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The report examines various global regulatory models for electricity revenue determination, including rate-of-return, incentive-based, performance-based, and market-based pricing. It details the technical process of Cost of Supply (CoS) studies—comprising functionalisation, classification, and allocation—and discusses the trade-offs between fixed and variable tariff charges. The document concludes that South Africa should move toward unbundled, cost-reflective tariffs supported by regular, audited CoS studies and a more robust, incentive-driven revenue determination methodology to support its transition to a wholesale market.

The report argues that KKR's use of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) often leads to financial instability and labor abuses in its portfolio companies. It documents a pattern of health and safety violations, anti-union activities, and wage theft across various sectors, including healthcare and landscaping. The document also highlights KKR's role in high-profile bankruptcies, such as Toys "R" Us and Envision Healthcare, and alleges that the firm has engaged in antitrust violations by obscuring information from the US government during mergers and acquisitions.

The document argues that Colombia's previous renewable energy auctions, which focused exclusively on price, led to social conflicts and project cancellations, particularly in La Guajira. It proposes a new framework incorporating non-price criteria—such as local employment, community benefit-sharing, and gender perspectives—into qualification and award processes. Additionally, it suggests creating a dedicated support agency and a 'joining process' (proceso de adhesión) to enable small-scale community energy projects (up to 5 MW) to access the market without competing directly with large developers.

The report finds that international reporting of military greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is generally poor, with significant under-reporting in data submitted to the UNFCCC. A comparison of five top military spenders showed that defence ministry reports for direct emissions were, on average, 95% higher than UNFCCC figures. The report highlights a critical lack of Scope 3 (supply-chain) reporting, noting that less than 10% of military carbon footprints typically appear in UNFCCC data. It identifies systemic loopholes in reporting guidelines and instances of 'greenwashing,' specifically by the UK military, and recommends mandatory, explicit military emissions reporting within National Inventory Reports.

The report finds that nominee companies, primarily branches of major global banks, mask the ownership of fossil fuel assets in Australia, obscuring approximately 18% of the national fossil fuel CO2 emissions. It highlights that these structures allow investors, including superannuation funds, to maintain stakes in high-emitting projects while avoiding public scrutiny, and notes that Australian law currently lacks regulations to require the disclosure of the actual shareholders behind these nominees.

The author argues that as more jurisdictions implement border carbon adjustments (BCAs), the lack of harmonized standards for measuring, reporting, and verifying emissions could create a "trade-restrictive, costly mess." While full harmonization is deemed unrealistic due to differing national economic and political realities, the document proposes "interoperability" as a viable alternative. This approach would involve splitting emissions accounting into discrete modules, harmonizing basic reporting information, and mutually recognizing accredited verifiers. The author suggests that existing forums like the OECD's Inclusive Forum for Carbon Mitigation Approaches and the Climate Club are appropriate venues for this coordination, warning that interoperability will be harder to achieve once multiple regimes are fully operational.

The document highlights Indonesia's decision to contribute to the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), a fund initiated by Brazil to raise up to $125 billion for nature conservation. The author describes this as a move away from the historical reliance on 'Global North' funding and urges wealthy nations to invest in the fund to reach the necessary scale, while noting that Indonesia and Brazil must still address internal deforestation drivers.

Reclaim Finance asserts that France is failing to lead a global coal exit ten years after the Paris Agreement. Despite domestic plans to close coal plants by 2027, major French banks like BNP Paribas and Société Générale continue to finance thermal and metallurgical coal projects internationally. The document also highlights the failure of the Coal Transition Accelerator (CTA) and other diplomatic efforts to create binding international standards for coal phase-out.

The report examines the paradox of Indonesia's nickel sector, where a critical mineral for the clean energy transition is processed using carbon-intensive captive coal. It identifies a significant expansion of captive coal capacity, projected to exceed 32 GW by 2031, driven by resource nationalism and the need for stable power in remote regions. The document contrasts 'Green Opportunism' (short-term gains via coal) with 'Green Developmentalism' (long-term competitiveness via decarbonisation) and proposes specific roles for Chinese stakeholders to support a sustainable transition through technical assistance, green finance, and market-shaping rules.

The document describes how securitization—pooling assets like loans into securities via special purpose vehicles—increases liquidity and capital recycling for low-carbon transportation, buildings, water, and renewable energy. It details commercial and public examples, the role of technical assistance, and the capacity requirements for issuers and regulators to scale these instruments.

The document argues that social acceptance is a critical bottleneck for CCS deployment in Poland, where public awareness is low and skepticism is high. It highlights the risk of 'NIMBY' (Not In My Back Yard) and 'WIMBY' (Why In My Backyard?) attitudes, drawing parallels to the historical failure of onshore wind development in Poland. Through international case studies from Japan, Norway, and Australia, the brief demonstrates that transparency, early engagement, and tangible local benefits are essential for securing a 'social licence to operate.' It recommends that the Polish government implement mandatory early community engagement, public data sharing, and benefit-sharing mechanisms to ensure the technology is accepted as a tool for industrial decarbonisation and job retention.

The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is designed to prevent carbon leakage and encourage global decarbonisation by imposing levies on high-emitting imports. While facing criticism from BRICS nations as a protectionist barrier, the CBAM's design allows for the deduction of carbon prices already paid in the country of origin. This has led several countries, including India, China, Brazil, and Vietnam, to strategically develop or expand domestic carbon markets or taxes to ensure that carbon revenues are retained domestically rather than paid to the EU. Modelling indicates that if domestic prices reach 50% of the EU's price, countries like India could retain EUR 676 million annually.

The document identifies critical gaps in the U.S. nuclear supply chain, particularly regarding HALEU fuel, nuclear-grade graphite, and ultra-large forgings, noting a heavy reliance on Russia and China for these essential materials and services.

The document explains that limiting global warming to 1.5°C will likely involve 'temperature overshoot', where targets are exceeded before returning to lower levels. Such overshoot increases the risk of triggering irreversible climate tipping points, such as the transformation of the Amazon rainforest into a savanna. The author argues that relying on large-scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) or geoengineering to correct overshoot is risky and uncertain, emphasizing that immediate, deep emissions cuts are the only reliable way to maintain a habitable planet. It also introduces the concept of 'positive socio-economic tipping points' as a strategic means to accelerate the transition to net zero.

In the first half of 2025, global solar and wind generation grew sufficiently to meet and exceed total electricity demand growth, leading to renewables overtaking coal in the global electricity mix for the first time. Solar generation saw record absolute growth, while total fossil fuel generation declined slightly. Consequently, global CO2 emissions from the power sector fell marginally by 0.2%, although results varied by region, with emissions decreasing in China and India but increasing in the US and EU.

Ember argues that the NSW EPA's proposed requirements for large emitters are a positive step but lack the ambition needed to meet net zero goals. The report highlights significant underreporting of coal mine methane (CMM) in New South Wales, suggesting satellite data shows emissions could be double official figures. Ember recommends extending reporting requirements to all coal mines, mandating pre-mine drainage for open-cut mines, and requiring 70-year post-closure monitoring for abandoned mine methane. It also emphasizes the need for alignment with the EU Methane Regulation to protect the export viability of metallurgical coal.

In the first half of 2025, global solar and wind generation grew sufficiently to exceed total electricity demand growth, leading to renewables overtaking coal's share of the global electricity mix for the first time on record. While China and India saw declines in fossil fuel generation and emissions, the US and EU experienced increases due to demand growth outpacing clean energy in the US and unfavorable weather affecting wind and hydro in the EU.

The report examines the social dimensions of deploying carbon capture and storage (CCS) in Poland, emphasizing that technical feasibility alone is insufficient without a 'social license to operate.' It highlights the risks of public opposition—citing failures in the Netherlands and Australia—and contrasts them with successful engagement in Japan and Norway. The authors identify low public awareness and safety concerns as primary barriers in Poland and recommend a shift from top-down communication to partnership-based engagement, including early stakeholder involvement, transparent data sharing, and tangible local economic benefits.

The report analyzes the role of nominee companies—middlemen that hold shares in name only—in masking the identities of investors in Australian coal, oil, and gas projects. It finds that these structures obscure approximately 18% of Australia's national fossil fuel CO2 emissions and are predominantly operated by major global banks. The document highlights a lack of regulatory requirements for nominee disclosure in Australia, which allows investors, including some superannuation funds, to maintain stakes in high-emitting assets while avoiding public scrutiny.

The report examines eight innovative financial instruments—including the Adaptation Benefit Mechanism, biodiversity credits, carbon taxes, carbon trading, credit guarantees, debt-for-nature/climate resilience swaps, pooled investment funds, and sovereign green/sustainability-linked bonds—to bridge the climate finance gap in developing countries. It identifies common barriers such as limited institutional capacity, lack of robust project pipelines, and underdeveloped local capital markets. The document emphasizes that while these instruments can signal a government's commitment to climate action, their success depends on a supportive enabling environment characterized by effective leadership, clear taxonomies, and robust climate data. For least developed countries (LDCs), the report suggests a phased approach, first strengthening basic financial and legal prerequisites before focusing on 'climate investability'. It concludes with specific recommendations for donors and development partners to provide technical assistance, anchor investments, and pilot projects to scale up private sector mobilization.