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The document provides a comprehensive guide to debt-for-climate (DFC) swaps, which are financial operations where public debt is cancelled, exchanged, or refinanced in return for policy commitments to invest savings into environmental conservation, mitigation, or adaptation. It distinguishes between official bilateral swaps and trilateral commercial swaps, highlighting recent large-scale examples in Ecuador, Belize, and Seychelles. The primer emphasizes that DFC swaps are most effective when limited fiscal space is the primary barrier to climate investment, rather than in cases of extreme debt distress. It also outlines the critical roles of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), Policy Development Banks (PDBs), and National Development Banks (NDBs) in providing credit enhancements, monitoring KPIs, and building government capacity.

The document explains that climate-resilient debt clauses (CRDCs) are contractual agreements that allow countries to temporarily postpone debt repayments following natural disasters, providing essential liquidity for emergency response. It details the design of these instruments—including parametric and proxy triggers—and discusses their adoption by Caribbean small island developing states and various multilateral development banks. The guide highlights challenges such as trigger identification and portfolio risk for regional banks, while providing a decision tree to help development finance institutions assess the feasibility of offering CRDCs.

In 2024, global prospective utility-scale solar and wind capacity grew by over 20% to 4.4 TW, though this remains only half of the 9 TW required to meet COP28's tripling renewables goal. While at least 240 GW of capacity became operational in 2024, project completion rates vary significantly: 76% in G7 countries, 55% in China, and 52% in other non-G7 countries. China leads in both operating capacity (at least 891 GW) and prospective projects, planning over two-thirds of all future utility-scale solar and wind projects. Conversely, G7 countries hold 45% of global GDP but are building only 10% of planned projects.

The paper proposes a state-led fiscal strategy for South Africa's energy transition, centered on a climate response fund. It recommends mobilizing domestic resources through carbon taxes, fuel levies, and mineral royalties, alongside the issuance of climate bonds. The goal is to protect vulnerable workers, particularly in coal-dependent regions like Mpumalanga, and provide an estimated R100 billion annually for climate priorities.

The document argues that South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) is currently unable to meet the country's climate goals due to a reliance on commercial financing and a portfolio skewed toward carbon-intensive sectors. It proposes a significant recapitalisation of R280 billion, the introduction of concessional lending at 2% below prime, and the diversification of the IDC board to include civil society and workers to ensure a just transition.

The document assesses the limitations of the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) in South Africa, noting that its focus on infrastructure may sideline workers. It proposes reallocating bank lending and retirement funds to unlock billions for onshore developmental projects and recommends implementing a Green Financial Taxonomy and targeted credit allocation to support a worker-centred transition.

The study finds that while the South African Green Finance Taxonomy (SA GFT) shows high international interoperability regarding its 'Make Substantial Contribution' (MSC) pillar and climate change mitigation priorities, it faces significant usability and adoption challenges regarding the 'Do No Significant Harm' (DNSH) and 'Minimum Social Safeguards' (MSS) pillars. The document recommends introducing more flexible classifications, such as an 'eligible vs aligned' system, increasing the use of quantitative thresholds and international standards (e.g., ISO), and integrating national regulations like the B-BBEE Act into the MSS framework to reduce ambiguity and compliance burdens for market participants.

The document critiques the current financial mechanisms of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, highlighting how the Global Environment Facility and private finance models perpetuate biodiversity loss. It identifies the role of banks in funding extractive industries and the 'predatory debt' cycles that force developing nations into nature-destroying exports. The author rejects biodiversity offsets and green bonds as 'false solutions' and calls for direct funding mechanisms for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs).

The Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) advocates for a nationally owned development finance strategy to address debt distress and the climate crisis. In South Africa, the IEJ focuses on increasing transparency for international financial institution (IFI) loans and ensuring that the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JET-P) prioritizes public good over private profit through fair risk-sharing and expanded policy tools.

The World Resources Institute evaluates the EU's Clean Industrial Deal, praising its focus on clean-tech and the mobilization of 100 billion Euros for manufacturing, but warns that potential delays to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and a lack of specific resource efficiency targets could undermine its effectiveness.

The document examines the systemic failures of carbon offsetting, highlighting that most credits—particularly those for forestry and renewable energy—lack additionality and environmental integrity. It argues that offsetting often leads to an overall increase in emissions by delaying necessary mitigation and allowing continued investment in high-emitting technologies. The briefing concludes that carbon avoidance and reduction offsets have no place in ambitious climate policies, recommending that priority be given to direct emissions cuts and non-market-based climate finance.

Agricultural methane emissions in the UK reached 996 thousand tonnes in 2021, representing 49% of all UK methane emissions in 2022. While emissions have fallen by 14% since 1990, they have remained constant since 2009. The document identifies enteric emissions from ruminants as the primary source (85%) and manure as the secondary source (15%). It evaluates several mitigation tools, including feed additives like 3-NOP, selective breeding for low methane emissions, anaerobic digesters (AD), and improved manure management. Key recommendations for the UK Government include investing in research for pasture-based feed additives, developing a breeding value for methane efficiency, creating a Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) system for rural anaerobic digesters, and updating the Slurry Infrastructure Grant to specifically target greenhouse gas reductions.

The report identifies that India requires USD 300 billion in total investment by 2032 to meet its National Electricity Plan-14 targets. It argues that managing project-specific risks is essential to keep the cost of capital low, as a 400 basis point increase in this cost could result in India falling short of its 2030 renewable energy target by 100 GW. Key risks analyzed include commissioning delays, the complexities of Firm and Dispatchable Renewable Energy (FDRE) projects, PV module performance and localization, and the financial instability of distribution companies (DISCOMs).

The Green Climate Fund partially granted information disclosure request IDP672. While Annual Performance Reports (APRs) for all listed projects were granted via website links, mid-term evaluation reports were consistently denied because the information does not exist. Financial reports were mostly granted, though some were denied based on confidentiality clauses, specifically for APR 2020 in several instances.

A group of French environmental and human rights organizations warns that the European Commission's proposed 'Omnibus' legislation threatens to undermine the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) by limiting corporate vigilance to direct partners, removing mandatory climate transition plans, and rolling back civil liability for failures.

C-PACE programs have provided $9 billion in financing for energy efficiency in 25 US states and cities, but most were established before embodied carbon data was available. The briefing proposes that C-PACE administrators update guidelines to classify low-embodied-carbon materials as "energy improvements," utilizing tools like Environmental Product Declarations (EPDs) and Whole Building Life Cycle Assessments. To incentivize this shift, the author suggests increasing financing limits for projects that demonstrate embodied carbon reduction. RMI is facilitating a working group through 2025 to develop nationwide best practices for integrating embodied carbon into C-PACE guidelines.

WRI has developed a cost-effective MRV framework and the TerraMatch platform to track land restoration progress. The process combines geospatial polygons, semi-annual field reports, and independent verification using AI-driven satellite imagery and employment records to measure tree counts, carbon stocks, and job creation.

The document identifies a USD 146.4 billion investment gap for Indonesia's 2030 ENDC targets, noting that private financial institutions' climate finance represents only 3% of their total investments. While new regulations like the Indonesia Taxonomy for Sustainable Finance (TKBI) and POJK 18/2023 support decarbonization, significant barriers remain, including contradictory fossil fuel subsidies and a mismatch between the long-term capital needs of climate projects and the short-term nature of commercial bank funding.

RMI outlines five key factors—facility suitability, electricity costs/net metering, energy efficiency, battery sizing, and available funding—to help US communities deploy solar-plus-battery microgrids that serve as resilience hubs during disasters.

The document examines the necessity of a Europe-wide CO2 transport network, estimating a need for 15,000 to 19,000 km of infrastructure by 2050 to move 250 million tonnes of CO2 annually. It highlights the risk of 'natural monopolies' in pipeline transport and advocates for a shift from negotiated third-party access to a regulated access regime to prevent excessive tariffs. The brief proposes inter-temporal cost allocation mechanisms, such as Germany's 'amortisation account', to solve the 'first mover disadvantage' where early users bear disproportionate costs for oversized infrastructure. It also addresses 'cross-chain' financial risks and the need for standardised CO2 purity specifications to ensure network interoperability and safety.