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The document defines a Green foreign policy as a holistic approach that prioritizes human rights, democracy, and environmental sustainability over narrow economic interests. It advocates for the reform of international organizations like the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions to increase transparency and representation for the Global South. The framework emphasizes the strengthening of international law, specifically the International Criminal Court, and supports restrictive weapons export policies and UN-mandated military interventions. It also calls for a development agenda that links environmental sustainability with social inclusion and conflict prevention through the 'Responsibilities to Protect' (R2P) framework.

The statement asserts that South Africa's 'soft power' and global standing depend on its domestic adherence to constitutional principles and the rule of law. It advocates for a more effective 'economic diplomacy' based on a national consensus between the state and the private sector to leverage opportunities in the African continent and the global economy. The author emphasizes that as a small regional power, South Africa's primary interest lies in a rules-based international order and multilateralism, while cautioning against over-reliance on specific blocs like BRICS at the expense of other collaborations.

The document analyzes the emergence of the BRICS grouping as a non-hegemonic alternative to Western-dominated financial institutions, focusing on the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) to address infrastructure deficits in the developing world. It details South Africa's strategic use of the NDB and its own development finance institutions, such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), to promote regional integration and economic growth within the SADC region and across the African continent.

The document assesses South Africa's strategic position in global development, arguing that the country can strengthen its peacebuilding and PCRD efforts in Africa by leveraging the IBSA Fund and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). It highlights the role of the newly established SADPA in coordinating these efforts while cautioning that South Africa must align its PCRD vision with the African Union and manage domestic perceptions of its outgoing aid.

The document assesses South Africa's role as an emerging global actor in peace and security, specifically its interactions with the UN peacebuilding architecture (PBC, PBSO, and PBF). It highlights South Africa's experience in mediation and peacekeeping in countries like the DRC and Burundi, while noting a lack of systematic staffing of South Africans in the UN system. The paper emphasizes the potential of South-South cooperation, exemplified by the IBSA Fund, and recommends that South Africa leverage the 2015 UN peacebuilding review to promote African perspectives and national ownership of peace processes.

The paper examines the shift in global trade governance from the WTO toward 'mega-regional' agreements like the TPP and TTIP, which establish new norms on issues such as the environment and labour. It warns that South Africa risks investment deflection and isolation if it continues a blocking strategy in the WTO while other BRICS nations, particularly China, consider engaging with these new frameworks. The author recommends that South Africa use regional initiatives like the Tripartite Free Trade Area to experiment with new regulatory agendas and proactively propose plurilateral initiatives within the WTO.

The report analyzes the deadlock of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and the subsequent shift toward preferential trade agreements (PTAs). It argues that the rise of international supply chain trade (SCT) requires the WTO to move away from a 'silo approach' to policy and instead adopt a framework that addresses the joint impact of tariffs, services, and regulations on value chains. The author suggests using the WTO as a forum for deliberation on new issues—such as digital trade and environmental policies—and proposes a 'code of conduct' for plurilateral agreements to allow subsets of members to advance without requiring full consensus.

The report argues that avoiding dangerous climate change requires a sophisticated international regime combining top-down UNFCCC direction with broad bottom-up action. It identifies climate diplomacy as the critical interface between national interest debates and international cooperation, requiring three core capabilities: 'knowing yourself' (understanding national interests), 'knowing the other' (analyzing other actors' constraints), and the 'capacity to influence' (integrating priorities into diplomatic channels). The authors highlight that most countries have not yet sufficiently embedded climate change into their 'whole of government' decision-making machinery, often leaving it siloed in environment ministries. The document outlines the evolution of the climate regime from narrow UNFCCC negotiations to a broader system including the G20, Major Economies Forum, and security councils, while emphasizing the need for strategic confidence-building and the use of 'unusual alliances' to overcome political stalemates.

The document outlines how climate diplomacy can advance multilateral action beyond the UNFCCC and identifies barriers and strategies for countries, especially LDCs, to build their diplomatic capacity. It recommends a 'whole-government approach' to integrate climate change across ministries and the development of specialized skills for diplomats and climate experts.

The author contends that the TTIP agreement will harm countries in the Global South, specifically citing risks to Mexico's clothing industry and citrus exports from South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco. The text argues that the primary goal of TTIP is for the EU and USA to establish global standards and maintain economic dominance, potentially forcing other nations to accept unfavorable terms or splitting the world into competing trade blocs. This process is viewed as a move away from the transparent, multilateral trade order established after World War II.

The author contends that the TTIP will harm the Global South through the diversion of trade flows and the imposition of EU-US standards on other nations. Mexico is highlighted as particularly vulnerable, specifically in its garment industry. The text suggests the agreement is a strategic attempt by the US and EU to bolster their diminishing economic influence and sideline the BRICS nations, potentially undermining the multilateral trading system in favor of a non-transparent, power-driven trade regime.

The Greens oppose the TTIP due to a lack of transparency, the potential for lowered consumer and environmental standards, and the use of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. They argue that the agreement undermines multilateralism by setting global standards without broader international consultation and call for the inclusion of civil society and parliaments in the negotiation process.

The Green party opposes the TTIP due to its secretive negotiation process and the risk that it will lower standards for consumer protection, health, and the environment. They specifically reject the inclusion of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism and the potential for the agreement to impose global trade standards that undermine the World Trade Organization and the influence of the Global South.

The author critiques the European Union's lack of preparation for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, warning that the United States is likely to use GMO products as a 'make-it-or-break-it' condition. The text argues that the EU must protect its environmental, climate, and consumer standards, and suggests that the positive agenda for TTIP should focus on energy and resource efficiency to support a low-carbon economy. It further cautions against using TTIP as a strategic tool to contain China, suggesting instead a multilateral approach to global trade to avoid dividing the world into competing blocs.

The document analyzes the strategic relationship between Russia and South Africa, noting that while political ties are strong and mutually beneficial for challenging existing global governance structures (such as the IMF and G-20), economic cooperation remains significantly underdeveloped. It highlights South Africa's role as a gateway to the African continent and the potential for BRICS to serve as a coordination mechanism for developing nations to increase their bargaining power in global forums. The authors argue that increasing trade and investment flows is essential to making the BRICS forum more credible and reliable.

The document argues that while the G-20 provides a more inclusive framework for global economic governance than the G-8, BRICS cooperation within it remains issue-based rather than institutionalized due to diverging national interests. It highlights that Brazil and South Africa share a reliance on soft power and a desire for institutional reform, which strengthens their bilateral alignment. The author identifies two primary areas for BRICS consensus in the G-20: the reform of international financial institutions like the IMF and a shift toward developmental issues. While the BRICS have successfully influenced the G-20 agenda and blocked certain industrialized-nation proposals, they struggle to speak with a single voice on trade and monetary policy.

The document analyzes South Africa's role as a 'middle power' and 'systems stabiliser' within the G-20 and BRICS. It argues that while South Africa uses these platforms to enhance its global profile and champion the 'African Agenda', its positions on finance and food security are often generalist rather than grounded in specific domestic strategies. The paper evaluates the potential of the BRICS Bank to address infrastructure gaps in Africa and highlights the lack of a cohesive collective identity among BRICS members, which limits their ability to act as a unified counterweight to the G-7. It concludes that South Africa must better align its external engagements with measurable domestic development imperatives to avoid 'bureaucratic capture' and ensure tangible benefits for its citizens.

The document outlines the Chinese view of South Africa as a critical 'bridge' between the BRICS nations and the African continent. It highlights the 'comprehensive strategic partnership' between China and South Africa, noting that while economic complementarity is strong, challenges exist regarding South Africa's investment environment and trade imbalances. Chinese analysts argue that South Africa's domestic political stability and regional leadership provide it with 'irreplaceable unique advantages' that enhance the BRICS' collective voice in reforming global economic governance, particularly within the IMF and G-20.

The document examines South Africa's role in global economic governance, analyzing the tension between liberal democratic values and domestic political pressures. It evaluates South Africa's alignment with the KAS guidelines, concluding that while current policies are generally compatible, future trajectories are uncertain due to internal factional battles within the ruling tripartite alliance and a potential shift toward state capitalism.

The document analyzes the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership against a backdrop of the euro-zone crisis and the rise of BRICS. While the EU remains South Africa's primary trading partner and a key donor, the relationship is strained by perceptions of EU imperialism, disputes over Economic Partnerships Agreements (EPAs), and disagreements on the reform of Bretton Woods institutions. Despite these frictions, the author argues that shared values of multilateralism and constitutionalism make the partnership essential for both parties to navigate a changing global order.