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The document analyzes proposed EU amendments to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) intended to simplify compliance for EU importers. While the briefing notes that changes to the scope and payment timing may have minimal material impact on African exporters, it warns that modifications to 'default values' for embedded emissions and carbon pricing could negatively affect exporters. Specifically, the shift toward global averages for the most carbon-intensive countries rather than EU-specific benchmarks may increase costs for African producers lacking reliable data. The report concludes that the amendments primarily benefit EU importers and may penalize African exporters who lack the administrative capacity to provide actual installation data.

The 2024 Independent Assessment finds that Canadian carbon pricing systems are effective, delivering between a third and a half of all projected emissions reductions by 2030. While systems have harmonized in coverage and stringency since 2020, some large-emitter trading systems (LETS) in Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan are at risk of losing effectiveness due to credit oversupply and adverse policy interactions. The report also notes that while LETS generally mitigate competitiveness risks for large emitters, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face varied exposure, with some sectors like water and truck transportation showing high vulnerability.

The 2024 independent evaluation finds that Canada's carbon pricing systems are effective, contributing between one-third and one-half of all projected emission reductions from climate policies by 2030. While systems are more harmonized than in 2020, the report warns that the rigor of some industrial exchange systems (SEGE) could erode by 2030 due to an oversupply of credits caused by overlapping policies. Coverage is broad, encompassing 77% of national emissions, though gaps remain in heating oil and agricultural fuels. Competitiveness risks for large emitters are generally mitigated through design features and subsidies, while small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) face varying pressures, partially offset by new federal revenue recycling mechanisms.

The document examines the evolution of stabilization clauses in the mining sector, arguing that traditional 'freezing' and 'economic equilibrium' clauses often constrain a state's right to regulate. It promotes the 2020 OECD Guiding Principles, which delegitimize non-fiscal stabilization and advocate for a targeted, commercially justified approach to fiscal stabilization. The guide introduces the concept of 'revenue certainty' for governments and provides specific model clauses for laws and contracts to ensure that investors' needs for predictability are balanced against the state's public interest objectives and the need to prevent tax base erosion.

The document examines the evolution of stabilization clauses in the extractive sector, arguing for a shift away from 'freeze' and 'economic equilibrium' clauses toward a model based on the 2021 OECD Guiding Principles. It distinguishes between non-fiscal stabilization, which it argues should be abandoned to protect the state's right to regulate for the public interest, and fiscal stabilization, which should be limited to specific, time-bound commercial needs. The guide provides detailed model language for laws and contracts to ensure revenue certainty for governments and predictability for investors, while explicitly excluding the use of stabilization to protect against anti-tax avoidance measures or climate-related regulations.

Brazil has announced a new NDC targeting a greenhouse gas emissions reduction of 59–67% by 2035 relative to 2005 levels. To achieve this, the government is developing a 2024-2035 Climate Plan consisting of an Adaptation Plan and a Mitigation Plan. The document argues that private sector investment is essential for success and recommends harmonizing sectoral policies, promoting corporate transition plans, and strengthening public-private dialogue. Key focus areas include halting illegal deforestation, decarbonizing agriculture, transitioning energy and industry away from fossil fuels, and implementing a national Emissions Trading System (ETS).

The paper proposes a state-led fiscal strategy for South Africa's energy transition, centered on a climate response fund. It recommends mobilizing domestic resources through carbon taxes, fuel levies, and mineral royalties, alongside the issuance of climate bonds. The goal is to protect vulnerable workers, particularly in coal-dependent regions like Mpumalanga, and provide an estimated R100 billion annually for climate priorities.

The research paper advocates for South Africa to move away from a market-led 'blended finance model' (BFM) for its just energy transition, arguing that market failures necessitate a state-led approach. The author proposes a 'climate response fund' to be financed by a combination of carbon tax increases, earmarking the General Fuel Levy and Mineral and Petroleum Resource Royalty, and implementing public sector efficiency reforms and retirement tax deduction caps. Together, these measures could generate over R100 billion annually for adaptation and equity. The paper also suggests the issuance of sovereign green bonds to fund renewable energy grid infrastructure, arguing for a gentler fiscal deficit glide path to accommodate this strategic investment.

The policy brief contends that South Africa must move beyond the blended finance model for its just energy transition due to market failures and risks of insufficient or unpredictable private capital. It proposes a suite of domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) measures—including sovereign green bonds, carbon tax reforms, and earmarking existing revenues—to generate approximately R100bn annually for climate priorities. These funds would be pooled into a central climate response fund dedicated to adaptation, equity, and supporting displaced workers, particularly in Mpumalanga. The author argues that this assertive domestic commitment is essential for maintaining state control over infrastructure and for unlocking larger-scale international finance between 2030 and 2050.

The report finds broad support among U.S. registered voters for various climate policies, including methane limits, carbon dioxide regulation, and renewable energy expansion, though support levels vary significantly by political affiliation. While a majority support the Paris Climate Agreement and the Inflation Reduction Act (after reading a description), actual political advocacy and collective efficacy remain low.

The South African Climate Finance Landscape 2025 reports an annual average of ZAR 188.3 billion in climate finance for 2022–2023, though this remains well below the estimated annual need of up to ZAR 499 billion. Investment is heavily skewed toward the energy sector, which receives 74.1% of total flows, primarily for renewable electricity generation. In contrast, adaptation finance is lagging, accounting for only 11.3% of tracked flows. While domestic sources provide nearly 60% of funding, international flows are dominated by public development finance institutions, particularly from Western Europe. The report highlights significant barriers, including grid bottlenecks, policy uncertainty, and a lack of concessional capital for high-risk or non-revenue-generating adaptation and just transition projects.

The report outlines three primary investment opportunities in the Western Cape's renewable energy sector: embedded solar PV for C&I and agricultural users, large-scale wind and solar projects, and behind-the-meter (BTM) lithium-ion storage. While the market is driven by rising electricity costs, decarbonisation pressures from export markets (such as the EU's CBAM), and a liberalising regulatory framework (Electricity Regulation Amendment Act of 2024), it faces significant barriers. These include severe grid constraints, administrative backlogs in municipalities, a shortage of specialised technical skills, and a high reliance on imported battery components, particularly from China.

The guide outlines the landscape of renewable energy in South Africa, emphasizing the shift toward private procurement and the dominance of solar PV. It details two primary implementation models—embedded generation and wheeling—and provides a comprehensive breakdown of financing options, including bank-specific instruments and power purchase agreements. The document also highlights the strategic role of backup storage for peak shaving and load shifting, lists available South African tax incentives for energy efficiency and renewable assets, and identifies critical grid and regulatory hurdles businesses may encounter.

The report outlines a shift in South Africa's renewable energy sector from public procurement to private off-taker agreements, driven by electricity market liberalisation and corporate decarbonisation needs. It estimates a total investment potential of R132 billion for private renewable energy development and R16 billion for local component manufacturing by 2030. Key barriers include severe grid capacity constraints in high-resource provinces and policy uncertainty regarding the future of public procurement programmes.

The paper examines the challenges South Africa and Brazil face in transitioning to green economies and their shared vulnerability to the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). It argues that both nations perceive CBAM as a form of 'green protectionism' that violates WTO non-discrimination principles and the Paris Agreement's principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). The authors suggest that South Africa and Brazil can collaborate through BRICS and BASIC to advocate for fairer trade rules, technological support, and the integration of development needs into WTO climate provisions. Domestically, the paper recommends that South Africa accelerate its Renewable Energy Masterplan (SAREM) and reform its carbon tax, while Brazil should formalise a national carbon pricing regime and enforce its Forest Code to maintain export competitiveness.

The paper analyzes how South Africa and Brazil utilize climate financing to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, highlighting the differences between South Africa's coal-dominant economy and Brazil's land-use-driven emissions. It evaluates national mechanisms such as South Africa's carbon tax and Brazil's proposed Emissions Trading Scheme, while advocating for the reform of multilateral development banks to lower the cost of capital for the Global South. The author emphasizes the importance of green taxonomies and central bank risk management in mobilizing private investment and ensuring financial stability during the energy transition.

The document outlines a process for conducting climate scenario analysis on investment portfolios using a static approach. It employs NGFS scenarios to model the financial impact on sovereign bonds (Colombia and USA) and specific industrial sectors (oil, gas, energy, and cement) from 2025 to 2050. The analysis demonstrates that ambitious climate policies generally decrease the valuation of carbon-intensive sectors like oil and cement due to lower demand and carbon taxes, while benefiting the energy sector. It also shows that orderly transitions tend to lower the risk perception and yields of Colombian sovereign bonds compared to disorderly or delayed scenarios.

The document examines the challenge of carbon leakage, where carbon pricing in one jurisdiction drives emissions to others. It evaluates several policy responses: international carbon pricing frameworks, Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs), carbon cost containment (such as free allocations in ETS), subsidies, and product standards. Each tool is analyzed based on its effectiveness in preventing leakage, its impact on decarbonization incentives, administrative complexity, and potential conflicts with WTO law or international principles like 'common but differentiated responsibilities'.

The document examines the phenomenon of carbon leakage, where carbon pricing in one jurisdiction leads to increased emissions in others. It evaluates several mitigation tools, including Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs), carbon cost containment measures (such as free allocations in ETS), subsidies, and product standards, while noting the political and practical hurdles of achieving a coordinated global carbon price.

The report analyzes the cost gaps for battery energy storage systems (BESSs), offshore wind, solar PV, electric vehicles (EVs), and green hydrogen (GH2) in India. It finds that while current subsidies are sufficient for solar PV and BESSs, significant additional support is needed for offshore wind, EVs, and GH2. Macroeconomic modeling suggests that bridging these gaps generally boosts GDP and employment, except for GH2, which remains cost-uncompetitive until after 2050.