Search Climate Insights Directory

The document analyzes the resource requirements and potential externalities of direct air capture (DAC) at both a single-plant (1 MtCO2/year) and a system-wide (0.5 GtCO2/year) scale. It finds that while on-site emissions are low, significant impacts arise from energy demand, land use, and the materials supply chain. The authors argue that responsible scaling requires project-specific social and environmental impact assessments, robust community engagement, and the use of legal agreements like Community Benefits Agreements to ensure equitable distribution of benefits, such as job creation.

The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) argues that carbon dioxide removals (CDR) are essential for the EU to reach climate neutrality by 2050, as current emission reduction policies are insufficient. CATF proposes a certification mechanism based on a 'long-cycle' (geological storage) and 'short-cycle' (terrestrial sinks) categorisation rather than a binary 'natural' vs 'industrial' split. To ensure environmental integrity, CATF recommends seven minimum standards: real, measurable, permanent, additional, avoidance of leakage, avoidance of double counting, and sustainability. The submission emphasizes that credits from short-cycle and long-cycle removals should not be fungible, with long-cycle removals carrying higher value due to their permanence. CATF also suggests a three-step process for integrating innovative CDR methods and a governance structure involving a clear division of responsibilities between public authorities and private certification bodies, supported by a Union-wide registry.

The testimony asserts that CCUS is not a viable climate solution, citing its failure to meet capture targets, high costs compared to renewables, and the risk of increasing lifecycle emissions. It highlights that most captured carbon is used for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), which produces more CO2 than it captures. The author warns of significant safety risks from CO2 pipelines and the environmental dangers of offshore storage in the Gulf of Mexico, where legacy oil and gas wells increase the likelihood of leaks and ocean acidification.

The authors evaluate the EU and German recovery funds, noting that while they are framed as 'green', much of the funding remains conditional or vague. They contrast this with the 2008 financial crisis, where green investments were limited. The text emphasizes the role of the European Parliament in ensuring accountability and pushing for a 60% CO2 reduction by 2030, while warning that Germany's current plans may not meet its 65% renewable energy target due to restrictive zoning laws and continued fossil fuel subsidies.

The analysis by CIEL and the Heinrich Boell Foundation argues that the IPCC Working Group III Summary for Policymakers obscures warnings about the dangers of 'overshoot' and reliance on speculative technologies. It asserts that a rapid, equitable fossil fuel phaseout is the only certain path to avoid irreversible harm, whereas current modeled pathways often assume continued fossil fuel use and rely on unproven carbon removal methods due to political pressure from fossil fuel-producing nations.

The briefing contends that the IPCC's mitigation pathways are skewed by economic assumptions in integrated assessment models (IAMs) and political pressures during the Summary for Policymakers (SPM) negotiation process. It argues that avoiding a 1.5°C overshoot is imperative to prevent irreversible harm and that the most feasible, cost-effective path is a rapid phaseout of fossil fuels combined with scaling renewables and reducing energy demand. The document warns that reliance on CCS, BECCS, and DACCS is a dangerous gamble, as these technologies are unproven at scale, costly, and may prolong fossil fuel use while threatening food security and biodiversity.

Analysis by Carbon Limits for Clean Air Task Force indicates that the public funding per tonne of CO2 avoided for recent carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects in Norway and the Netherlands is comparable to, or lower than, the average funding spent by EU schemes for onshore wind, offshore wind, and solar power since 2012.

The document outlines the role of BECCS as a carbon dioxide removal (CDR) method, noting its technical potential to remove 0.5-11.3 GtCO2 annually by 2050. However, it warns that large-scale deployment could threaten food security, biodiversity, and Indigenous rights, potentially requiring land areas twice the size of Egypt by 2100 in 1.5°C pathways. The briefing emphasizes that delaying near-term emissions reductions increases reliance on BECCS, thereby escalating land-use pressures.

The policy brief contends that Germany cannot achieve climate neutrality by 2045 without carbon management technologies, including carbon capture and storage (CCS), direct air capture (DAC), and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). It highlights that current industrial emissions reductions are insufficient and that a lack of CO2 transport infrastructure and storage sites within Germany necessitates a strategy to connect to regional hubs in Northern Europe. The document further argues that carbon management is essential for decarbonizing the hydrogen economy—specifically through the use of blue hydrogen—and for producing the low-carbon industrial materials required for the renewable energy transition.

The document highlights the dependency of the European wind industry on steel, noting that turbines consist of at least 70% steel. It argues that while wind energy is critical for the EU's energy transition, the steel production process remains highly carbon-intensive, emitting 1.85 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of steel in 2020. Using the example of Dirostahl in Remscheid, the brief illustrates the technical and financial barriers to switching from fossil gas to hydrogen or carbon capture and storage (CCS), specifically citing a potential price increase of 700 to 800 Euro per tonne of steel if switching to renewable hydrogen. It calls for the development of hydrogen and CO2 pipeline infrastructure and the implementation of policy tools like Carbon Contracts for Difference to maintain industrial competitiveness during the transition.

The report identifies significant gaps in the monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) infrastructure for carbon dioxide removal (CDR), noting that existing frameworks are primarily designed for emission reductions rather than removals. It highlights inconsistencies in how permanence, system boundaries, and additionality are treated across different voluntary and compliance standards. The authors recommend the development of dedicated methodologies for Direct Air Capture (DAC) and Bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), the adoption of dynamic baselines aligned with Paris Agreement targets, and a standardized approach to defining 'permanent' storage to prevent the overestimation of mitigation results.

The report highlights a global trend toward phasing out coal power, accelerated by COP26 commitments, while identifying China as a significant exception due to its continued construction of new plants. It details the decline of international public financing for coal and the risks associated with 'clean coal' technologies like CCS.

The global coal fleet grew by 18.2 GW in 2021, primarily driven by China, which commissioned 25.2 GW of new capacity. While COP26 led to an increase in the number of plants with phase-out dates to 750 (550 GW), a significant gap remains to meet the 1.5C pathway, which would require retiring an additional 1,100 GW. Public financing for new international coal projects has largely ceased following pledges from G20 countries, including China, Japan, and South Korea. However, some nations continue to rely on unproven 'clean coal' technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS) to extend plant lifetimes.

The report details a global landscape where coal capacity is increasingly concentrated in China, while other regions face a decline in new projects. Despite a record number of phase-out announcements following COP26, the global fleet grew by 18.2 GW in 2021, primarily due to Chinese expansion. The document argues that 'clean coal' technologies are costly and ineffective distractions from the necessary total phase-out of coal power.

The report finds that while many countries are committing to end coal power, global capacity increased by 18.2 GW in 2021, driven primarily by China. While OECD countries and several non-OECD nations are cancelling projects, China's continued expansion and the use of unproven 'clean coal' technologies in some developed nations hinder alignment with the 1.5°C Paris Agreement target.

The report finds that while many countries are committing to 'No New Coal' and accelerating closures, China continues to expand its coal capacity, largely offsetting global reductions. As of 2021, 750 coal plants (550 GW) have determined closure dates, but a significant gap remains to meet IPCC 1.5°C targets, which would require an additional 1,100 GW of capacity to be cancelled or closed by 2030.

The report analyzes the global state of coal power, noting that while many OECD and non-OECD countries are canceling new projects and setting closure dates, China continues to expand its capacity. It highlights that 750 coal plants (550GW) now have effective closure dates following COP26, but global capacity increased by 18.2GW in 2021 due to Chinese additions. The document argues that 'clean coal' technologies like CCS are expensive and unreliable distractions from a full transition to renewables. Specifically for South Korea, it criticizes the 2050 phase-out goal as lagging behind international standards and notes the continued construction of new plants despite public commitments.

The report provides a comprehensive tracking of global coal-fired power plant capacity, highlighting a divergence between the decline of coal in most OECD and non-OECD countries and the continued expansion of coal capacity in China. It evaluates the effectiveness of COP 26 commitments, the role of public financing, and the perceived inefficiency of 'clean coal' technologies like Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).

The report finds that while many countries are committing to end new coal power, China continues to expand its capacity, offsetting global declines. In 2021, global operating coal capacity increased by 18.2 GW, largely driven by China, which accounted for 56% of new operational capacity. Despite COP26 commitments, a significant gap remains between current plans and the 1.5°C warming limit, which would require decommissioning an additional 1,100 GW of capacity by 2030. The report also critiques 'clean coal' technologies like CCS as costly and ineffective distractions from renewable energy.

The Europe Gas Tracker Report 2022 finds that the EU possesses substantial overcapacity for gas imports via pipelines and LNG terminals, making proposed new projects unnecessary. It argues that expanding this capacity is incompatible with the European Climate Law's 2030 emissions targets and the IEA's Net Zero by 2050 scenario. The report highlights that the EU's energy crisis is driven by global market tightness and supply shortages rather than a lack of import infrastructure. Furthermore, it critiques 'carbon-neutral' LNG claims as misleading due to methane emissions across the supply chain and warns that new gas assets risk becoming stranded.