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The IEU report for Q1 2022 outlines the completion of an evaluation on investments in least developed countries and the progress of the Second Performance Review (SPR). It details the development of 15 GCF Evaluation Standards to ensure high-quality, credible evidence and reports on the unit's budget expenditure, staffing updates, and communication efforts across various digital platforms.

The methodology evaluates carbon credits across seven quality objectives: robust GHG impact determination, avoidance of double counting, addressing non-permanence, facilitating the transition to net zero, institutional arrangements of the crediting program, environmental and social impacts, and host country ambition. It employs a standardized scoring system (1-5) using point systems and 'inverse weighing' to ensure that a low score in one critical criterion cannot be offset by high scores in others. The guide focuses on ex-post credits and provides detailed indicators for assessing additionality, vulnerability in collapsed markets, and the alignment of credits with the Paris Agreement's Article 6 and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

The GCF is developing its own Environmental and Social Safeguards (ESS) to replace the interim IFC Performance Standards. The proposed framework expands from eight to ten standards, adding dedicated standards for Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure (ESS 9) and Climate Change Resilience and Adaptation (ESS 10). Key updates across all standards include a shift from a 'do-no-harm' to a 'do-good' approach, emphasizing the generation of positive co-benefits, the integration of circular economy principles, and a stronger focus on human rights, gender equality, and intersectionality. The document outlines specific structural and content changes for each standard, including new requirements for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions disclosure, the use of a precautionary approach, and enhanced protections for Indigenous Peoples and vulnerable groups.

The document clarifies the distinctions between Article 6.2 and 6.4 mechanisms, the role of 'corresponding adjustments' in preventing double counting, and the transition of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) into the new framework. It highlights risks such as the potential for 2.8 billion 'dud' credits from transitioning CDM projects and the lack of mandatory cancellation for ITMOs under Article 6.2.

The author contends that outdated Kyoto-era carbon credits lack environmental integrity and that reviving the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) would not benefit the climate. The text highlights the lack of legal basis for continuing the CDM after 2020 and notes the significant uncertainty regarding the volume of existing credits, with estimates ranging from 300 million to over 4 billion CERs.

The document outlines five primary concerns regarding Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: the lack of buyer demand compared to sellers, the prevalence of unregulated private sector greenwashing, the oversupply of low-quality credits, the struggle to find high-integrity removal credits, and the risk of legacy credits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) undermining new climate targets.

The statement criticizes the Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance (AOA) for its 'The Net in Net Zero' paper, which encourages asset owners to scale investment in offsets and negative emissions technologies. The author contends that this focus shifts attention away from the necessary deep decarbonization and the phase-down of fossil fuel production. The text highlights the failure of previous offsetting schemes, such as the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and argues that current efforts by the AOA and the Task Force on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets (TSVCM) will replicate these flaws. It concludes that asset owners should follow the International Energy Agency's (IEA) 'Net Zero by 2050' report by stopping investments in new oil and gas projects.

The document critiques the negotiations surrounding Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, specifically the market-based approaches in paragraphs 6.2 and 6.4. It argues that these mechanisms allow developed nations to avoid direct emission reductions and fail to provide necessary public finance to the global South. The author highlights risks such as double counting, lack of environmental integrity, and human rights abuses, including land grabbing and displacement of Indigenous Peoples. Friends of the Earth International advocates for the rejection of carbon markets in favor of non-market approaches (Article 6.8) and direct, grant-based public finance from Northern governments to Southern countries.

The document critiques the negotiations surrounding Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, specifically the market-based approaches of Articles 6.2 and 6.4. It argues that carbon markets are incompatible with the 1.5°C goal and serve as a tool for developed nations and fossil fuel companies to avoid direct emission reductions. The author highlights technical risks such as double counting and the lack of a legal mandate for demand, while advocating for non-market approaches under Article 6.8 and direct public climate finance from the Global North to the Global South.

The document critiques the carbon market mechanisms being negotiated under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, specifically Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 6.8. It argues that these markets allow developed countries and fossil fuel companies to avoid direct emission reductions through offsetting, which the author claims is incompatible with limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. The briefing highlights technical concerns such as double counting and the lack of a legally binding demand for carbon credits, while emphasizing the risks to Indigenous peoples and local communities, including land grabbing and forced displacement. It calls for a shift toward non-market approaches and the fulfillment of public climate finance obligations by the Global North.

Carbon Market Watch argues that environmental integrity under Article 6 requires the mandatory application of corresponding adjustments to all mitigation activities to prevent double counting. The briefing strongly opposes the carry-over of pre-2020 Kyoto Protocol units, asserting they would flood the market with up to 4 billion "junk credits" and increase global emissions. Additionally, it advocates for a share of proceeds (SOP) for adaptation that combines monetary and in-kind contributions, recommending that this levy apply to both Article 6.2 and 6.4 mechanisms to ensure stable finance for developing countries.

Carbon Market Watch argues against the transition of CDM credits to the Paris Agreement era, warning that up to 4 billion "hot air" credits could flood the market. The organization advocates for a clean break from the Kyoto Protocol, requiring all CDM projects to be reassessed against strict quality criteria. To enable climate ambition under Article 6, the submission proposes the use of conservative baselines, an automatic partial cancellation rate of credits to ensure overall global emission reductions, and the restriction of carbon markets to the disbursement of results-based climate finance rather than zero-sum offsetting.

The GCF and GEF have established a Long-Term Vision (LTV) to move beyond their Pilot Coordinated Engagement (launched in 2018) toward a structured partnership. The LTV focuses on three pillars: collaborative programming for major initiatives (such as the Great Green Wall and Amazon initiatives), sharing knowledge and methodologies to maximize climate impact, and improving joint communication. The funds aim to leverage their unique strengths—GEF's focus on upstream enabling environments and multi-convention synergies, and GCF's ability to mobilize large-scale blended finance for climate-specific benefits—to reduce duplication and streamline support for developing countries.

Between 2008 and 2019, fifteen CO2-intensive industrial sectors in nineteen EU countries earned estimated additional profits between €30 billion and over €50 billion from the EU ETS. These profits were derived from three primary sources: the overallocation of free emission allowances, the use of cheaper international credits (CERs/ERUs) for compliance, and the passing through of opportunity costs of free allowances into product prices. The iron and steel sector was the largest beneficiary, with profits ranging from €11.9 billion to €16.1 billion. In contrast, the aviation sector experienced a net loss of €151.2 million due to the need to purchase allowances. The report argues that free allocation may no longer be fit for purpose and recommends increasing the share of auctioning combined with targeted investment subsidies or a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to reduce windfall profits and encourage decarbonization.

The document outlines the structure and process for developing GCF Country Programmes, which serve as the foundation for prioritizing climate finance proposals. It details five mandatory components: country context, climate finance strategy, project priorities, institutional needs, and stakeholder engagement. The guide emphasizes alignment with national climate plans (such as NDCs and NAPs) and the role of Accredited Entities in implementing these priorities over four-year programming cycles.

The report argues that emissions trading mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement risk undermining global mitigation ambition and causing human rights violations. It proposes three essential policy pillars—robust public participation, social and environmental safeguards, and independent grievance mechanisms—as prerequisites for any such framework. The document highlights failures in previous systems like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and provides examples of 'good policies' from development finance institutions to guide the UNFCCC in creating a rights-compliant rulebook.

The document outlines a framework for countries to create long-term strategies (LTS) for low-emission development in alignment with the Paris Agreement. It proposes that LTS development be a continuous planning process integrated with Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) cycles, utilizing three levels of complexity—from basic to detailed—to allow countries to improve the robustness of their strategies over time across eight key aspects.

The report examines past experiences with sustainable development in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), voluntary markets, and non-UNFCCC multilateral institutions to inform the operationalisation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. It analyses draft texts from SBSTA 50 and CMA2 to propose three scenarios for incorporating sustainable development into the guidance and rules of Article 6, concluding with specific text amendments and suggestions for a potential work programme to ensure safeguarding provisions are anchored in the final rules.

The research evaluates the vulnerability of CDM projects and the supply potential of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) between 2013 and 2020. It finds a significant oversupply of CERs, with 4.6 billion potential units available, while only 4% originate from highly vulnerable project types. The analysis suggests that strict eligibility restrictions on CER supply are necessary to ensure that new demand supports genuine, additional emission abatement.

The document argues that while the world possesses sufficient global financial assets to fund sustainable development, a significant financing gap and a persistent digital divide hinder the achievement of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. It traces the history of UN efforts from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration to the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, highlighting the critical need for technology transfer and financial mobilization for developing countries. The text notes that developed countries have struggled to meet the USD 100 billion annual climate finance goal and identifies barriers to technology diffusion, including intellectual property rights and insufficient absorptive capacities. It concludes by calling for better alignment between development cooperation and climate action to ensure financing does not undermine sustainable development.