Search Climate Insights Directory

The report documents the killing of 124 land and environmental defenders in 2025, with Latin America remaining the most dangerous region. It highlights the role of organized crime, extractive industries, and state repression in these attacks, while advocating for 'collective protection' and the legal recognition of indigenous guards.

In 2024, Global Witness documented 146 land and environmental defenders murdered or disappeared globally, with 82% of cases occurring in Latin America. The report identifies mining as the deadliest industry and highlights the disproportionate targeting of Indigenous Peoples and small-scale farmers. It examines specific crises in Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, Guatemala, and Palestine, while critiquing the failures of state protection mechanisms and the rise of criminalization. The document calls for the ratification of the Escazú Agreement, the implementation of mandatory corporate due diligence, and the formal recognition of defenders' roles in climate solutions ahead of COP30.

In 2024, 146 land and environmental defenders were murdered or disappeared globally, with 82% of cases occurring in Latin America. Mining remains the most lethal sector, followed by logging and agribusiness. The report highlights systemic failures in state protection, high levels of impunity, and the criminalization of activists. It specifically examines the precarious situation of indigenous and peasant communities in Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, Honduras, Guatemala, and Chile, while also addressing the environmental destruction and land expropriation in occupied Palestinian territories. The document calls for the ratification of the Escazú Agreement, the implementation of the EU's Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, and the guaranteed safe participation of defenders in COP30.

Global Witness reports that 1,733 land and environmental defenders were killed between 2012 and 2021, with 200 deaths recorded in 2021 alone. The report identifies extreme land inequality, corruption, and the repression of civic space as primary drivers of violence, particularly affecting indigenous peoples in the Global South. It highlights critical situations in Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and the Philippines, while advocating for the implementation of the Escazú Agreement and mandatory corporate due diligence in the EU to protect those on the front lines of the climate and biodiversity crises.

In 2024, 146 environmental and land defenders were killed or disappeared globally, with 82% of cases occurring in Latin America. The report identifies mining as the deadliest industry for defenders and highlights the role of organized crime and state actors in these attacks. It specifically examines the critical situations in Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, Honduras, and Guatemala, while detailing the systemic failures of state protection mechanisms and the criminalization of activism. The document calls for the ratification of the Escazú Agreement, the implementation of binding corporate due diligence laws, and the recognition of defenders' roles in climate solutions ahead of COP30.

The report provides a comprehensive overview of Peru's sustainable finance landscape, detailing the growth of Green, Social, and Sustainability (VSS+) bonds. It highlights Peru's role as a regional pioneer, starting with the first green bond in Latin America in 2014, and examines the current market composition where sustainable bonds dominate. The document identifies significant investment gaps in infrastructure, water management, and low-carbon transport, while outlining a roadmap for growth involving key public and private stakeholders. It also addresses systemic barriers such as low market liquidity, currency risk, and the need for a national green taxonomy.

The report analyzes Peru's sustainable finance landscape, noting that while it was a regional pioneer with the first green bond in 2014, its GSS+ market has expanded more slowly than its peers. As of April 2022, the market reached approximately USD 6.6bn across 16 deals, dominated by sovereign sustainability bonds. The document identifies significant investment gaps in infrastructure (USD 110bn) and sanitation (USD 22bn), while highlighting opportunities in renewable energy, low-carbon agriculture, and nature-based solutions. It outlines structural barriers such as low market liquidity, currency hedging challenges, and political instability, and recommends the development of a national green finance taxonomy by 2025 to provide clarity and attract capital.

The report details a period of institutional violence in Honduras following the 2009 coup, characterized by the criminalization of environmental and land defenders, systemic gender-based violence, and the expansion of transnational corporate control over natural resources. It documents specific cases of human rights abuses, including the murders of Berta Cáceres and Keyla Martínez and the forced disappearance of Garífuna leaders. The text argues that the state acted as a facilitator for extractivist projects—such as hydroelectric dams and 'model cities' (ZEDEs)—often ignoring the right to free, prior, and informed consent. It concludes by welcoming the election of Xiomara Castro as a step toward democratic recovery and calls for continued international solidarity to support a feminist and just transition.

The document details a 12-year period of state-sponsored violence and corporate exploitation in Honduras after the 2009 coup. It focuses on the criminalization of environmental defenders, the disproportionate impact of femicide and patriarchal violence, and the role of transnational corporations in seizing indigenous lands for tourism and energy projects. It concludes by supporting the transition to the government of Xiomara Castro and advocating for continued international solidarity.

The document argues that as China tightened regulations on domestic heavy rare earth mining, production shifted to Myanmar, specifically Kachin Special Region 1. This illicit industry is controlled by armed militias and Chinese interests, leading to severe environmental degradation, human rights abuses, and labor violations. Because China controls the vast majority of global processing, these minerals enter the supply chains of major international companies producing electric vehicles and wind turbines. The report recommends that companies and governments implement strict due diligence and import restrictions to prevent the green transition from fueling harms in Myanmar.

The report identifies widespread labor rights violations by Chinese companies in Southern Africa, including low wages, unsafe working conditions, and unfair dismissals. It highlights a systemic failure of national governments to enforce labor laws, often exacerbated by corruption and political ties between Chinese investors and local elites. While some positive impacts on employment and infrastructure are noted, the study emphasizes the precarious nature of these jobs and the marginalization of trade unions.

The Centre for Environmental Rights (CER) submitted written representations on 29 July 2022 regarding the Draft Mine Health and Safety Amendment Bill, 2022. The CER argues that the current Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996 and the proposed amendments fail to adequately protect the constitutional rights of communities living near mines, specifically regarding the impacts of mine blasting.

The document argues against the use of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to subsidize the mining of critical minerals, advocating instead for a circular economy based on recycling and reuse. It demands that if DPA mechanisms are used for metals such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt, the US government must mandate free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) from Indigenous communities, binding human rights due diligence, and strong anti-corruption measures. The authors emphasize the need to avoid repeating the 'generational trauma' of past government-subsidized mining and suggest the US adopt frameworks similar to the EU Battery Directive.

The report argues that while Canada has a competitive advantage in clean electricity, industrial electrification is stalled by technical gaps, grid reliability concerns, and the low cost of natural gas. It focuses on the manufacturing, mining, and construction sectors, noting that industry electricity use must increase from 25% to 41% by 2050. To accelerate this, the authors propose three primary catalysts: the development of near-term corporate electrification plans and pilots, the alignment of utility planning with net-zero pathways to ensure power supply, and the use of financial mechanisms like carbon contracts for difference to provide carbon pricing certainty.

The report identifies the manufacturing, construction, and mining sectors as having high potential for electrification to reduce Canada's industrial greenhouse gas emissions. It highlights three primary barriers: technical readiness for hard-to-abate sectors, concerns over electricity reliability and availability, and the low cost of natural gas. To overcome these, the report proposes three catalysts: the development of short-term electrification plans by companies, the alignment of utility planning with net-zero trajectories, and the implementation of guaranteed carbon pricing mechanisms, such as carbon contracts for difference.

The document analyzes China's strategic control over the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) cobalt and copper supply chains, from extraction to refining. It examines the 'resources-for-infrastructure' model initiated under President Joseph Kabila and the subsequent efforts by President Félix Tshisekedi to renegotiate contracts. The author argues that while a 'US vs China' rivalry narrative exists, the dynamics are heavily influenced by internal Congolese political needs, including electoral goals and financial gain, and notes that Chinese firms are often preferred due to their flexibility in opaque business environments.

The document serves as a toolkit for the press to evaluate the environmental proposals of Colombian presidential candidates. It identifies critical areas of concern—including deforestation, climate change, energy transition, and marine conservation—and provides data-driven contexts and specific lines of inquiry to ensure candidates are held accountable to national and international commitments.

The author develops a conceptual framework to analyze how non-domestic proxy actors attempt to hold governments and corporations accountable for the social and ecological damages of natural resource extraction in rentier states. Using the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a model, the paper identifies an 'hourglass' structure of engagement: proxies first define standards remotely, then seek compliance information from affected communities, and finally seek sanctions remotely, which can widen the gap between the proxies and the communities they represent.

The report finds that most agreements between Sámi reindeer herding districts and developers in Sweden provide limited benefits and introduce significant risks, often reflecting 'manufactured consent' due to a lack of alternatives. While some agreements include protections for reindeer wellbeing or revenue sharing, many contain harmful clauses such as 'gag orders' (confidentiality) and open consent for undefined projects, particularly in the wind power sector. The authors argue that Sámi districts should broaden their negotiation goals beyond simple economic compensation to include veto rights and project closure conditions, drawing on examples from Australia and Canada.

CrossBoundary Energy is implementing a hybrid-renewable energy grid for a mine in Fort Dauphin, Madagascar, to replace unreliable heavy fuel oil (HFO) power. The project includes 8 MW of solar PV, 12 MW of wind turbines, and an 8 MW battery storage system (BESS), financed by EUR 24,152,505 in equity.