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The pandemic has exacerbated existing infrastructure funding weaknesses in Africa, leading to potential debt defaults, as seen in Zambia's request to pause repayments on $3bn in bonds. China is a dominant creditor, with 44% of Zambia's total debt owed to it and 60% of this year's debt repayments from poor countries going to China. While China has joined the G20's Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), it prefers opaque, case-by-case negotiations and classifies some major lenders, like the China Development Bank, as commercial entities to exempt them from the initiative. The author suggests that African nations may enter deals similar to Laos's hydroelectric plant agreement—where a Chinese entity became the majority shareholder to forestall default—to avoid credit downgrades by agencies like Fitch Ratings and maintain access to capital markets, potentially increasing China's control over African state assets.

The document analyses the scope and direction of energy transition policies in 34 African countries, evaluating them against dimensions of energy justice. It finds a general shift toward market-oriented regimes using auction instruments and feed-in tariffs, but warns that an overemphasis on bankability can sideline development goals. The brief identifies several 'good practice' countries and recommends that AU-EU cooperation integrate energy justice criteria, support regional partners, and facilitate policy learning from African successes.

The document argues for a comprehensive AU-EU partnership on the green transition and energy access that moves beyond a risk-based lens to address Africa's developmental goals. It highlights the critical need to expand electricity access, leverage private investment through de-risking mechanisms, and integrate nexus issues such as agriculture and the digital economy. While acknowledging the disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, the briefing suggests the crisis offers an opportunity to redesign the partnership to ensure a just transition that includes skills development and gender mainstreaming.

The document analyzes the energy deficit in Africa, noting that over 600 million people lack electricity. It identifies key barriers to green energy adoption, including a need for $70 billion in annual investment, technical capacity gaps, and fossil fuel subsidies. The author argues that the AfCFTA can fast-track the transition by creating a unified market, reducing investment risks through dispute resolution mechanisms, and facilitating the free movement of skilled labor. Additionally, the briefing suggests that the EU-Africa partnership should shift from bilateral aid to regional support, prioritize institutional knowledge sharing on fossil fuel transitions, and focus on local adaptation of green technologies rather than mere imports.

The document examines the challenges of Africa's transition to renewable energy, highlighting a significant skills gap and the persistent under-representation of women in energy value chains. It argues that while gender-mainstreaming policies exist, they often lack the monitoring, evaluation, and comprehensive support systems—such as financial and technical assistance—necessary to create tangible change. The briefing specifically calls for the AU-EU strategic partnership to better integrate gender dimensions into its green transition and energy access pillars, particularly for youth and those in fossil-fuel-dependent economies to ensure a just transition.

The policy brief contends that Africa's vulnerability to crises like COVID-19 and climate change is exacerbated by low access to energy and the digital economy. It proposes that the AU-EU partnership should prioritise decentralised, renewable energy solutions to bridge the digital divide, as internet access is viewed as a critical value-added energy service and a human right. The document recommends that multi-lateral financial institutions invest in green energy, while policymakers incentivise broadband access and integrate ICT skills into education to foster economic inclusion and climate resilience.

The document examines the role of the circular economy in the economic recovery of the EU and AU following the COVID-19 pandemic. It highlights the EU's Green Deal and its goal of carbon neutrality by 2050, while noting that African countries often practice circular economy principles without formal policies. The brief suggests that the EU's desire to shorten global value chains for food and medical security presents an opportunity for Africa to enhance its regional value chains in mining and agriculture through partnerships. It recommends that the EU-AU Summit prioritize a circular economy baseline for all future programmes to ensure sustainable development and the attainment of Sustainable Development Goals.

The document argues that public funds alone cannot meet Africa's growing energy demands, which require an estimated $120 billion annually until 2040. It advocates for 'green financing'—blending public, development, and private capital—to reduce investment risks and improve affordability. Using Kenya as a model, the brief details how instruments like Partial Risk Guarantees, concessional loans, and Feed-in Tariffs have facilitated large-scale wind and geothermal projects. It specifically encourages the European Union to leverage its development finance institutions to create risk-mitigation products and support local private sector partnerships to accelerate the continent's green transition.

The policy brief highlights the 'value-addition gap' in African agriculture, where low productivity and lack of energy access limit economic growth. It proposes that the AU-EU partnership focus on deploying solar mini-grids to power village-level agro-processing, reforming cooperatives to improve farmer bargaining power, and providing micro-finance and micro-enterprise training to smallholders. Using Uganda's maize sector as an example, the document demonstrates that over 60% of maize croplands could be served by mini-grids, which would displace inefficient diesel mills and reduce post-harvest losses.

The policy brief examines the opportunities and challenges of a sustainable energy transition partnership between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU). It highlights Africa's vast renewable potential and the EU's need for clean energy, while cautioning against post-colonial rhetoric and the economic risks for African fossil-fuel-dependent nations. The authors recommend a joint vision focused on infrastructure investment, technology transfer, and job creation to ensure a just transition.

The policy brief examines the tension between Africa's need for universal energy access and the competing influences of China's coal-focused Belt and Road Initiative and the EU's green transition strategy. It highlights 'hotspots' of coal development in countries like South Africa and Kenya, noting that social resistance and civil society can halt fossil fuel projects. The author argues that the EU can better compete with China by moving beyond technology transfer to support social innovation, transparency, and mutually respectful business relationships that prioritize local job creation and industrialization over aid.

The document examines Egypt's long-term nuclear ambitions, culminating in the current Dabaa nuclear power plant project. It argues that the project is framed as a 'national prestige' mega-project under President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, characterized by 'technological fetishism' and a lack of public transparency. The author highlights the project's funding via a $25 billion Russian loan and expresses concerns regarding safety, the management of spent fuel, and the exclusion of public consultation in the decision-making process.

The Africa Energy Guarantee Facility (AEGF), a risk-sharing instrument launched by the European Investment Bank in 2018, aims to unlock $1.4 billion in clean energy investment across Africa by providing insurance against political and sovereign risks. While the facility leverages the EU's position as a major investor and supports the African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI), its effectiveness may be hindered by high transaction costs, partial risk coverage, and low investor awareness. The document argues that for the AEGF to succeed, African policymakers must establish enabling regulatory frameworks and promote reforms that facilitate foreign direct investment and technical exchanges in climate-resilient infrastructure.

The workshop, hosted by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) on 22 September 2020, focused on the role of civil society and youth in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process. Participants discussed the importance of inclusive governance, the necessity of a youth-focused civil society submission for South Africa's 2021 review, and shared lessons from APRM processes in Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia. Key discussions highlighted the need for civil society to demand accountability and the establishment of the APRM Youth Network to mainstream young people into governance reviews.

The document argues that South Africa must update its Trade Policy Strategic Framework to address the 'new normal' post-COVID-19, focusing on regional integration, digital trade, and a redesigned multilateral trading system. It highlights the critical role of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in diversifying markets and enhancing industrialisation, while urging a strategic shift in South Africa's approach to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and traditional partners like the US and EU.

The briefing contends that peace in the Great Lakes region requires a shift from prioritizing regime stability to fostering sustainable democratic institutions and addressing the 'regional mafia' of actors profiting from illicit mineral trade. It suggests that the leadership of President Félix Tshisekedi in the DRC provides an opportunity to reinvigorate regional relations, provided the international community stops tolerating human rights violations in the name of stability.

The document argues that individual African countries often lack the resources to transition to green energy, but regional integration via the AfCFTA can create a larger market to attract investment and skilled labor. It highlights the role of regional power pools and suggests that a strategic shift in EU development assistance toward regional rather than bilateral support, combined with knowledge and technology sharing, could further fast-track the transition.

The document argues that public funds alone cannot meet Africa's growing energy demands, which require an estimated $120 billion annual investment until 2040. It advocates for 'green financing'—blending public and private capital—to overcome high infrastructure costs and investment risks. Using Kenya's experience, the brief details how instruments like Partial Risk Guarantees, concessional loans, and Feed-in Tariffs have attracted private investment for wind, solar, and geothermal projects. It specifically recommends that the EU and development partners provide technical assistance and risk-mitigation products to create enabling environments for private sector energy investments across the continent.

The document argues for a comprehensive AU-EU partnership that integrates the green transition with Africa's broader developmental goals, such as industrialisation and employment. It highlights the critical gap in energy access—with 600 million Africans lacking electricity as of 2018—and the underutilisation of Africa's solar resources. The authors recommend using public finance to de-risk private investment in renewables and addressing 'nexus issues' linking energy to agriculture, the digital economy, and trade. It also notes the tension in countries like Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Tanzania, and Mozambique, which are pursuing renewable energy while continuing to develop fossil fuel reserves.

The document analyzes the 2018 Revitalised Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which established a power-sharing arrangement between President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. While the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) was formed on 22 February 2020, the process has been hindered by delays, disputes over state boundaries, and unresolved security arrangements. The paper highlights the 'payroll peace' logic, where bloated leadership structures are used to buy loyalty, and examines the influence of external actors including Uganda, Sudan, and the Troika (US, UK, and Norway).