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This research paper analyzes the IGAD Peace Initiative in Sudan as it nears a signed agreement between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The author argues that while the first stage of negotiations was successful in its narrow focus, the subsequent transitional period requires a shift toward inclusivity, democratic transformation, and the rehabilitation of volatile bilateral relations with neighboring states in the Horn of Africa to ensure a sustainable peace.

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  • The IGAD Peace Initiative's success in reaching a potential agreement is attributed to its clarity in identifying core conflict issues and the application of international pressure, particularly from the United States.
  • The first stage of the IGAD process was characterized by an exclusive, elite-driven, and secretive approach that focused solely on the GoS and SPLM/A, ignoring human rights and broader Sudanese civil society.
  • A critical component of the peace process is the Machakos Protocol of 20 July 2002, which establishes the right to self-determination for southern Sudan and the need for a democratic system of governance.
  • The author warns that the peace process is threatened by the marginalization of other groups, specifically the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) in Darfur and the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) in the south.
  • The stability of the peace process is inextricably linked to Sudan's bilateral relations with its neighbors, particularly the history of 'tit-for-tat' support for rebel groups across borders in the Horn of Africa.
  • Relations between Sudan and Eritrea remain tense due to Eritrea's support for the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and Sudan's support for Eritrean dissidents.
  • The role of the United States was pivotal in invigorating the faltering IGAD process through a combination of sanctions, diplomatic pressure via Senator Danforth, and the Sudan Peace Act of October 2002.
  • The author identifies a lack of attention to human rights in the IGAD negotiations and suggests that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, similar to the South African model, could be a viable path forward.
  • The transition to a democratic state is viewed as the best insurance against the recurrence of armed struggle by marginalized regional and tribal groups who feel excluded from the 'political and resource pie'.

Cite the original document

APA
Institute for Security Studies (2004). The Sudan–IGAD Peace Process. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER86.PDF
Chicago
Institute for Security Studies. The Sudan–IGAD Peace Process. 2004. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER86.PDF.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=The Sudan–IGAD Peace Process |date=March 2004 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER86.PDF |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudies2004sudanigad, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{The Sudan–IGAD Peace Process}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2004}, month = mar, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER86.PDF}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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