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The report analyzes the EU's 2030 climate deal, which includes a binding 40% domestic greenhouse gas reduction target, a 27% renewable energy target, and a 27% energy efficiency target. Carbon Market Watch argues that these targets fall short of the 55% reduction required for a fair contribution to global climate goals. The analysis highlights significant risks to the 40% target, specifically the oversupply of EU ETS allowances (estimated at 2.6-4.5 billion by 2020) and the use of ETS allowances to meet non-ETS sector targets. It also criticizes the continuation of free emission allowances for industry and the provision of financial support to the power sectors of low-income Member States, which may prolong the use of coal.

The author contends that climate change is the primary challenge to sustainable development and that the post-2015 framework must include a dedicated climate goal and integrated targets to avoid undermining poverty eradication efforts. While the current SDG report includes these elements, the author warns that some countries oppose the climate goal due to perceived overlaps with the UNFCCC. The document asserts that the post-2015 framework should complement, not replace, the UNFCCC and can provide momentum for the COP21 agreement.

Carbon Market Watch asserts that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) cannot be accredited for Green Climate Fund (GCF) finance because it fails to meet GCF's mandates for new financial resources and lacks the necessary environmental and social risk management systems, including grievance mechanisms.

The document argues that success at COP20 in Lima depends on rich nations delivering climate finance, specifically filling the Green Climate Fund, which has only seen "USD 2.3 billion in pledges" despite a "USD 100 billion a year by 2020" goal. It emphasizes the need for an international accounting framework to prevent "double counting" and ensure that only countries with "stringent targets" can access carbon markets to avoid the "hot air" issues seen under the Kyoto Protocol. The author calls for the accounting framework to be embedded in the new climate treaty separately from the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) and highlights the need to streamline human rights safeguards for the CDM, REDD+, and Green Climate Fund.

The document argues that LULUCF should be treated separately in the EU's 2030 climate framework to prevent its carbon sink from being used to reduce mitigation efforts in energy, industry, and transport. It emphasizes that land-use policies must prioritize biodiversity and environmental integrity over simple carbon sequestration, specifically recommending the rewetting of peatlands and the end of subsidies for unsustainable farming. Globally, it calls for the EU to address its role as a major importer of deforestation-embodied products through mandatory standards and a new EU Action Plan on deforestation.

Carbon Market Watch criticizes EU leaders for adopting a 2030 climate deal that it argues weakens emission reductions to 31% due to excess permits and provides up to €300 billion in subsidies to industry. Separately, the organization highlights human rights abuses and lack of consultation affecting indigenous communities in Guatemala associated with the UN-registered Santa Rita hydroelectric project.

Carbon Market Watch warns that the leaked 2030 Council Conclusions could reduce the effective EU greenhouse gas reduction target from 40% to 26% due to the potential banking of 'hot air' (surplus allowances). The organization criticizes the 40% target as postponing urgent action, opposes the use of EU ETS allowances to meet non-ETS targets, argues against including transport in the EU ETS, and condemns the dynamic allocation of free pollution permits as an industry subsidy.

A coalition of organizations requests UN intervention regarding the Santa Rita hydroelectric project in Guatemala, alleging severe human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and state-sponsored violence, and criticizing the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for registering the project despite a lack of genuine indigenous consultation.

The document is a formal request to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to address serious human rights abuses linked to the Santa Rita hydroelectric dam in Guatemala. The authors argue that the project, registered under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in June 2014, has been imposed without the free, prior, and informed consent of the Q’eqchí and Poqomchí indigenous communities. They report a pattern of violence, including the deaths of seven people, including two children, and state-sponsored repression involving the deployment of 1,500 police officers in August 2014. The document calls for the Government of Guatemala to provide information on its plans and for the CDM Board to investigate and potentially withdraw the project's registration due to non-compliance with consultation standards.

The document argues that the European Parliament's decision to uphold the European Commission's carbon leakage list, using a €30 per tonne carbon price, leads to an over-allocation of free emission permits. It claims this results in a loss of approximately €5 billion in taxpayer revenue over five years and provides windfall profits to polluters, despite a lack of evidence for actual carbon leakage.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the EU ETS has failed to drive decarbonisation due to a surplus of over 2 billion emission allowances, leading to carbon prices around 5 euros per tonne. While the proposed Market Stability Reserve is a necessary step, the author contends it is 'too little, too late' because it is scheduled for 2021 rather than July 2016 and fails to permanently cancel allowances, which could lead to an unstable carbon price.

Carbon Market Watch warns that the proposed 40% greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030 is insufficient and threatened by 'hot air' loopholes. Specifically, the carry-over of surplus allowances from the EU ETS and Effort Sharing Decision could reduce actual emissions cuts to as low as 26%. The author advocates for the retention of nationally binding renewable and energy efficiency targets to drive innovation and decarbonisation.

The briefing warns that loopholes in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) have created a massive surplus of emission rights. This "hot air"—estimated at 4 billion tonnes—threatens to undermine the EU's 2030 climate ambitions by allowing continued pollution, effectively lowering a proposed 40% emission reduction target to 26%. The author calls for the permanent removal of these surpluses to protect climate goals.

The briefing warns that loopholes in the EU's climate framework have created a 'bubble' of 4 billion tonnes of unused pollution credits. This surplus, split between the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and the Effort Sharing Decision, threatens to undermine the EU's proposed 2030 goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40% compared to 1990 levels. The author argues that if these credits are carried over into the 2030 framework, the actual emission reductions could drop to 26%.

The document warns that a 'bubble' of 4 billion tonnes of excess emission rights threatens to undermine the EU's proposed 2030 climate target. It details how surpluses in the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) and the Emissions Trading System (ETS) could be carried over into the 2030 framework, effectively lowering the actual emission reductions from a proposed 40% to 26% if not addressed by EU leaders.

The document warns that a 'hot air bubble' of 4 billion pollution credits across the EU ETS and ESD could reduce the actual effectiveness of the EU's 2030 climate target from 40% to as low as 26%. It details how 1.35 billion tonnes of surplus credits in the Effort Sharing Decision and 2.6 billion excess allowances in the Emissions Trading System are created by weak targets, international offsets, and free permit allocations to industry. The author calls on EU Heads of State to disallow the banking of ESD surpluses and permanently cancel excess EU ETS allowances to prevent these 'phantom rights to pollute' from carrying over into the 2030 framework.

The document outlines the European Union's attempts to regulate international aviation emissions through the EU-ETS and the subsequent 'stop the clock' derogations following pressure from China, India, and the US. It notes that ICAO is considering market-based measures (MBM) for post-2020 CO2 emissions, with a decision expected in 2016. Carbon Market Watch urges the EU to resume including all flights in its cap-and-trade scheme if ICAO does not implement ambitious global targets and measures by 2016.

The document critiques the proposal for 'dynamic allocation' of free emission allowances in the EU ETS post-2020, which would remove caps on free permits for industrial sectors. It argues this model enables windfall profits, reduces incentives for innovation, and shifts a significant financial burden to taxpayers. The author recommends full auctioning of allowances as the default method to uphold the polluter-pays principle and suggests using auctioning revenues to fund an industrial innovation fund for low-carbon technologies.

The EU ETS is currently failing to promote low-carbon solutions due to a carbon price that has plunged to around 5 euros per tonne of CO2, driven by a surplus of 2.1 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent allowances. This oversupply is attributed to weak emission targets, the inflow of international offsets, and reduced demand following the economic crisis. The document warns that this surplus allows the EU to transform current emission reductions from other policies into 'future rights to pollute', potentially reducing the domestic impact of the 2030 climate target from 40% to 34%. To fix the market, the author recommends increasing the linear reduction factor to 2.6%, permanently cancelling 1.6 billion excess allowances, enacting the Market Stability Reserve by 2017, and transitioning to full auctioning for all industrial sectors post-2020 to eliminate windfall profits and adhere to the polluter-pays principle.

Carbon Market Watch asserts that the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism is plagued by transparency and quality problems, particularly within 'Track 1' projects. The author argues that the mechanism fails to produce genuine emission reductions and that proposed reforms are insufficient, suggesting the scheme be consigned to history after 2020.