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The report argues that the climate pledges of major oil and gas companies are 'empty promises' designed to deceive the public. It finds that none of the analyzed companies' plans meet the standards required to limit warming to 1.5°C, as they often exclude Scope 3 emissions, rely on unproven carbon capture technology, and continue to invest in fossil fuel exploration and production.

The report finds that climate finance for AFOLU sectors is severely underfunded, representing only 2.5% of total tracked climate finance in 2019/20. While overall trends were positive between 2013 and 2020, a 20% drop occurred between 2017/18 and 2019/20. The sectors require an estimated USD 423.4 billion annually by 2030 to align with the Paris Agreement, a nearly 26-fold increase over 2019/20 levels. Finance is dominated by public sources, with significant gaps in private investment and a stagnation in adaptation funding. Geographically, East Asia and the Pacific are the primary recipients, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa.

The U.S. Government Global Water Strategy 2022-2027 establishes a whole-of-government approach to achieve a water-secure world. It prioritizes four strategic objectives: strengthening sector governance and financing, increasing equitable access to climate-resilient water and sanitation services, improving the conservation of freshwater resources, and reducing water-related conflict. The strategy emphasizes local leadership, the needs of marginalized populations, and the integration of climate resilience. Implementation is coordinated through the Interagency Water Working Group (IWWG) and focuses on High-Priority Countries (HPCs) identified by a data-driven needs and opportunity index. Specific agency plans from USAID, the Department of State, CDC, and others detail how they will leverage technical expertise, diplomatic engagement, and financial tools to meet these goals.

The document analyzes thirty years of UN climate negotiations, arguing that countries in the Global North, particularly the United States, have consistently and deliberately obstructed the creation of a loss and damage finance mechanism. It divides this history into four periods: the initial efforts from 1991 to 2007, the lead-up to the Warsaw International Mechanism (2008-2013), the road to the Paris Agreement (2014-2015), and the post-Paris era (2016-present). The author highlights how advocates from the Global South, including AOSIS and the G77, shifted their framing from legal liability to moral risk to gain traction, while obstructionists used tactics such as conflating loss and damage with adaptation, proposing limited insurance alternatives, and explicitly excluding liability and compensation from official texts, most notably in Paragraph 51 of the Paris Agreement decision.

The report argues that 'net zero' initiatives are being manipulated by 'Big Polluters' to create an illusion of climate action while continuing to expand fossil fuel portfolios. It specifically analyzes the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market, the UN's High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities, and the Race to Zero campaign. The analysis highlights how leadership roles in these bodies are held by individuals and organizations with deep ties to the fossil fuel industry, such as executives from banks that provide billions in fossil fuel financing and lawyers representing oil majors. For instance, the report notes that member banks of the Race to Zero, Net-Zero Banking Alliance, and GFANZ invested over US$500 billion in fossil fuels in 2021, with 25% directed toward new expansion. The document concludes that these initiatives allow polluters to greenwash their business plans and avoid meaningful regulation.

The report analyzes the links between 'Big Polluters' and three major net-zero initiatives: the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market, the High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on Net-Zero Commitments of Non-State Entities, and the Race to Zero. It argues that these initiatives are compromised by leaders and advisors with deep ties to the fossil fuel industry, allowing companies to 'greenwash' their business models while continuing to finance fossil fuel expansion. The document highlights specific instances where financial institutions and corporate executives within these bodies have a history of funding fossil fuels or opposing environmental justice, thereby questioning the credibility of the standards and guidelines these bodies produce.

The report analyzes the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM), the UN High-Level Expert Group (HLEG), and the 'Race to Zero' alliance, asserting that these bodies are compromised by ties to the fossil fuel industry. It details how board members and advisors have professional links to companies like ExxonMobil, Shell, and BP, or financial institutions that continue to fund fossil fuel expansion. The document argues that these connections allow polluters to use 'net zero' frameworks as a tool for greenwashing and to avoid regulations that would require actual emission reductions at the source.

The report finds that Canada's comprehensive wealth grew by only 7 per cent per person between 1980 and 2013, a rate significantly lower than the 54 per cent growth in individual consumption over the same period. While Canada remains the wealthiest G7 nation per capita, it has the lowest growth rate in comprehensive wealth among that group. The analysis reveals a stark decline in market natural capital, stagnant human capital, and produced capital growth that is dangerously concentrated in housing and oil and gas extraction. The document advocates for the federal government to fund Statistics Canada to regularly report comprehensive wealth measures to guide a transition toward a low-carbon, diversified economy.

The report provides an overview of global environmental governance in 2022, noting a return to face-to-face multilateralism after the pandemic. Key achievements include the adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, the launch of plastics treaty negotiations, and the agreement to establish a loss and damage fund for vulnerable countries. It also examines the integration of human rights into environmental policy and the impact of the war in Ukraine on environmental governance.

The document defines 'critical minerals' as raw materials essential for renewable energy and clean technology, noting that criticality is context-specific and varies by country. It identifies two primary perspectives on criticality: security and control of supply (emphasized by the US, EU, and Japan) and value capture (emphasized by China, Australia, and Canada). The guide highlights the role of rare earth elements (REEs) in permanent magnets and lists key demand drivers such as e-mobility and decarbonization. It also discusses supply sources, including the significant role of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) for cobalt and tantalum, and emerging sources like deep-seabed mining. Finally, it outlines the macroeconomic and geopolitical risks associated with mineral dependency, such as 'Dutch disease' and supply chain concentration.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of critical minerals, which are essential for renewable energy and low-carbon technologies. It distinguishes between two primary perspectives on criticality: supply security (emphasized by the US, EU, and Japan) and value capture (emphasized by China, Australia, and Canada). The text details the importance of rare earth elements, the drivers of demand—such as electric mobility and decarbonization—and the role of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). It also highlights the significant increase in mineral requirements for electric vehicles and the global demand projections for 2050, while warning governments about supply risks, macroeconomic volatility, and the 'Dutch disease'.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of critical minerals, which are essential for clean energy technologies and a low-carbon future. It explains that 'criticality' is context-dependent, defined either by supply security (import dependence) or strategic valuation (leveraging abundance). The text highlights the specific role of rare earth elements (REEs), the massive increase in mineral demand for electric vehicles and decarbonization, and the growing importance of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) alongside emerging sources like deep-sea mining and phytomining. It concludes by weighing the economic opportunities of value chain development against risks such as production concentration, price volatility, and the 'Dutch disease'.

The document examines how the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated pre-existing gender inequalities in the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector globally, with a focus on women's disproportionate loss of income, increased food insecurity, and limited access to healthcare. Through case studies in Zimbabwe, Peru, and the Philippines, it illustrates how women's roles—often classified as 'secondary'—led to higher layoff rates and exclusion from government aid. The brief argues for a three-tiered policy approach: emergency rapid gender assessments, short-term resilience measures based on gender-disaggregated data, and long-term structural reforms including gender-responsive budgeting and formalization of the sector.

The document explores the 'brownfield to brightfield' transition, where contaminated or abandoned mine sites are repurposed for renewable energy. It highlights two primary examples: the SunMine solar project in Kimberley, BC, and the Windpark Hünxe in Ruhr, Germany. Both cases demonstrate how utilizing former mining land can reduce financial liabilities, leverage existing electrical infrastructure, and provide community economic benefits while mitigating greenhouse gas emissions.

The document details the establishment of the Mine Audits Unit and the role of the Chief Auditor in British Columbia, created to ensure independent, transparent evaluation of the provincial mining regulatory framework. This initiative followed the 2014 Mount Polley tailings storage facility breach and a 2016 Auditor General report that found compliance and enforcement activities were inadequate. The first major audit focused on Tailings Storage Facilities (TSFs), concluding that 2016 Code revisions have had positive impacts but identifying seven recommendations for improvement, including resolving inconsistencies with the Water Sustainability Act and clarifying ambiguous language. The Ministry has accepted these recommendations and established a Strategy and Advisory Services Team to implement them.

The report examines how the mining industry must balance the surge in demand for critical minerals needed for low-carbon technologies with the necessity of reducing its own greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate-driven risks like water scarcity and tailings dam failures.

The 2022 state of global environmental governance was marked by a post-pandemic return to in-person multilateralism, resulting in significant milestones such as the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and the agreement to establish a loss and damage fund for vulnerable countries. The report notes the rise of 'nature-based solutions' across various treaties and the formal recognition of the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment by the UN General Assembly. However, geopolitical tensions, specifically the war in Ukraine, and ongoing financial gaps continue to challenge the implementation of these global goals.

The report finds that while the French information ecosystem showed relative resilience during the 2022 elections, there was a significant rise in domestic anti-system narratives and far-right mobilisation. The limited impact of destabilisation efforts is attributed to the war in Ukraine diverting Russian resources, institutional pressure from the French government and EU (specifically the Digital Services Act), the regulated nature of the French electoral system, and the continued influence of traditional media. However, the authors warn of a growing trend of distrust in democratic institutions and the normalisation of polarising rhetoric by far-right actors using coordinated inauthentic behaviour and astroturfing.

The report analyzes the role of Telegram as a 'buttress' for far-right and conspiracy-oriented actors in Germany. Through link analysis of 238 channels, it finds that while Telegram serves as a primary hub and file-sharing tool, these actors continue to strategically use established platforms like YouTube despite regulatory efforts such as the NetzDG. The study highlights the influence of 'power users' like Attila Hildmann, who build complex networks of channels to maximize reach and circumvent platform restrictions.

The WACC New Years Message 2023 reflects on the organization's resilience following the COVID-19 pandemic and sets priorities for 2023. Key goals include expanding programs for digital justice, combating online gender inequality and violence, and addressing immigration narratives. The organization also commits to communicating climate change issues in accessible ways and integrating the voices of marginalized groups into national policy making.