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Carbon Market Watch argues that an independent grievance body must be operational before any Article 6.4 activities begin to avoid reputational risks and human rights infringements. The author recommends that this body be independent of the 6.4 Supervisory Body, free of charge for stakeholders, and capable of imposing temporary measures like suspending credit issuance. The document also suggests extending this mechanism to cover Article 6.2 and compares existing voluntary carbon market standards, noting that some, like Verra, have inappropriate fee requirements.

Carbon Market Watch argues that Article 6.2 and 6.4 mechanisms lack a clear definition of "removals," leading to the risk of including "false solutions." The organization proposes four scientific principles for defining real removals: atmospheric GHG removal, permanent storage (at least 200-300 years), comprehensive accounting of process emissions, and a net-positive removal balance. Based on these, the document asserts that nature-based sequestration and point-source CCS do not qualify as permanent removals. It specifically critiques nature-based activities due to the impossibility of guaranteeing monitoring and liability for reversals over centuries, noting that buffer pools are inadequate. Instead, it suggests nature-based activities generate "Paris Agreement Support Units" to channel finance without allowing offset claims.

Carbon Market Watch argues that Parties should prioritize domestic mitigation over carbon credits and recommends strict transparency, science-based definitions for removals, and the establishment of an independent grievance body for Article 6 mechanisms.

A coalition of NGOs argues that releasing 200-250 million allowances from the Market Stability Reserve to generate EUR 20 billion for REPowerEU would increase atmospheric emissions and fund fossil fuel infrastructure, thereby undermining the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement.

The report challenges the "carbon neutral" claim of the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar, finding that the estimated 3.6MtCO2e footprint likely underestimates actual emissions due to flawed accounting of stadium construction. It further argues that the carbon credits provided by the Global Carbon Council lack integrity due to non-additionality and that the event's mitigation measures, such as a desert turf farm, are not durable.

The briefing asserts that the EU's current 55% emissions reduction target for 2030 is insufficient and that the proposed reforms to the EU ETS will fail to meet even their own targets. Based on research from Climact and the Öko Institute, the document advocates for a 65% overall reduction target by 2030 and an EU ETS target of at least 70%. To achieve this, it proposes a 'three-stage rocket' approach: a one-off reduction of 350 million allowances, increasing the Linear Reduction Factor to 4.4%, and revising Market Stability Reserve thresholds downward to zero by 2030.

Carbon Market Watch outlines recommendations for the EU ETS II, emphasizing that emission allowances should be auctioned rather than allocated for free to ensure the 'polluter pays' principle. The author argues that the estimated annual average revenue of €47 billion (2026-2030) should be recycled into socially fair compensation schemes for energy efficiency and renewable energy to protect low-income households. Additionally, the document asserts that carbon pricing must be complemented by regulatory frameworks, such as vehicle emission standards and energy performance requirements for buildings, as pricing alone is insufficient to drive full decarbonization.

The report evaluates the impact of expanding the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) to cover more European aviation flights compared to the European Commission's (EC) proposal, which retains the EU ETS for intra-EEA flights and uses CORSIA for flights between the EEA and other participating states. Using the AERO-MS model, the study finds that expanding the EU ETS to include all outgoing flights (Scenario 1) or all outgoing and incoming flights (Scenario 2) would significantly increase emission reductions and auctioning revenues, though at a higher cost to airlines. Specifically, Scenario 2 would result in a 113% higher emission reduction than the EC proposal. The report also highlights uncertainties in CORSIA's effectiveness, noting that changes in the baseline or non-participation of major aviation countries could reduce its emission reductions by up to 77%.

The document addresses the rise in EU ETS carbon prices, which reached €98.49 on 8 February 2022. It refutes claims from energy-intensive industries and countries like Poland and Spain that speculative trading is causing price spikes, noting that speculative activity accounts for only about 4% of ETS activity. The author opposes a proposal by MEP Peter Liese to release 100 million additional allowances if prices remain high for six months, arguing this would undermine emission reduction goals. Instead, the document advocates for reducing the oversupply of credits, ending free allowances, and aiming for a 70% reduction in ETS emissions by 2030 to provide a stable price signal for industrial decarbonisation.

The briefing assesses the failure of the EU ETS to reduce emissions in the steel sector, which accounts for 221 megatonnes of CO2 annually. It identifies flaws such as excessive free allowances and stagnant benchmarks—particularly for hot metal—that have led to flatlining emissions since 2012. The author proposes replacing free permits with a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and increasing funding for the Innovation Fund to support zero-carbon technologies like hydrogen direct reduction.

The document outlines eleven specific recommendations to strengthen the EU ETS, arguing that the European Commission's proposal lacks sufficient ambition and fails to properly implement the 'polluter pays' principle. Key demands include increasing the 2030 emission reduction target to 70% for ETS sectors, phasing out free emission allowances for energy-intensive industries, and expanding the system's scope to include waste incineration and all international shipping voyages. It also suggests strengthening the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) to prevent price crashes and calls for stricter criteria for the use of ETS revenues to ensure they support climate action. Additionally, the guide provides a communication framework based on urgency, risk, and fairness, alongside a directory of key policymakers in the European Commission and Parliament.

The document asserts that the EU's current target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 is incompatible with the 1.5°C temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. It argues that the EU would require double its per capita share of the remaining global carbon budget under current policies. The author suggests the EU should instead target at least a 65% reduction by 2030 and achieve climate neutrality by 2040. To achieve this, the briefing recommends reforming the EU ETS by rebasing emission levels to actual 2020 levels and increasing the annual linear reduction factor beyond the proposed 4.2%.

The briefing evaluates MEP Mohammed Chahim's draft report on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), focusing on the phase-out of free allowances, the extension of sectoral scope, financial support for Least Developed Countries, the allocation of revenues, and the handling of export rebates.

Carbon Market Watch (CMW) critiques a draft guidance document for companies purchasing tropical forest carbon credits, primarily arguing that the draft implicitly supports 'offsetting'—which CMW deems scientifically inaccurate when substituting fossil carbon with biological carbon. CMW demands the removal of the word 'consensus' from the title, as the draft does not reflect the views of many NGOs and CSOs. The response emphasizes the need for mandatory transparency regarding how much revenue from credit transactions actually reaches indigenous peoples and local communities (IPs and LCs) versus intermediaries. CMW also insists that 'corresponding adjustments' under the Paris Agreement must be mandatory for any claims of emission reductions to prevent double counting.

Carbon Market Watch calls for a ban on corporate "net zero" and "carbon neutrality" claims, arguing that these terms are ambiguous and often mask inaction. The brief recommends that governments, particularly in the EU, require companies to report absolute emission reductions separately from external financing and to cover all value chain emissions (Scopes 1-3). It further warns against the use of low-quality carbon credits and the risk of double counting under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

The Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor 2022 assesses 25 multinational companies, finding that most 'net zero' pledges are ambiguous and lack deep emission reduction commitments. The report highlights a systemic reliance on low-quality carbon offsets and renewable energy certificates (RECs) that often fail to provide additional climate benefits. While a few companies demonstrate leadership in renewable energy procurement and value chain engagement, the overall integrity of corporate climate strategies remains low, with many targets falling short of the 1.5C Paris Agreement goal.

The EU ETS is a 'cap and trade' system covering power, industry, and aviation across the EU and several other European nations. While it has successfully reduced emissions in the power sector, the document argues that free allocation of permits has led to stagnant industrial emissions and significant windfall profits for companies. The guide details the role of the Market Stability Reserve in managing oversupply and discusses the proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as a potential replacement for carbon leakage protections.

The document outlines the EU's proposed Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), designed to prevent carbon leakage by requiring importers to purchase certificates for embedded emissions in specific goods. It details the sectors covered, the calculation of emissions, the phase-out of free ETS allowances, and the transitional period from 2023 to 2025. Carbon Market Watch critiques the proposal for excluding bulk chemicals and indirect emissions, the slow phase-out of free allocations, and the plan to use revenues for COVID-19 debt repayment rather than international climate finance.

Carbon Market Watch and signatory organisations argue that the European Commission's proposal for the EU ETS revision fails to apply the 'polluter pays principle' by continuing free pollution permits. They contend that free allocations have stagnated industrial decarbonisation, noting that over 200 billion euros in allowances have been distributed since 2008 while emissions reductions remained below 0.4% annually since 2013. The document calls for full auctioning of allowances to internalise carbon costs and generate revenue for clean technology, warning that the Commission's plan for 5 billion free allowances between 2021 and 2030 could represent a subsidy of approximately 400 billion euros at current prices.

A joint statement by five NGO networks providing policy recommendations for the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), focusing on the phase-out of free allowances, expanded scope, support for vulnerable nations, and the rejection of export rebates.