impact areas where GPP could drive decarbonization, yet implementation is hindered by a lack of standardized data, insufficient capacity and time for procurement officers, and a lack of mandatory EU-level criteria. The report recommends harmonizing GPP definitions, introducing mandatory carbon criteria, and expanding the scope of EU Directives to include embedded emissions.

In 2022, the EU electricity mix was led by nuclear (22%), gas (20%), coal (16%), and wind (15%), with solar accounting for 7.3%. While solar and wind continued their long-term growth trends, nuclear and hydro experienced significant declines due to plant closures and drought. Coal saw a temporary increase to offset these losses, while gas remained the only fossil fuel to show growth over the last two decades.

In 2022, wind and solar generated a record 22% of EU electricity, overtaking fossil gas (20%). Despite this, EU power sector emissions rose by 3.9% due to a 185 TWh generation gap caused by a severe drought affecting hydro power and unexpected French nuclear outages. This gap was partially filled by a 7% increase in coal generation. However, electricity demand fell by 7.9% in Q4 2022, and coal generation declined in the final four months of the year. Ember projects a 20% plummet in EU fossil generation in 2023 as hydro and nuclear capacity recover and renewable deployment accelerates.

In 2022, EU electricity demand fell by 2.7% to 2809 TWh, driven by mild weather and demand reduction measures. Despite this, power sector CO2 emissions rose by 3.9% due to shortfalls in nuclear and hydro generation, which necessitated increased fossil fuel use. Wind and solar generation continued to grow, reaching a 22% market share, while nuclear generation fell to its lowest share in 40 years at 22%.

In 2022, the EU experienced a temporary 7% rise in coal generation driven by shortfalls in nuclear and hydro power, rather than a structural 'return to coal'. This was offset by a record surge in solar capacity and a significant 7.9% drop in electricity demand in Q4 2022. Solar power generated 7.3% of EU electricity, avoiding approximately 249 billion in gas import costs. Looking ahead to 2023, the report forecasts a potential 20% plummet in fossil fuel generation as French nuclear capacity returns and renewable capacity continues to grow.

Following its 2021 pledge to stop financing overseas coal projects, China faces a choice between investing in natural gas or renewable energy. The document argues that China lacks the domestic market maturity and technical export edge to compete with countries like Japan and the US in gas power generation, where it ranked 13th in investment from 2001 to 2022. Conversely, China dominates global renewable manufacturing, controlling 72% of solar and 50% of wind turbine markets. While high demand in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries and low equipment costs favor a green pivot, challenges such as geopolitical tensions, regulatory unevenness, and limited insurance capacity from Sinosure hinder the bankability of renewable projects.

The document examines various European initiatives to reduce public transport costs, ranging from temporary low-cost summer passes to permanent free transit. While these measures can alleviate financial pressure on citizens and reduce pollution, the author argues that price reductions alone are insufficient; sustainable mobility requires improved accessibility, simplified tariff systems, and strategic public investment funded by mechanisms like congestion charges or corporate taxes.

The authors contend that inflation in Europe is caused by global supply chain disruptions, the energy crisis, and corporate profit maintenance rather than rising wages. They argue that increasing interest rates risks severe economic damage and unemployment, suggesting instead that the solution lies in price controls, windfall profit taxes, wage indexation, and reducing dependence on global imports through a green transition.

The briefing assesses the intersection of climate change and U.S. national security, noting progress in regional strategies and whole-of-government planning while highlighting critical gaps in climate finance and implementation. It recommends that the U.S. institutionalize climate security through expanded personnel training, the development of a National Adaptation Plan, and the use of strategic foresight tools like wargaming to prepare for worst-case climate scenarios.

The analysis argues that the UK's economic insecurity is rooted in neoliberalism, which prioritizes individual resilience over collective security. This is evidenced by underinvestment in public infrastructure, the sale of 2.5 million social houses between 1979 and 2022, and a lack of energy storage (four days compared to France's fourteen). In contrast, Finland's approach to housing, energy, and social policy—including a 'housing first' strategy and a basic income pilot—is presented as a model for restoring public confidence and wellbeing. The authors suggest that a cost-neutral universal basic income of approximately £60 per week for single adults could more than halve child and pensioner poverty in the UK.