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The report examines the complex relationship between the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), specifically the application of 'subsidiarity'—the principle that regional structures should lead in their own jurisdictions. It highlights systemic failures in North Africa due to the inactivity of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), tensions between the AU and SADC over elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the AU's successful re-assumption of leadership in the Central African Republic. The document also notes the East African Community's (EAC) internal trade disputes, ECOWAS's struggle to adapt to violent extremism in the Sahel, and the general lack of civil society engagement within the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

The document analyzes the migration experiences of South Africa and Germany, noting that while both are regional economic hubs attracting diverse migrants, Germany has developed a more sophisticated, integration-focused infrastructure. South Africa struggles with high unemployment, xenophobia, and a securitized approach to migration, often lacking the resources and policy coordination seen in Germany. The author argues that South Africa can benefit from Germany's model of inter-departmental coordination, private sector involvement, and proactive integration to avoid the creation of 'parallel societies' and potential radicalization of unintegrated migrant populations.

The SADC–IISD Investment Facilitation Workshop, held in August 2018, aimed to transition the concept of investment facilitation toward a focus on sustainable development. Participants from 13 SADC member states analyzed the distinctions between trade and investment facilitation and reviewed the UNCTAD Global Action Menu. The workshop concluded that facilitation measures should primarily remain at the national level to preserve regulatory space, while the regional (SADC) and international levels should focus on information sharing, capacity building, and technical assistance rather than new legal obligations.

The document examines the persistent instability in Lesotho, focusing on the politicisation of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), the failure of frequent elections to provide legitimacy, and a small economy heavily reliant on government spending. It argues that while security sector reform and electoral changes are necessary, long-term stability requires diversifying the economy and improving the relationship with South Africa to reduce the competition for state resources.

The document examines how the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) integrates climate change into its monitoring of State obligations. In 2018, the CRC issued climate-related recommendations to 47% of reviewed States, focusing heavily on procedural rights, education, and disaster-sensitive social protection. While mitigation was addressed in only 14% of climate recommendations—specifically targeting fossil fuel exploitation in Norway and coal-fired power plants in Spain—the CRC also urged Niger to address deforestation and land regeneration. The briefing highlights a trend of linking recommendations to Sustainable Development Goal 13 and emphasizes the need for children's meaningful participation in climate policy-making.

The document identifies a "missing middle" in climate finance—a systemic gap where mobilized funds fail to reach local and subnational actors due to bureaucratic barriers, capacity constraints, and a preference for international intermediaries. It argues that the direct access modality is a critical tool for overcoming this gap by empowering national and subnational entities. The authors highlight that while the AF has pioneered direct access, the GCF remains dominated by Multilateral Implementing Entities (MIEs), with only 16% of approved funding channeled through Direct Access Entities (DAEs) as of March 2019. The paper recommends shifting toward a principle of subsidiarity, increasing grant-based financing, and holding MIEs accountable for transferring capacity to national institutions.

The report examines the gap between the official goal of freedom of movement in Southern Africa and the reality of securitised border management. It identifies key barriers including a lack of political will, unreliable data, and the prioritisation of national sovereignty over regional integration. The authors argue that migration should be viewed as a developmental opportunity rather than a security threat, noting that remittances contribute an average of 3.7% to SADC countries' GDP. South Africa is highlighted as a primary destination for migrants but a major obstacle to regional integration due to its restrictive 'detain and deport' policies and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

At its 21st meeting in October 2018, the GCF Board approved 19 new projects and programmes totaling USD 1.04 billion in GCF investment to support over USD 4 billion in climate action across more than 50 countries. The Board also accredited 16 new entities, appointed the World Bank as the Fund's Trustee, and launched the process for the GCF's first formal replenishment to be concluded by October 2019. Governance updates included the establishment of a Performance Oversight Committee and the appointment of Javier Manzanares as Executive Director ad interim.

The document identifies a significant gap between South Africa's stated goal of harnessing the strategic potential of African migration and its implementation of restrictive policies. While the Department of Home Affairs has proposed progressive measures like SADC visas and regularisation schemes, these have stalled. Instead, the government is fast-tracking the Border Management Authority Bill and the Refugees Amendment Act of 2017, and pursuing the construction of expensive asylum processing centres. The author argues that these measures are based on unsubstantiated claims that low-skilled migrants and asylum seekers pose security risks, and that they distract from endemic administrative corruption and management failures within the Department of Home Affairs.

The report identifies Strategic Water Source Areas (SWSAs) as critical land areas that provide a disproportionate amount of surface water runoff or groundwater recharge, sustaining over 50% of South Africa's population and 64% of its economy. It establishes a management framework to mitigate impacts from forestry, agriculture, mining, and invasive alien plants, while providing guidelines for government planners to integrate SWSA maps into strategic development frameworks and zoning schemes.

The report defines and maps 22 national Strategic Water Source Areas for surface water (SWSA-sw) and 37 for groundwater (SWSA-gw) in South Africa, including transboundary areas in Lesotho and Swaziland. It links these areas to major urban centres and agricultural sectors, highlighting that a small percentage of land provides a disproportionate amount of the region's water. The study identifies significant threats from invasive alien plants, mining, and land degradation, and recommends integrating SWSAs into national policy, legislation, and spatial planning to ensure long-term water security.

The paper concludes that a regional SACU stabilisation fund is inappropriate and infeasible because member states experience different degrees of revenue volatility driven by different sources. While Lesotho, Namibia, and eSwatini are primarily affected by the SACU revenue pool's distribution formula, Botswana is driven by commodity revenues and South Africa by its internal tax base. The author argues that the core issue for the BLNS countries is the current revenue-sharing formula, which links their revenues to South African import patterns. The paper recommends that member states focus on revising the revenue-sharing formula or implementing country-level fiscal tools—such as medium-term expenditure frameworks, fiscal rules, or national stabilisation funds—rather than pursuing a regional fund.

The EU-SADC EPA provides Lesotho with tariff preferences and liberal rules of origin for exports to the EU, supported by a development envelope of EUR 6 million. However, Lesotho currently exports almost no agricultural or agro-processed products to European markets due to low production volumes, inability to meet stringent EU and South African standards, and fragmented coordination between government and donors. While aquaculture (freshwater trout) is growing, other produce like apples, peaches, and tomatoes remains local or limited to South African markets. The document recommends that Lesotho integrate into South African value chains as a stepping stone to the EU and focus development efforts on a few specific products to achieve the necessary scale.

The EU–SADC EPA, effective October 2016, provides tariff preferences for South Africa and other SADC members, with higher benefits for processed goods. Despite this, South Africa has underutilised its quotas for several processed fruit products due to a lack of awareness, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues, and drought. The document highlights the potential for growth in the canned fruit and juice sectors, noting that while large companies dominate, there are opportunities for SMEs if barriers such as the lack of local testing laboratories and changing EU consumer preferences (e.g., reduced sugar) are addressed. It recommends establishing information portals, improving SPS capacity, and providing technical assistance for niche markets like nuts to better integrate small-scale producers into the EU value chain.

The document examines how South Africa and Lesotho can leverage the SADC EPA to increase agro-processing exports to the EU. While South Africa has established capacity but struggles with quota uptake and SME integration, Lesotho starts from a 'near zero base' with significant infrastructure and standards gaps. The paper emphasizes the need for regional value chains and targeted EU development support to assist SMEs, women, and youth.

On 19 April 2018, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) conducted a workshop for over 50 Namibian MPs and staff. The event focused on integrating parliament into the APRM process, sharing lessons from other African nations, and aligning the mechanism with Namibia's national development plans. Discussions highlighted the importance of parliamentary oversight in implementing National Programmes of Action (NPoA) and the need for a formal parliamentary strategy and committee to manage APRM engagement.

The report examines remittance flows in sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting that while they are a vital source of capital—often exceeding official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI)—formal flows are constrained by high costs and regulatory barriers. Nigeria is the dominant receiver of remittances in the region. The study identifies a significant mismatch between migration patterns and formal remittance data, suggesting a high level of informality. It argues that shifting these flows to formal channels would enhance financial sector development and overall economic growth in SSA.

The report examines the systemic marginalization of women in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), where they constitute 30% of the global workforce but are often relegated to low-value, non-digging roles. It identifies key bottlenecks, including lack of access to land, finance, and geological data, as well as cultural taboos and discriminatory legal frameworks. The document argues for gender-mainstreaming in formalization processes, the creation of women-specific financial products, and the strengthening of female miners' associations to improve women's economic independence and influence in the sector.

The paper argues that SADC's integration efforts have been hindered by weak leadership, a lack of enforcement powers in its Secretariat, and a reluctance by member states to cede sovereignty. It suggests that President Ramaphosa's background in mining could drive a future-oriented regional mining strategy, particularly regarding minerals for renewable energy batteries, and that strengthening the SADC Parliament is necessary to ensure regional policies are domesticated into national laws.

The report introduces a framework for measuring 'additionality' in climate finance, focusing on whether public investments catalyze activity that would not have occurred under a business-as-usual scenario. It details a qualitative multi-criteria assessment (MCA) for individual projects and a quantitative 'additionality modifier' based on the IESE VCPE Index for portfolio-level analysis. The findings suggest that private equity is a viable instrument for additionality as it often targets high-risk markets where commercial investment is otherwise lacking.