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South Korean state-owned financial institutions have invested US$5.6 billion in overseas coal-fired power plants since 2013, primarily in Vietnam and Indonesia. These investments face significant risks of becoming stranded assets as renewable energy costs drop and private lenders withdraw from coal. The document notes that new coal plants in Southeast Asia may operate for less than five years before becoming economically unviable. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted construction schedules and reduced electricity demand. These trends conflict with the South Korean Democratic Party's Green New Deal, which calls for phasing out public coal funding. Specific high-risk projects include the Jawa 9 and 10 plants in Indonesia, for which US$232.5 million in funding is under consideration.

South Korean public finance institutions have invested $5.6 billion in overseas coal plants, primarily in Vietnam and Indonesia, creating a significant risk of stranded assets. This trend persists despite the Democratic Party's Green New Deal promising a phase-out of such financing and a global decline in private coal funding. The economic viability of coal is deteriorating as solar and wind power costs fall, with projections that renewables will be cheaper than existing coal in Southeast Asia by 2028. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has depressed electricity demand and caused construction delays, further destabilizing these investments.

South Korean public financial institutions face up to $6 billion in stranded asset risks due to investments in overseas coal power plants, particularly in Indonesia and Vietnam. This trend contradicts the South Korean government's 'Green New Deal' policy to phase out public funding for coal. The economic viability of coal is declining as solar and wind power costs drop, and the COVID-19 pandemic has further disrupted construction schedules and reduced electricity demand. Specific high-risk projects include the Jawa 9 and 10 plants in Indonesia and the Bung Ang 2 plant in Vietnam. Meanwhile, private financial institutions and several Southeast Asian nations are increasingly transitioning away from coal toward renewables.

The briefing warns that emergency government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic—such as lockdowns, medical supply requisitions, and export bans—create an unprecedented risk of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims under over 3,000 investment treaties. It highlights the unpredictability of arbitration tribunals and the high cost of defense, citing historical examples from Argentina and Egypt where states faced multi-billion dollar awards. The authors call for a coordinated global response, potentially through the UN or WTO, to suspend ISDS for pandemic measures or issue joint interpretations of the 'state of necessity' defense. As an interim measure, it suggests states may withdraw their consent to arbitration.

The briefing warns that emergency COVID-19 measures—such as lockdowns, nationalization of health services, and export bans—risk triggering a wave of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims under over 3,000 investment treaties. It highlights the unpredictability of arbitration tribunals and the high cost of defense, which can average 8 million USD per case. Using historical examples like Argentina's 2001 crisis, the document illustrates how such claims can result in billions of dollars in awards, potentially undermining national health budgets and IMF rescue packages. The authors call for a coordinated global response via the UN, UNCTAD, or UNCITRAL to suspend arbitration for COVID-19 measures or issue joint interpretations of the 'state of necessity' defense. As an interim measure, it suggests that states may unilaterally withdraw their consent to arbitration.

The survey of 5,000 respondents across Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam reveals high levels of concern regarding COVID-19 and strong support for closing illegal wildlife markets to prevent future pandemics. While support for closures is nearly universal in Southeast Asian markets, it is lower in Japan, where respondents perceive such markets to be less prevalent. The report identifies a strong public link between wildlife trade and zoonotic outbreaks, with a majority of respondents indicating they would stop consuming wildlife products if markets were closed.

The author contends that the EU's current trade policy is characterized by an 'inertia' that prioritizes unconditional liberalization over environmental and social goals. While the EU aims for carbon neutrality via the Green Deal, its trade framework continues to promote 'new generation' bilateral agreements that limit state sovereignty through investor-state dispute settlements and 'living agreements' that bypass democratic control. The text argues that the EU remains a net importer of carbon, with one-third of its footprint stemming from imports, and calls for a shift toward trade regulation that conditions market access on the achievement of environmental and social objectives.

The report evaluates UK supermarkets' reliance on fishmeal and fish oil (FMFO) for farmed seafood, arguing that the current 'fed aquaculture' model is unsustainable and threatens marine ecosystems and global food security. It ranks retailers based on their policies, transparency, and in-store practices, finding that none have a time-bound target to eliminate wild-caught fish in feed.

The document examines the role of fixed-income instruments in funding waste management and circular economy initiatives. It highlights that while waste management is only the fourth largest category for green bond use of proceeds, there is significant latent potential and investor demand. The briefing details specific issuances from corporates and local governments in Europe, the US, and Asia, and discusses the barriers to scaling these markets, such as the lack of standardised definitions. It particularly emphasizes Japan's leadership in resource efficiency and the potential for green bonds to support its circular economy goals.

The 2020 Global Electricity Review reports a record 3% fall in global coal-fired electricity generation and a 2% drop in power sector CO2 emissions in 2019. While coal collapsed in the EU and US, generation rose in China, which now accounts for over 50% of global coal generation. Wind and solar generation grew by 15%, providing 8% of the world's electricity. However, the report argues that these declines are largely due to one-off factors and that current progress is insufficient to meet the IPCC's 1.5°C scenario, which would require coal generation to collapse by 11% annually until 2030.

The report finds that while global coal capacity grew by 34.1 GW in 2019, this was primarily driven by China, as capacity in the rest of the world continued to shrink. Global coal plant utilization hit a record low of 51% in 2019. The report highlights a shift in financing, with Western commercial banks largely exiting project finance for coal, while Japanese and Chinese public finance continue to support new developments. Significant retirements occurred in the US and EU, though some OECD nations like Japan and South Korea continue to develop new capacity.

The report finds that while the global coal fleet grew by 34.1 GW in 2019, this was primarily driven by China, as the fleet outside China shrank for the second consecutive year. Most leading indicators of growth, including construction starts and pre-permit development, continued to decline globally. The report highlights a shift in financing, with Western commercial banks exiting project finance for coal, while Chinese public finance and Indian state-backed institutions continue to support new capacity. Despite these trends, the report argues that coal power use must fall by 80% by 2030 to align with the 1.5C warming limit of the Paris climate agreement.

The report finds that while global coal capacity grew by 34.1 GW in 2019, this was primarily driven by China, where 68.3 GW of new capacity began operating. Outside China, the global coal fleet shrank for the second consecutive year. Pre-construction pipelines are declining globally, with significant drops in India, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In OECD countries, capacity has declined since 2011, though Japan remains a major driver of new coal power. Financing is becoming more restrictive, with no direct project finance from major US, European, or Australian banks for 2019 constructions, although public financing from China and India continues to support new projects.

The report finds that while global coal capacity saw a net increase of 34.1 GW in 2019 due to Chinese additions, overall indicators for new projects have declined for four consecutive years. It highlights a significant shift in the OECD, where closures in the US and EU are outpacing new builds, and notes that Japan has become the most active OECD nation in new coal development. The document also details the increasing role of public finance from China, Japan, and South Korea in funding overseas coal projects as commercial banks withdraw support. In China, capacity continues to grow despite low average utilization rates of around 50% and government efforts to limit new permits.

The report finds that while the global coal fleet grew by 34.1 GW in 2019, this was primarily driven by China, as the rest of the world saw a net decrease in capacity. It highlights a continuing decline in new project starts and a significant increase in retirements in the US and EU, though it warns that current trends are insufficient to meet the IPCC's 1.5°C goal, which requires an 80% reduction in coal-fired power by 2030.

The report identifies a four-year decline in coal power growth indicators, though global net capacity increased by 34.1 GW in 2019 primarily due to China. While the US and EU continue to retire coal plants, Japan remains a major OECD driver of coal development. Financial support from Western commercial banks has largely ceased, though Chinese state institutions continue to fund projects internationally. The report emphasizes that coal use must drop by 80% by 2030 to meet the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement.

The report finds that while global coal capacity saw a net increase of 34.1 GW in 2019, this was driven almost entirely by China. Excluding China, the global coal industry declined for the second consecutive year. The report highlights a significant shift in financing, with Western commercial banks withdrawing direct funding for new coal, while Chinese and Indian state-backed institutions continue to provide critical capital. Regional analysis shows sharp declines in pre-construction capacity in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, though some countries like Japan and Turkey continue to pursue coal development despite international pressure.

The report finds that low-carbon energy transitions do not automatically improve social equity and can replicate existing structural inequalities if power asymmetries are not addressed. While some technologies like household solar provide benefits, others—particularly large-scale hydropower and biofuel plantations—often lead to land loss, displacement, and precarious employment. The authors argue that institutional frameworks and participatory processes, rather than the technology itself, determine whether a transition is just.

The document examines the global issue of CITES document abuse, where permits and certificates are falsified or obtained corruptly to legalize the trade of endangered species. It identifies key methods of abuse, such as counterfeiting and mis-declaration, and highlights the role of corrupt officials as gatekeepers. To mitigate these risks, the brief recommends a combination of prosecuting corrupt officials, implementing e-permitting systems (eCITES), enhancing technical capacity for inspectors, and improving the security of paper documents.

The report identifies systemic gender inequalities and capacity gaps in Vietnam's climate and agricultural sectors, proposing a Gender Action Plan (GAP) to ensure equal access to water, climate information, and credit for vulnerable smallholders.