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The report identifies 'Europe’s Democracy Stack' as a strategic public infrastructure consisting of independent organizations that perform nine critical public-interest functions, including disinformation research, digital rights litigation, and compliance monitoring. Despite its importance to the EU's digital sovereignty, the analysis finds that the stack is overwhelmingly dependent on non-EU funding—specifically US government and philanthropic sources—which is currently contracting. The authors argue that the EU's current short-term grant-based funding is structurally mismatched with the long-term nature of these functions. To close this capability gap, the paper proposes two primary reforms for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF): cost-neutral changes to the AgoraEU program to provide multiyear operating grants and the creation of a €1 billion European Democracy Stack Endowment Fund to provide a permanent funding anchor.

The report evaluates Bhutan's MEL system for its 2023 National Adaptation Plan, finding significant institutional fragmentation, capacity gaps, and a lack of quantifiable metrics for resilience. It recommends establishing a formal coordination mechanism between the Department of Environment and Climate Change, the Office of the Cabinet Affairs and Strategic Coordination, and the Ministry of Finance, alongside a unified national M&E system to replace outdated web-based tools and fragmented Excel reporting.

The report argues that the primary barriers to subsea power cable deployment in ASEAN are institutional rather than technical. It identifies gaps in regional planning, cost allocation, and maritime coordination, suggesting a phased approach to strengthen governance. Key recommendations include operationalising the ASEAN Power Grid Generation and Transmission Planning (AGTP) function, exploring cross-border cost allocation (CBCA) frameworks, and deepening the role of the Submarine Cable Working Group to manage the complexities of shared maritime spaces.

The GCF Accreditation Panel recommends the accreditation of HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation (APL180) for 'small' individual projects with a maximum environmental and social risk category of medium risk (category B/I-2). The assessment found that Helvetas fully meets most fiduciary, environmental, social, and gender standards, though it partially meets basic fiduciary standards due to gaps in internal audit quality assessment and the public disclosure of investigative guidelines. Helvetas is recommended for accreditation provided it meets specific conditions regarding the publication of its investigation terms of reference and the delivery of an external quality assessment of its internal audit function.

Latvia employs a "Comprehensive State Defence" model that integrates biosecurity into a whole-of-society resilience framework, led by the Ministry of Health. While the country possesses solid institutional foundations—including a BSL-3 national reference laboratory and a new Crisis Management Centre established in July 2025—it lacks a standalone national biosecurity strategy and does not explicitly identify biological weapons as a distinct threat in its security documentation. Latvia is heavily integrated into EU and NATO mechanisms, regularly conducting CBRN exercises such as RADEX 2025 and participating in ECDC preparedness assessments. Key areas for improvement include modernizing disease surveillance IT infrastructure, formalizing access to BSL-4 capabilities, and articulating a clearer posture against deliberate biological threats.

The document argues that major private credit rating agencies (CRAs) employ subjective, biased, and procyclical methodologies that unfairly inflate the risk premiums for African nations. This 'credit rating impasse' increases the cost of capital, hinders debt restructuring, and obstructs the deployment of climate finance. To counter this, the author supports the African Union's endorsement of the Africa Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) to be based in Mauritius. The brief recommends that African nations improve data transparency, build debt management capacity through partnerships with the IMF and AfDB, and implement legislative oversight via debt sustainability laws to improve their macroeconomic fundamentals and challenge inaccurate ratings.

The report examines Africa's green tech transition in 2025, highlighting the challenges posed by the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and the expiration of AGOA. It details continental efforts to mobilize $50 billion annually for climate solutions and the progress toward an African Single Electricity Market, while noting the emerging role of AI in climate action and the need for a just transition to prevent the marginalization of smaller firms.

The document analyzes how climate-induced stressors, such as desertification in the north and sea-level rise in the south, exacerbate security threats in Nigeria, including farmer-herder conflicts and insurgency. It evaluates the current security architecture, finding that while the National Security Strategy recognizes climate change, there is a significant lack of actionable integration within the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and other security agencies. The brief highlights gaps in institutional coordination, resource allocation, and risk assessment, while suggesting lessons from South Africa, Kenya, and Australia to build a more resilient, community-engaged policing model.

The report argues that the African Union Commission's reform, which reduced commissioners from eight to six, has led to institutional imbalances where crisis response overshadows conflict prevention. It highlights a significant funding gap for the new structure, costing an additional US$53 million. The document also analyzes the rise of military coups, attributing them to 'democratic subversions' such as the removal of term limits, and discusses the strain on Africa's humanitarian system due to conflict and climate shocks.

The report examines Bolivia's conservation landscape, highlighting a tension between formal state strategies and local practices. While Bolivia has a robust system of protected areas and land tenure, conservation outside these areas is often hindered by state priorities favoring extractivism and agribusiness. The document argues that indigenous territories and community-led initiatives offer significant potential for OECM recognition, provided that the state shifts toward a more inclusive, less bureaucratic, and better-funded support system that aligns with local livelihoods.

The report examines Ecuador's conservation landscape, highlighting the tension between a strong legal framework for biodiversity and a dominant extractivist economic model. It evaluates various conservation modalities, including the SNAP and OECMs, and argues that for OECMs to be truly inclusive, they must move beyond symbolic recognition to provide tangible benefits, secure land tenure, and respect the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.

The paper examines the transition of African carbon markets from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) legacy to the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. It contrasts an 'export-led' approach, which risks exploitative 'carbon grabs' and low pricing (USD 1-3 per tonne), with a 'sovereign-first' approach that uses carbon markets as tools for national decarbonization. The author proposes a five-pillar readiness framework—covering policy, registries, authorization, safeguards, and finance—to help countries move toward domestic compliance markets. Current progress varies across the continent, with South Africa and Egypt adopting domestic-focused 'Paris' mindsets, while Ghana and Rwanda remain more export-led, and Kenya and Nigeria occupying hybrid positions.

The document analyzes Nigeria's climate policy through four 'policy moments', highlighting a persistent struggle with institutional overlap and fragmented governance. It examines how internal competition between bodies like the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC) and the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy on Climate (OSPEC) dilutes Nigeria's international bargaining power. The paper also discusses the impact of global energy market shifts, the divestment of onshore assets by International Oil Companies (IOCs), and the challenges of removing fuel subsidies. It concludes that Nigeria must move away from transplanting foreign institutional models and instead develop a domestically driven, streamlined framework that integrates the petroleum sector into its climate goals.

The document analyzes the institutional strain on BRICS caused by its expansion, noting that while the bloc's global influence has grown, its consensus-based governance struggles with divergent member interests. It evaluates Brazil's 2025 presidency, which attempted to prioritize institutional development but saw most structural reforms deferred in the Rio Declaration. The authors contrast the informal nature of the broader bloc with the formal success of the New Development Bank (NDB) and propose six targeted, low-bureaucracy improvements—including a shared document repository and standardized onboarding—to improve operational effectiveness without sacrificing the group's flexible identity.

The report analyzes the complementary roles of VCEFs, MDBs, and NDBs in scaling climate finance, highlighting the potential for financial instruments like guarantees and catalytic equity to mobilize private investment. It identifies systemic barriers—such as complex accreditation and slow approval processes—and proposes a roadmap for non-financial collaboration through country platforms, technical assistance, and the creation of enabling policy environments. The document provides specific recommendations for the G20 Sustainable Finance Working Group to improve interoperability and leverage NDBs' local expertise to bridge the investment gap, particularly for adaptation in low-income countries.

The report analyzes the complementary roles of VCEFs, MDBs, and NDBs in the climate finance architecture, focusing on financial instruments like guarantees, equity, and local currency lending. It identifies systemic barriers such as complex accreditation and slow approval processes and proposes a framework for non-financial collaboration through country platforms, technical assistance, and the creation of enabling policy environments. The document provides a set of short- and mid-term recommendations to harmonize metrics, simplify due diligence, and unlock the potential of NDBs to increase the flow of climate finance to emerging markets and developing economies.

The report details the evolving role of Indigenous Peoples in the Rio Conventions, highlighting a shift from being viewed as stakeholders to recognized rights holders. Key 2024 achievements include the creation of a permanent Subsidiary Body on Article 8(j) under the CBD, the extension of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) mandate under the UNFCCC, and the establishment of two separate caucuses for Indigenous Peoples and local communities under the UNCCD. Despite these procedural gains, the report identifies persistent challenges, including limited direct access to funding and the ongoing tension over the use of human rights language and terminology in international environmental governance.

The document examines the fragmented nature of the global trade, finance, and investment ecosystem, which comprises approximately 200 organisations. It argues that institutions often operate in silos, leading to contradictory policies and a significant trade finance gap, particularly affecting African SMEs. The author advocates for G20-led reforms to align global governance with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and regional priorities like the AfCFTA. Key recommendations include the establishment of a G20–Africa Trade Guarantee Fund and the creation of a knowledge and coordination platform to enhance transparency and technical assistance.

The East African Community (EAC) has expanded its membership to include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia, aiming to increase its geopolitical influence and market size. However, this growth strains the bloc's institutional capacity, particularly regarding financial sustainability, bureaucratic efficiency, and the harmonisation of economic policies among fragile states. The inclusion of conflict-prone members introduces significant security risks, though it also provides opportunities for collective regional stability and trade integration through frameworks like the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement.

The African Union's admission as a permanent member of the G20 in September 2023 represents a shift in global economic governance, increasing the G20's global population representation from 65% to 80%. Historically, the G20 has been viewed as favoring advanced economies, with initiatives like the 2017 Compact with Africa (CWA) and the 2021 debt service suspension initiative (DSSI) criticized for serving the interests of wealthier nations or creditors. The AU's debut at the November 2024 Rio de Janeiro summit focused on priorities including financial system reform, food security, and climate resilience. However, the document warns that rising nationalism, specifically the 'America First' agenda of the Trump administration, poses a threat to the multilateralism necessary for the AU's effectiveness. To move beyond symbolism, the paper argues the AU must leverage the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to increase aggregate purchasing power—projected to reach USD 1.8 trillion by 2035—and emulate the European Union's model of policy harmonization to attract global investment.