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The author contends that CORSIA fails to address aviation's climate impact because it only covers emissions above a high baseline and lacks binding national enforcement mechanisms. Even with penalties, the scheme would only cover 20% of emissions for a Brussels-New York flight by 2030. In contrast, the EU ETS is presented as a superior model due to its 100% coverage of intra-EEA flights and harmonised penalties of €100 per tonne of CO2. The document advocates for the European Commission to extend the EU ETS to all departing flights by mid-2026, which could generate up to €9 billion annually by 2030 to fund zero-emission aircraft and high-speed rail.

The document examines the role of the proposed UN Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) in addressing corporate impunity for environmental and human rights abuses. It argues that existing voluntary frameworks, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, are inadequate because they lack enforceable obligations. The LBI is presented as a mechanism to turn the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment (RtHE) into actionable obligations, including strict liability for parent companies and extraterritorial jurisdiction. The text highlights specific cases of corporate harm in Uganda, Chile, Senegal, India, Brazil, Colombia, Serbia, Iraq, and the 'Lithium Triangle' to illustrate the need for binding regulation. It also discusses how recent Advisory Opinions from the International Court of Justice and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights reinforce the necessity of state-led regulation of private actors to prevent climate and environmental harm.

The document advocates for a legally binding international treaty to end corporate impunity for environmental and human rights abuses, highlighting the insufficiency of voluntary frameworks and the potential of the UN's Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) process to establish enforceable obligations, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and effective remedies for affected communities.

The document translates the ICJ's 2025 Advisory Opinion on climate change into practical legal tools for climate litigation. It details State obligations under international treaties (UNFCCC, Paris Agreement) and customary law, emphasizing a 'rigorous' due diligence standard to limit global warming to 1.5°C. The guide covers specific litigation areas including government framework cases, adaptation, reparations, the right to a healthy environment, corporate conduct, climate finance, speculative interventions (like geoengineering), and regulatory backsliding, providing key quotes and illustrative case examples for each.

The document translates the ICJ's 2025 advisory opinion into practical tools for climate litigation, focusing on government framework cases, adaptation, remedies, the right to a healthy environment, corporate conduct, climate finance, speculative interventions, and regulatory rollbacks. It emphasizes that States have binding obligations to limit warming to 1.5°C, act with 'stringent' due diligence based on the best available science (IPCC), and protect human rights. The notes detail how these findings can be used to challenge inadequate NDCs, hold corporations accountable for emissions, and oppose the dismantling of environmental protections.

The document analyzes the ICJ's advisory opinion to argue that States must prioritize reducing greenhouse gas emissions at the source over speculative technologies like geoengineering and carbon offsets. It outlines how the ICJ's standards of 'stringent due diligence' and the 'precautionary principle' can be used in litigation to hold States and corporations accountable for ineffective climate strategies that delay the phase-out of fossil fuels.

The document translates the ICJ's 2025 advisory opinion into practical tools for climate litigation, focusing on government framework cases, adaptation, remedies, the right to a healthy environment, corporate conduct, climate finance, speculative interventions, and regulatory rollbacks.

The report argues that fossil fuel supermajors use the voluntary carbon market (VCM) as a strategic pillar to maintain a green image while continuing carbon-intensive operations. It details how these companies and trade associations like IETA and API lobby for weaker credit quality standards and increased flexibility in offsetting Scope 3 emissions. The document specifically critiques the governance of the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM) and the Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative (VCMI), alleging that the inclusion of industry representatives in decision-making roles creates significant conflicts of interest that risk diluting integrity standards.

Despite the veto of SB 643, California can leverage SB 840 and the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund to scale its carbon dioxide removal industry, ensuring it meets its 2030 and 2045 targets while preventing homegrown companies from relocating.

The Canadian Climate Institute argues that current federal benchmark tests for large-emitter trading systems (LETS) create 'false positives' by verifying market liquidity without ensuring the price signals are strong enough to drive decarbonization. Through modelling of 57 scenarios for Alberta's TIER system, the Institute found that 77% of systems passing federal tests failed to meet the $130-per-tonne stringency target. The report recommends anchoring equivalency to the Effective Marginal Credit Price (EMCP) and prioritizing benchmark tightening while limiting dilution mechanisms like direct investment credits.

The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), supported by the Climate Policy Initiative and Promethium Carbon, has developed two financial instruments to scale the voluntary carbon market (VCM) in South Africa. A proposed carbon credit-backed bond would raise capital for project loans, with repayments consisting of cash interest and carbon credits. A Carbon Repo Facility would provide short- to medium-term liquidity by allowing developers and banks to sell carbon credits with an agreement to repurchase them later. These tools aim to bridge the gap between high demand for offsets—driven by the national carbon tax—and a limited supply of bankable projects caused by high early-stage costs and regulatory ambiguity.

The document examines the evolution of carbon pricing globally and regionally, with a deep dive into Southeast Asian markets. It analyzes the impact of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on regional exports and the progress of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Specific country updates detail Indonesia's operational ETS, the Philippines' legislative efforts toward a cap-and-invest system, and Viet Nam's pilot phase for a national compliance market.

The Private Equity Stakeholder Project outlines five categories of climate standards for private markets investors: alignment with science-based targets, disclosure of fossil fuel exposure and emissions, the requirement for portfolio-wide energy transition plans, integration of environmental justice and community protections, and transparency regarding political spending and climate lobbying. The framework recommends specific timelines, such as phasing out coal power by 2030 and achieving a 4:1 ratio of low-carbon energy supply investments relative to fossil fuel investments by 2030.

The author contends that Alberta's TIER carbon market is currently broken, with credit prices hovering below $20 a tonne despite a headline price of $95. To align with the Alberta-Canada Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) goal of a $130 per tonne minimum price by 2030, the document proposes reducing the 48 million surplus credits through a revenue-recycling procurement fund and tightening performance standards to limit the supply of new credits and offsets.

Carbon Market Watch argues that Verra's VM0052 methodology for coal transition credits is flawed and risks issuing low-quality credits that do not represent real emission reductions. The briefing identifies critical failures in additionality testing, baseline setting, leakage prevention, and just transition safeguards, specifically highlighting risks in the Philippines' energy context. It recommends a total suspension of the methodology until significant revisions are made to prevent overissuance and carbon leakage.

Carbon Market Watch concludes that Verra's VM0052 methodology for coal-to-clean carbon credits is inadequate and should not be used to issue credits in its current form. The report identifies critical risks of carbon leakage, over-estimation of emission reductions due to static baseline assumptions, and potential double counting. It also finds that the 'just transition' requirements are too vague and susceptible to manipulation, particularly regarding benefit-sharing and worker compensation. Using the South Luzon Thermal Energy Corporation (SLTEC) project in the Philippines as a case study, the report illustrates how independent power producers could build new coal plants to replace retired capacity, nullifying climate benefits. The author urges Verra to suspend the methodology and implement substantive revisions.

Carbon Market Watch argues that Verra’s VM0052 methodology for coal transition credits is significantly flawed and should be put on hold. The briefing identifies critical risks of carbon leakage due to low renewable energy pairing requirements, weaknesses in baseline-setting and additionality tests, and inadequate safeguards against double issuance. It also finds that just transition provisions are unreliable, particularly regarding benefit-sharing and stakeholder mediation. Using a case study of the South Luzon Thermal Energy Corporation (SLTEC) in the Philippines, the document illustrates how the methodology could allow for the overissuance of credits that do not represent real emission reductions.

In 2025, Europe transitioned toward commercial-scale CCS deployment, marked by the first fully operational value chain at Norway's Brevik cement plant. While ten projects reached final investment decisions (FID) between December 2024 and October 2025—adding approximately 4 Mt CO2/year of capture and 14 Mt CO2/year of storage capacity—deployment remains far below the trajectories needed for 2040 and 2050 climate targets. Progress is heavily reliant on blended finance and corporate carbon dioxide removal (CDR) offtake agreements, particularly with Microsoft. Geographically, CCS is expanding from Northern European hubs into Southern and Central & Eastern Europe, with new projects in Spain, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary. Policy advancements include the Net-Zero Industry Act's 2030 injection target and Germany's 2025 legislation classifying CO2 transport and storage as projects of overriding public interest.

The report investigates whether corporate use of carbon credits substitutes or complements internal emission reductions. A review of existing literature shows mixed results: while several studies find a positive correlation between carbon credit use and internal emission reductions, a peer-reviewed study by Stolz and Probst (2025) finds no significant correlation and provides qualitative evidence of 'mitigation deterrence' in some cases. Interviews with companies indicate that the role of carbon credits is shifting due to greenwashing concerns and the rise of science-based targets (SBTi). The authors conclude that developing a robust empirical study to prove causality is inherently challenging due to endogeneity, data limitations in the CDP database, and structural changes in corporate climate strategies.

The report examines the transition of cookstove carbon credits from legacy methodologies, which faced allegations of over-crediting, to more rigorous, CCP-approved standards. It identifies monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) as a high-concern risk due to complex human behaviors like stove stacking and the Hawthorne effect, while highlighting the role of new tools like MoFuSS and the forthcoming CLEAR methodology in improving credit integrity.