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The document argues that flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, specifically the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), have failed to achieve net emission reductions due to non-additional credits and 'hot air' surpluses. It calls for a severe restriction on the trade of emission surpluses, the exclusion of fossil-fuel-based mega-projects from the CDM, and the establishment of international human rights and oversight standards for carbon projects.

The document argues that current market mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, specifically the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), are failing due to the issuance of non-additional credits and the accumulation of 'hot air' (excess AAUs). It calls for a strict regulation of emission permits, the prohibition of large-scale fossil fuel energy projects from generating credits, and the establishment of an arbitration mechanism to protect human rights and social impacts in CDM projects.

The document critiques the CDM's standardized baseline framework, arguing that its one-size-fits-all approach to performance thresholds and benchmarks may lead to both under-crediting and over-crediting of projects. It highlights risks to environmental integrity, particularly because the voluntary nature of these baselines may encourage developers to select them only when they yield more credits than project-based baselines.

The authors argue that the current CDM framework for standardized baselines is too rigid and impractical, potentially leading to both over-crediting and under-crediting of emission reductions. They recommend moving away from a single methodological approach in favor of sector-specific, data-driven baselines that are mandatory once approved and reflect technological trends over time.

Carbon Market Watch proposes eleven specific reforms for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to be discussed at CMP8, focusing on additionality, project bans, human rights, and governance.

Carbon Market Watch outlines recommendations for the WG-KP 18th session, emphasizing the urgency of climate action to avoid warming of 4°C or more and addressing specific technical issues including the carry-over of assigned amount units and the review of the clean development mechanism.

The EU-ETS is the world's largest cap-and-trade system, regulating approximately half of the EU's CO2 emissions across 30 countries. While it has evolved through three trading periods to include more greenhouse gases and airline emissions, the system has suffered from severe over-allocation of allowances, leading to price collapses and a surplus of approximately 2 billion allowances by the end of 2012.

Ninety-five organizations from 31 countries have raised concerns regarding MDL project No 3197 in the Bajo Aguán Valley, Honduras, citing evidence of severe human rights violations and violence against peasant communities.

The document serves as a technical and strategic manual for Nepal's delegation to the UNFCCC. It explains the institutional structure of the climate regime, analyzes Nepal's high vulnerability to climate change—particularly in the Himalayas—and outlines national policies like the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). It details Nepal's engagement with mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and REDD+, while advocating for a 1.5°C global warming limit and increased, direct climate finance for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and mountain nations.

The document critiques the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for failing to deliver sustainable development benefits, noting that host countries often lack incentives to enforce rigorous sustainability criteria to avoid deterring investment. It highlights that only greenhouse gas reductions have economic value in the current system, leading to projects that may cause local harm, such as displacement and pollution. The author, CDM Watch, advocates for international sustainability criteria, mandatory safeguards, monitoring plans, and grievance mechanisms to prevent negative impacts.

China transitioned from being 'slow off the mark' in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to dominating the market by employing a coordinated capacity-building strategy and strong governmental oversight. Central to this success was the appointment of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) as the Designated National Authority (DNA), ensuring that climate policy was managed by a powerful 'heavy-hitting' ministry rather than a less influential environment ministry. China implemented unique restrictions to protect its interests, including a floor price for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), revenue levies ranging from 2% to 65% to fund the state-controlled CDM Fund, and requirements for Chinese control of project entities. These experiences have served as a foundation for China's transition toward a domestic emissions trading system, with pilot programs in cities like Beijing and Shanghai starting in early 2013 and a nationwide goal for 2015. Furthermore, China integrated carbon intensity reduction goals into its national 5-year plans, linking the performance of local officials to the achievement of these environmental targets.

The submission advocates for carbon pricing in the international aviation and maritime sectors to reduce emissions and generate funds for climate action, while cautioning against the use of non-additional offsets based on experiences with JI and CDM.

The report finds a significant surplus of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) from the first Kyoto commitment period (CP1), totaling 12,637 Mt, which vastly exceeds the estimated demand of 11.5 Mt. It notes that the ability to carry over these surpluses to the second commitment period (CP2) depends on a country's participation in CP2, meaning Russia's stated intent not to join would remove 5.8 Gt CO2e from the available surplus.

Coal mining accounts for 8 percent of global methane emissions. While significant potential exists for abatement through degasification and ventilation air methane (VAM) oxidation, progress is hindered by policy, financial, and technological barriers. In China, legal frameworks and conflicting safety/emission standards create hurdles, while India lacks resource assessments. Russia faces issues with licensing and inefficient degasification systems. In the US, split-estate ownership on federal lands and a lack of federal mandates limit viability. The report suggests that while large-scale investment is available, a lack of small-scale funding for design and demonstration is a primary obstacle, proposing revolving funds and micro-loans as solutions.

The document examines China's strategic approach to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), highlighting the role of powerful ministries, coordinated capacity building, and specific market restrictions to ensure local benefits.

Transparencia Mexicana analysed 150 Project Design Documents (PDDs) for CDM projects in Mexico as of June 2012 to evaluate the integrity of public consultation processes. The study found that a lack of regulation allows project developers full discretion over consultation design, leading to poor reporting of results and minimal recording of public requests for mitigation or compensation. The authors argue that current guidelines are insufficient and recommend reforming the CDM consultation process to better facilitate interactions between diverse stakeholders, including local communities, academics, and specialized public authorities, to prevent manipulation and exploitation.

The document argues that local stakeholder consultations for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in India and Mexico are frequently inadequate or falsified due to a lack of clear guidelines and oversight. In India, project proponents often omit meeting details from public notices, provide documents in English that are inaccessible to impoverished villagers, and produce reports that omit unfavorable comments. The author provides case studies from Gujarat involving a solar project and a biogas project to illustrate how villagers were excluded or ignored. To improve transparency and sustainable development, the document recommends mandatory videography of consultations, publishing notices in local languages and multiple newspapers, and ensuring the public is informed about their 2% share of carbon credit sales.

The paper examines the fragmented landscape of climate change adaptation finance, analyzing the roles of the UNFCCC, the Adaptation Fund, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). It argues that the current system is a 'non-system' characterized by inefficiencies, double counting of funds, and a lack of standardized metrics for success. The author explores the potential for regional banks, such as the African Development Bank, to provide more effective, decentralized management of funds. The document concludes by offering lessons for the Green Climate Fund (GCF), emphasizing the need for direct access modalities, clear ring-fencing of assets, and a transparent trustee selection process to avoid conflicts of interest, particularly regarding the World Bank.

The Prosol program (2005-2010) successfully scaled the deployment of solar water heaters in Tunisia by combining capital subsidies, concessional credit, and a unique risk-mitigation framework. By leveraging the state utility STEG as a debt collector and guarantor, the program reduced credit risk for commercial banks, leading to a 1:5 public-to-private investment ratio. The initiative not only increased installed capacity fivefold but also generated significant fiscal returns for the Tunisian government by reducing expenditures on liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) subsidies.

The report examines the financing gap for smallholder farmers in developing countries, who are critical for global food security but highly vulnerable to climate change. It argues that achieving a 'triple dividend'—increased food production, improved adaptive capacity, and reduced emissions—requires a coordinated mix of public, private, and climate-specific financing. The document analyzes the limitations of current mechanisms, such as the decline in official development assistance for agriculture and the high transaction costs of carbon markets, and recommends creating national funds and enabling policy environments to support climate-smart agricultural transitions.