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South Korean state-owned financial institutions have invested US$5.6 billion in overseas coal-fired power plants since 2013, primarily in Vietnam and Indonesia. These investments face significant risks of becoming stranded assets as renewable energy costs drop and private lenders withdraw from coal. The document notes that new coal plants in Southeast Asia may operate for less than five years before becoming economically unviable. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted construction schedules and reduced electricity demand. These trends conflict with the South Korean Democratic Party's Green New Deal, which calls for phasing out public coal funding. Specific high-risk projects include the Jawa 9 and 10 plants in Indonesia, for which US$232.5 million in funding is under consideration.

South Korean public finance institutions have invested $5.6 billion in overseas coal plants, primarily in Vietnam and Indonesia, creating a significant risk of stranded assets. This trend persists despite the Democratic Party's Green New Deal promising a phase-out of such financing and a global decline in private coal funding. The economic viability of coal is deteriorating as solar and wind power costs fall, with projections that renewables will be cheaper than existing coal in Southeast Asia by 2028. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has depressed electricity demand and caused construction delays, further destabilizing these investments.

South Korean public financial institutions face up to $6 billion in stranded asset risks due to investments in overseas coal power plants, particularly in Indonesia and Vietnam. This trend contradicts the South Korean government's 'Green New Deal' policy to phase out public funding for coal. The economic viability of coal is declining as solar and wind power costs drop, and the COVID-19 pandemic has further disrupted construction schedules and reduced electricity demand. Specific high-risk projects include the Jawa 9 and 10 plants in Indonesia and the Bung Ang 2 plant in Vietnam. Meanwhile, private financial institutions and several Southeast Asian nations are increasingly transitioning away from coal toward renewables.

The report finds that while global coal capacity grew by 34.1 GW in 2019, this was primarily driven by China, as capacity in the rest of the world continued to shrink. Global coal plant utilization hit a record low of 51% in 2019. The report highlights a shift in financing, with Western commercial banks largely exiting project finance for coal, while Japanese and Chinese public finance continue to support new developments. Significant retirements occurred in the US and EU, though some OECD nations like Japan and South Korea continue to develop new capacity.

The report finds that while the global coal fleet grew by 34.1 GW in 2019, this was primarily driven by China, as the fleet outside China shrank for the second consecutive year. Most leading indicators of growth, including construction starts and pre-permit development, continued to decline globally. The report highlights a shift in financing, with Western commercial banks exiting project finance for coal, while Chinese public finance and Indian state-backed institutions continue to support new capacity. Despite these trends, the report argues that coal power use must fall by 80% by 2030 to align with the 1.5C warming limit of the Paris climate agreement.

The report finds that while global coal capacity grew by 34.1 GW in 2019, this was primarily driven by China, where 68.3 GW of new capacity began operating. Outside China, the global coal fleet shrank for the second consecutive year. Pre-construction pipelines are declining globally, with significant drops in India, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In OECD countries, capacity has declined since 2011, though Japan remains a major driver of new coal power. Financing is becoming more restrictive, with no direct project finance from major US, European, or Australian banks for 2019 constructions, although public financing from China and India continues to support new projects.

The report finds that while global coal capacity increased by 34.1 GW in 2019—driven primarily by China—overall planning and construction are declining globally. It highlights a significant shift in the OECD, where the US and EU are accelerating closures, while Japan remains a major supporter of new coal projects both domestically and abroad. The document also notes a critical gap between current trends and the IPCC's requirement to reduce coal power by 80% by 2030 to limit warming to 1.5°C.

The report finds that while global coal capacity saw a net increase of 34.1 GW in 2019 due to Chinese additions, overall indicators for new projects have declined for four consecutive years. It highlights a significant shift in the OECD, where closures in the US and EU are outpacing new builds, and notes that Japan has become the most active OECD nation in new coal development. The document also details the increasing role of public finance from China, Japan, and South Korea in funding overseas coal projects as commercial banks withdraw support. In China, capacity continues to grow despite low average utilization rates of around 50% and government efforts to limit new permits.

The report finds that while the global coal fleet grew by 34.1 GW in 2019, this was primarily driven by China, as the rest of the world saw a net decrease in capacity. It highlights a continuing decline in new project starts and a significant increase in retirements in the US and EU, though it warns that current trends are insufficient to meet the IPCC's 1.5°C goal, which requires an 80% reduction in coal-fired power by 2030.

The report identifies a four-year decline in coal power growth indicators, though global net capacity increased by 34.1 GW in 2019 primarily due to China. While the US and EU continue to retire coal plants, Japan remains a major OECD driver of coal development. Financial support from Western commercial banks has largely ceased, though Chinese state institutions continue to fund projects internationally. The report emphasizes that coal use must drop by 80% by 2030 to meet the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement.

The report finds that while global coal capacity saw a net increase of 34.1 GW in 2019, this was driven almost entirely by China. Excluding China, the global coal industry declined for the second consecutive year. The report highlights a significant shift in financing, with Western commercial banks withdrawing direct funding for new coal, while Chinese and Indian state-backed institutions continue to provide critical capital. Regional analysis shows sharp declines in pre-construction capacity in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, though some countries like Japan and Turkey continue to pursue coal development despite international pressure.

The report finds that the EU is proposing or building gas infrastructure worth €99 billion, which would increase import capacity by over 30% despite existing capacity already being nearly double current consumption. This expansion contradicts EU climate goals to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, which require a sharp reduction in fossil gas use. The author highlights that many of these projects, including those on the European Commission's 4th list of Projects of Common Interest (PCI), are unnecessary for energy security and risk becoming stranded assets. Additionally, the report notes that EU gas-fired power plants are currently underutilized compared to global averages and are increasingly uncompetitive against renewable energy portfolios.

The document argues that falling renewable energy costs are making coal-fired power projects in South and Southeast Asia economically unviable, placing $4.8 billion of pending Japanese public financing at risk of becoming stranded assets.

The document highlights the continued financial support from Japan for coal power projects and references findings that new renewable energy will be cheaper to build than operating existing coal plants in Southeast Asia within a decade.

The report finds that China is the primary driver of global coal power expansion, adding 42.9 GW of capacity between January 2018 and June 2019 while the rest of the world saw a decrease of 8.1 GW. This growth was largely fueled by a surge in provincial-level approvals between 2014 and 2016. Despite some central government restrictions, nearly half of the projects ordered to be suspended in 2017 have continued development. The report argues that to meet the IPCC's 2°C warming limit, China would need to reduce its coal capacity to 600 GW or less by 2030, contradicting industry proposals to increase the capacity ceiling to 1,400 GW by 2035.

The report finds that China is driving the growth of the global coal fleet, adding 42.9 GW between January 2018 and June 2019 while the rest of the world's capacity decreased by 8.1 GW. This growth is largely attributed to a provincial permitting surge between 2014 and 2016, which created a pipeline of projects that the central government has struggled to restrict. Despite a recent slowdown in new proposals and permits, China has 147.7 GW of capacity either under construction or likely to be revived. The report concludes that to keep global warming well below 2°C, China would need to reduce its coal capacity to 600 GW or less by 2030, a target that contradicts industry proposals to increase the national coal power cap to between 1,200 and 1,400 GW by 2035.

The report identifies a massive global expansion of LNG infrastructure, with at least 202 terminal projects in development representing $1.3 trillion in capital outlays. This growth is heavily concentrated in North America, where the U.S. and Canada account for 74% of proposed new export capacity. The authors argue that this expansion risks creating stranded assets as renewable energy costs fall and that the lifecycle greenhouse gas impact of these projects is comparable to, or exceeds, that of new coal-fired power plants. Consequently, the report calls for a moratorium on new LNG construction to align with IPCC targets requiring gas use to decline by 2030 and 2050.

The report identifies a significant surge in global oil and gas pipeline development, with North America leading the trend. It contends that this expansion is predicated on a 'super cycle' of demand from Asia that is incompatible with IPCC climate goals and threatened by the rise of renewables and competing production in other regions. The authors compare the current situation to the 2011–2016 coal mining crash, warning that high leverage and a loss of 'social license' create a high risk of stranded assets.

In 2018, global coal power growth indicators declined for the third consecutive year, with new construction capacity falling 39% compared to 2017. While China and India saw record lows in new permits, China remained an outlier by resuming construction on previously frozen projects. The United States led the world in plant closures, recording 17.6 GW of decommissioned capacity. The report highlights that meeting IPCC climate goals of 1.5°C to 2°C requires a rapid phase-out of coal, yet China's China Electricity Council has proposed increasing its coal capacity limit to 1,300 GW by 2030. In India, coal is facing stiff competition from cheaper solar and wind energy, while Vietnam has seen the fastest growth in coal capacity among countries with over 4 GW, though it is facing increasing public opposition and financial tightening from Japanese banks.

In 2018, global coal-fired power capacity growth continued a three-year decline, with new construction and commissioning falling significantly. While the US led a high rate of retirements, China saw a paradoxical trend: a sharp drop in new approvals but a rise in under-construction capacity as previously halted projects resumed. India also saw a historic low in new approvals as solar and wind power became more cost-competitive. The report emphasizes that current operating coal plants are incompatible with IPCC goals to limit warming to 1.5 or 2 degrees Celsius.