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The document evaluates the Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe as a successful example of an 'African solution' to a political stalemate, while critiquing the slow pace of the diplomatic response. It highlights the agreement's goals of dividing executive power and restoring basic services, but notes that the delay in action allowed for extreme economic collapse, including hyperinflation and a cholera pandemic.

The document details the perspectives of General Martin Luther Agwai on the implementation of the UNAMID mandate in Darfur. It outlines the socio-economic and political origins of the Darfur conflict, the transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the hybrid UNAMID operation, and the significant logistical and political hurdles facing the mission. General Agwai argues that while UNAMID has achieved success in civilian protection and humanitarian support, it is severely hampered by a lack of equipment, insufficient troop levels, and a complex security environment where no stable peace exists to be kept.

The document analyzes the foreign policy platforms of candidates John McCain and Barack Obama ahead of the 2008 US election, arguing that while Africa will likely remain a low priority for any new administration, South Africa can leverage its role as a 'pivotal state' to secure military resources, trade benefits, and health funding. It highlights diverging candidate views on energy—with Obama favoring a 'cap-and-trade' system and McCain supporting increased nuclear power and Alaskan drilling—and suggests South Africa could engage the US on carbon-trading opportunities.

The briefing argues that Zimbabwe's political crisis, characterized by contested elections and state power abuse, necessitates a transitional government. Unlike a government of national unity, a transitional government acts as a short-term caretaker to draft a new constitution and create an environment for free and fair elections. The author proposes an inclusive body comprising more than just the MDC and Zanu-PF, potentially with Robert Mugabe remaining as president under strict checks and balances, supported by expanded mediation from SADC, the AU, and the UN, as well as international civilian peacekeepers.

The briefing argues that Zimbabwe's political crisis and the contested re-election of Robert Mugabe in June 2008 necessitate a transitional government rather than a government of national unity. It defines a transitional government as a short-term caretaker authority tasked with drafting a new constitution and preparing for legitimate elections. The author proposes a one-year mandate for an inclusive body comprising more than just the MDC and Zanu-PF, supported by expanded mediation from SADC, the AU, and the UN, as well as international civilian peacekeepers.

The report details a seminar hosted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to evaluate the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006. Experts argued that while the Act aims to curb mercenary activity and align with the South African Constitution, it is overly restrictive, lacks clear definitions for 'humanitarian assistance', and may push the private military and security company (PMSC) industry underground. Discussions highlighted the tension between the Act's punitive approach and the potential utility of PMSCs in peacekeeping and stability operations, as well as the Act's impact on the military profession and its relationship with International Humanitarian Law.

The document analyzes the transition of French foreign policy in Africa from 'la Francafrique'—characterized by personal ties to corrupt elites in former colonies—to a strategy of 'partnership' between equal nations. This shift involves a move toward multilateralism through the European Union and a strategic pivot toward new markets and power-brokers, specifically South Africa. Key drivers for this change include the 'Abidjan doctrine' on economic governance, the devaluation of the CFA franc, and a desire to move beyond a relationship driven by colonial guilt. The text highlights South Africa's role as France's leading economic partner in Africa, noting cooperation in military training in the Central African Republic and nuclear energy projects involving the company Areva.

The research paper examines the complexities of the China-Africa relationship, highlighting the tension between massive Chinese investment and growing African concerns over colonial-style economic structures, labor standards, and environmental impacts. It identifies four conceptual roles China plays in Africa—as a face of globalisation, a development model, a mirror for the West, and a responsible stakeholder—and argues that the sustainability of the partnership depends on Africa's ability to manage these dynamics and China's adherence to international standards.

The document examines the long-term conflict in Sudan, focusing on the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as a framework for governance and peace. It details the interests of the Government of Sudan (GOS), the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and international mediators like IGAD. The paper analyzes the CPA's protocols on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security, while highlighting the critical role of the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process in post-conflict reconstruction.

This briefing from the Institute for Security Studies evaluates the fragile implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan as of May 2007. It details significant failures in security arrangements, the lack of a functioning population census, and the political tensions between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) ahead of planned national elections.

The author contends that sustainable peace and civilian protection in Africa require a differentiated strategic approach to security, linking short-term cessation of hostilities with long-term security sector transformation. Using the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as a primary case study, the paper critiques 'deadline diplomacy' and the tendency of mediators to treat security arrangements as technical 'add-ons' rather than central strategic terrain. The author argues that the Abuja process failed because it forced a comprehensive political settlement on unwilling parties instead of first establishing an effective, enforceable ceasefire and civilian protection process to create the necessary political space and trust.

The National Chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs assesses South Africa's role as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007. The statement critiques the tension between South Africa's aspirational moral authority and the 'realpolitik' of global diplomacy, specifically citing failures to address human rights violations in Zimbabwe. It advocates for a shift from state security to human security and calls for the development of indigenous African research capacity to shape the continent's policy agendas.

The author argues that the African Union's (AU) reliance on a rotational system for selecting its annual chairman creates a crisis of credibility when the designated region's candidate is a leader accused of grave human rights abuses. Specifically, the document highlights the risk of installing Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir as chair in 2007 despite the ongoing conflict in Darfur, where the Sudanese government has been accused of attacking civilians and bombing villages. The text notes that while Sudan was bypassed in 2006 in favor of Congo, a 2006 AU Assembly declaration deferred Sudan's claim to 2007. The author suggests that the AU must move beyond simple rotation toward firmer rules regarding the qualifications of its leaders to avoid damaging its international reputation.

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is described as 'nearly dead' and 'in a coma' just five months after ratification, with violence against civilians intensifying. The report highlights the failure of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission due to inadequate funding, equipment, and a limited mandate, while the Sudanese government under President Omar al-Bashir resists a full UN peacekeeping deployment. The conflict is rooted in historical land disputes and the politics of natural resources, including unexploited oil, uranium, copper, and bauxite in Darfur. International action is complicated by the commercial interests of UN Security Council permanent members—China, Russia, and France—who buy Sudanese oil. The report concludes that while the proposed 'AU-Plus' option (an extended AU mission with UN logistical and financial support) may be insufficient, it represents the only viable alternative to break the current diplomatic impasse.

The document examines the state of Sudan's transition following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). While noting security gains such as the establishment of UNMIS and the Joint Defence Board, it highlights severe risks to the peace process. Central to these is the unresolved demarcation of the Abyei boundary, which is viewed as a potential 'flashpoint' for renewed war due to oil interests and tribal tensions between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya. The report also notes that the death of Dr. John Garang weakened the 'New Sudan' vision of pluralism, leaving the SPLM more inclined toward secession and the NCP increasingly dominated by security and petroleum elites. Further instability is noted in Darfur and the Eastern Beja region, where marginalized groups feel excluded by the NCP-SPLM power-sharing arrangement.

The document argues that the IGAD peace process in Sudan is undermined by a lack of trust between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A, systemic failures in monitoring security agreements, and the GoS's use of proxy militias to maintain influence. It highlights specific breaches of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in the Shilluk Kingdom and Western Upper Nile, where civilian abuses and cattle looting occurred. The author concludes that sustainable peace requires a democratic transformation of the Sudanese state to address root grievances, rather than focusing solely on security maintenance.

The paper analyzes the Sudan-IGAD peace process, highlighting the shift from the first stage of negotiations between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A to a necessary second stage focused on inclusivity and democratic transformation. It argues that the success of the Machakos Protocol depends on expanding the process to include civil society and northern opposition groups, as well as resolving volatile bilateral relations with neighbors like Eritrea and Uganda. The author emphasizes the critical role of US pressure and the need for a successful referendum on self-determination for southern Sudan to prevent a return to conflict.

The document analyzes the IGAD-led peace process between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), highlighting the critical role of US pressure and the Machakos Protocol. It warns that the initial 'elite-driven' and 'secretive' approach must be replaced by transparency and democratic engagement to prevent instability from marginalized groups, such as the SSDF and the SLM/A in Darfur. The author emphasizes that internal stability is inextricably linked to resolving contentious bilateral relations with neighbors, particularly Eritrea and Uganda, and calls for a comprehensive regional framework to secure the peace.

The document details an interview with Al-Sadig al-Mahdi, who argues that the bilateral peace talks between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A are insufficient. He advocates for an 'IGAD Plus' approach that incorporates 'new forces'—including marginalized minorities and armed resistance in Darfur—and a transition to a religiously neutral, democratic constitution. Al-Mahdi proposes a strategic alliance between the Umma Party and the SPLM/A to ensure a united, democratic Sudan, while criticizing the National Islamic Front (NIF) and the historical role of the US in supporting regional dictatorships.

The report examines Sudan's history of military coups, focusing on the 30-year authoritarian rule of Omar al-Bashir and the subsequent 2019 transition attempt. It details the power-sharing agreement between the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), and the subsequent October 2021 coup by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The author argues that the coup weakened the civilian government and strengthened the military's influence, leaving the path to democracy uncertain and potentially destabilizing the Horn of Africa.