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The document examines the evolution of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) from a cooperative pool to a competitive regional electricity market (REM). It highlights the role of the SADC Energy Protocol and the integration of independent power producers (IPPs) and renewable energy sources (RES), using South Africa's REIPPPP as a primary example of private sector participation. The analysis identifies significant challenges, including the lack of political will among member states, disparities in national energy policies, and infrastructure deficits, while noting the potential for regional integration through shared hydropower and thermal resources.

The report argues that while trade integration in SADC has been stagnant, integration in public goods sectors like water, power, and conservation has seen varying degrees of success. It finds that these processes are heavily dependent on third-party financing and often suffer from a disconnect between donor-driven regional agendas and national service delivery priorities. The document highlights that SADC lacks the institutional capacity to implement policies, often requiring independent entities or NGOs to manage funds and projects. Case studies on REDD+, transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs), and the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) illustrate that bottom-up collaboration and the transposition of regional goals into national law are more effective than top-down mandates.

The Southern African sugar sector is a vital agricultural industry characterized by high levels of state involvement and concentrated private ownership, particularly by South African firms. While the SADC region accounts for approximately 54% of African sugar production, the sector operates within a highly distorted global market marked by heavy subsidies and dumping. Regional cooperation is managed through the SADC Protocol on Trade (Annex VII), which establishes import quotas for surplus producers to access the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) market. The industry faces significant risks from the reform of the EU's preferential trade scheme for ACP countries, which threatens the value of exports for several regional producers.

The paper examines why Angola, SADC's second-largest economy, has remained outside the SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) despite signing the Protocol on Trade (PoT) in 2003. While the government of Angola (GoA) cites the need to rebuild its war-ravaged industry and protect 'infant industries' from cheap imports, the author argues that this protectionism is contradictory given Angola's openness to imports from China, Brazil, and Portugal. The analysis suggests that vested interests—specifically 'Empresários de Confiança' (trusted businessmen with political links)—benefit from existing high-cost import monopolies and may be discouraging the FTA. The document also critiques the SADC Secretariat for its lack of enforcement mechanisms to hold member states accountable for protocol violations.

Brazil provides technical assistance to Africa primarily through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), focusing on South-South solidarity and the transfer of domestic expertise in agriculture, health, and social policy. While Brazil has established flagship projects like ProSavana in Mozambique and 'Cotton-4' in West Africa, the rapid expansion of these commitments has led to institutional overstretch, a lack of monitoring mechanisms, and a need for greater transparency and civil society involvement.

Angola is implementing a tax reform programme to increase non-oil tax revenues to 20% of GDP by 2017, aiming to reduce its acute dependence on oil. The reform includes merging national tax and customs agencies, updating tax codes, and introducing new property and consumption taxes. However, the document highlights significant obstacles, including a narrow tax base, lack of fiscal decentralisation, endemic corruption, and a weak taxpaying culture. While political will exists, the ease of collecting oil revenues may reduce the urgency for the sweeping reforms needed to address persistent underdevelopment and high inequality.

The August 2012 elections in Angola saw the ruling MPLA party retain power with 71 per cent of the vote, though this was a decrease from 82 per cent in 2008. The document describes the election as a 'procedural exercise in democracy' characterized by widespread irregularities, including the use of a 'parallel counting centre' and 'forced abstention' through the manipulation of voter lists. It highlights a rising tide of social unrest, specifically among youth and demobilised soldiers, and the emergence of a more consolidated opposition through UNITA and the new CASA-CE coalition. The report further details the consolidation of power by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos through constitutional amendments and the creation of a US$5 billion Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSDEA) managed by his son, while noting that the regime's failure to address poverty and corruption may lead to future instability.

The policy briefing addresses the declining momentum of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and its National Programmes of Action (NPOA). It identifies causes for this decline, such as lack of interest from heads of state and insufficient financial support, and proposes reviving the process by integrating NPOA into National Developmental Plans (NDPs) and collaborating with African Union organs and regional economic communities.

The research paper argues that South Africa's military involvement in the Central African Republic (CAR) is driven by a desire to contest Western influence and secure resource interests. It highlights the CAR's wealth in diamonds, uranium, and potential oil, which has attracted Chinese investment and caused friction with France. The author notes that South Africa's efforts to resist 'western interference' have been undermined by a lack of regional diplomatic support and insufficient intelligence infrastructure, leading to a 'humiliating experience' in the face of more established international rivals.

The research paper analyzes Senegal's strategic relationship with Guinea-Bissau from 2000 to 2012. It argues that under President Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal exercised a policy of patronage and influence over its smaller neighbor to secure military cooperation against the Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC). This influence was built on Senegal's relative economic power, diplomatic networks, and direct financial support to Guinean leaders and military officials. However, the document notes a decline in Senegalese influence after 2009 due to the deaths of key allies and the emergence of Angola as a primary diplomatic and financial partner for Guinea-Bissau.

The report assesses worldwide methane emissions from the oil and gas sector, estimating 2010 emissions at 1,554 MMTCO2e. It argues that methane is a critical target for short-term climate mitigation due to its 20-year global warming potential (GWP) being 72 times that of carbon dioxide. The document details over 80 abatement technologies, such as vapor recovery units and infrared leak imaging cameras, while analyzing barriers including government price controls, lack of industry knowledge, and the complexities of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

The document finds that while trade among BRICS nations has grown, intra-BRICS FDI remains low and lacks strategic policy direction. Most BRICS countries rely on traditional investors from the EU, US, and Japan, though China, India, and Brazil have increased resource-seeking investments in Africa. The briefing recommends collaborative research, comparative studies of investment frameworks, and improved statistics to foster sustainable, development-oriented FDI within the bloc.

The document outlines the regional expansion of Capricorn Investment Holdings (CIH) from Namibia into Botswana and Zambia, detailing the regulatory, fiscal, and infrastructural challenges encountered. Key barriers identified include the absence of double taxation agreements with Zambia, skill shortages in Namibia, and the high cost of compulsory IT system localisation. CIH advocates for a regional currency within SADC to reduce exchange rate volatility and suggests that Southern African countries should specialise in specific services to foster genuine regional integration.

The research examines how the physical and economic characteristics of natural resources predispose them to be exploited by warring factions in Africa. It posits that resources requiring low specialized skills, high portability, and high liquidity (like alluvial diamonds) are more likely to fuel conflict. Conversely, capital-intensive resources (like deep-level gold or oil) are less attractive to rebels but can still be linked to conflict through state weakness and elite rent-seeking. The author emphasizes that while resource characteristics create vulnerabilities, the state's capacity to manage grievances and maintain territorial control determines whether these vulnerabilities lead to actual conflict.

The document analyzes the evolution of China's strategies to secure mineral resources in Africa, moving from a primary reliance on 'infrastructure-for-resources' loans to a more diversified approach emphasizing mergers and acquisitions (M&A). While infrastructure-for-resources deals have been effective in locking in long-term supply, they have often failed to secure hard equity assets due to project delays and political instability. In contrast, the 2008-09 global financial crisis enabled Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to use their high liquidity to acquire significant mining and oil assets through M&As, particularly in the mining sector. The author concludes that while the Chinese state remains a critical financier, the strategy has shifted toward more market-oriented, direct acquisitions to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers and gain control over commodity prices.

The document analyzes Senegal's use of patronage, economic influence, and military cooperation to exercise power over Guinea-Bissau from 2000 to 2012. It highlights how Senegal leveraged Guinea-Bissau's instability to secure military support against Casamance separatists, while noting the eventual decline of this influence due to the rise of Angolan involvement and internal Senegalese political shifts.

The document describes a planned conference, 'The APRM +10: Reviewing a Decade of Peer Learning and Projecting a Future of Governance in Africa', to be held in Addis Ababa in May 2013. It seeks to evaluate the APRM's progress since its 2003 establishment, specifically focusing on the implementation of National Programmes of Action (NPoAs) and the role of civil society in holding member states accountable. The briefing highlights the tension between the voluntary nature of the APRM and the compulsory nature of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), while calling for better synergies between the APRM and other AU organs, such as the Pan African Parliament and the Peace and Security Commission.

The document analyzes Zambia's energy sector and the incentives provided by the government to attract private investment in renewable energy. It details a framework of fiscal incentives (tax exemptions on dividends, import duties, and corporate tax), financial incentives (grants from the Rural Electrification Fund and government-backed loan guarantees for ZESCO), and other support services provided by the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) and the Office for Promoting Private Power Investment (OPPPI). While stakeholders report a generally positive trend and increased interest in projects, the report notes a lack of transparency regarding the actual costs of these incentives and a need for greater legal clarity regarding which renewable energy technologies qualify for support.

The 2011 elections in the DRC were marked by significant logistical failures, allegations of fraud, and persistent insecurity, particularly in the east. While Joseph Kabila was declared the winner and consolidated power, the process was criticized by international observers and the opposition for lacking transparency. Post-election dynamics have been characterized by continued instability in the Kivu regions, including military mutinies and the emergence of the M23 group, alongside deep-seated socio-economic poverty and ethnic polarization.

The document argues that South Africa's status as an economic gateway is primarily driven by its geography and infrastructure, though this role is challenged by emerging regional and global competitors. It assesses South Africa's capacity as a hub for regional headquarters, logistics, sourcing, and finance, while examining the impact of transport corridors and trade policies on its regional dominance.