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The report examines the use of environmental attribute certificates (EACs) via a book and claim model to scale lower-carbon steel and concrete. It argues that this mechanism allows organizations to fund upstream decarbonization even when they cannot directly procure low-carbon materials. The authors identify critical infrastructure needs—including certification schemes, standards, registries, and reporting guidelines—and share lessons from a Microsoft pilot, noting that the market is currently in early stages with a lack of fit-for-purpose accounting methods.

The report argues that labelled transition finance is currently stalled by 'transition-washing'—where finance is provided to entities without a credible plan to reach net zero. It identifies root causes such as a lack of scientifically robust, geography-specific emissions pathways and the prevalence of non-binding voluntary standards. Using sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs) and Japanese transition-labelled bonds as case studies, the author highlights issues like unambitious targets, immaterial penalties, and reliance on non-credible technologies like ammonia co-firing. To address this, the report recommends six guardrails: preparing national Paris-aligned pathways, establishing robust classification standards, building external verification capacity, implementing mandatory regulatory thresholds for protected labels, empowering regulators to penalise transition-washing, and enacting systemic reforms such as mandating transition plans for large firms.

The report assesses decarbonisation strategies for refineries across four major regions, focusing on Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions. It evaluates technologies such as carbon capture, blue and green hydrogen, and the transition to biorefineries (specifically the HEFA process) or clean fuels facilities. Regional analysis shows that while the US and GCC benefit from cheap natural gas for blue hydrogen, Europe is trending toward green hydrogen imports and biorefinery revamps. Singapore's strategy is heavily influenced by its status as a global trading hub and its lack of domestic natural gas or carbon storage resources. The report concludes that energy efficiency projects are generally the most immediate and viable, while large-scale carbon capture and hydrogen transitions require significant policy support and infrastructure development to be economically feasible.

The report finds that Chevron's strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over sustainable energy. Its projected 2030 production levels and LNG capacity exceed NZE requirements, while its diversification efforts are described as marginal and focused on unsustainable energies like bioenergy and fossil-fuel-based hydrogen.

The report concludes that ExxonMobil's strategy prioritizes fossil fuel expansion and shareholder returns over sustainable energy investments. It finds that the company's 2030 production targets and LNG capacity expansions significantly exceed the limits required to align with a 1.5°C pathway. Furthermore, the report highlights a lack of scope 3 emissions targets and a diversification strategy that relies on unsustainable energies like blue hydrogen and biofuels.

The CSDDD requires large companies to ensure their operations do not have disproportionate impacts on the climate, environment, biodiversity, and human rights. However, the document highlights a critical gap: financial services are excluded from due diligence requirements, meaning financial actors are only responsible for their non-financial activities (e.g., office supplies) rather than their investments in harmful projects. While the directive mandates climate transition plans for all covered entities, including financial actors, the document warns that relying on CSRD reporting standards may result in low-quality, non-prescriptive plans that fail to stop fossil fuel expansion.

The report finds a substantial gap between the world's largest public and private companies regarding net zero commitments. While 70% of the largest public companies have set net zero targets, only 40% of the largest private companies have done so. Furthermore, private companies show a critical lack of integrity in their pledges; only 20% of those with net zero targets have published plans to achieve them, compared to 80% of public companies. The analysis highlights that high-emitting private sectors, particularly fossil fuels, are largely avoiding targets. The report argues that emerging regulations, such as the EU's CSRD and CSDDD, as well as California's SB 253 and SB 261, are essential to compel private companies to disclose emissions and adopt mandatory transition plans to mitigate transition risks.

Reclaim Finance criticizes a statement released by the SBTi Board of Trustees on April 9, 2024, which suggested extending the use of environmental attribute certificates for Scope 3 emissions abatement. The organization asserts that this move contradicts existing SBTi policy, which limits carbon credits to long-term net-zero targets for residual emissions (up to 10%), and was made without consulting the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) or Scientific Advisory Group (SAG). Reclaim Finance warns that this decision threatens the scientific integrity of science-based targets and could facilitate greenwashing.

Carbon Market Watch argues that the SBTi Board of Trustees' decision to recognize carbon credits for abating scope 3 emissions violates scientific principles and governance processes. The organization claims this flexibility allows companies to appear climate-positive on paper while continuing to emit greenhouse gases, potentially dismantling the mitigation hierarchy that prioritizes deep internal emission reductions. Carbon Market Watch calls for the retraction of the decision, a public analysis of evidence regarding environmental attribute certificates, and a review of the SBTi's board delegation process.

The We Mean Business Coalition welcomes the Science Based Targets initiative's (SBTi) updated guidance allowing environmental attribute certificates, such as carbon credits, to be used for Scope 3 emissions. The Coalition argues that this reform provides companies with necessary clarity and tools to accelerate value chain decarbonization while increasing funding for climate projects in the Global South.

The 2024 Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor finds that while the ambition of 51 major global companies has improved, their 2030 targets—with a median absolute emission reduction of 30% for full value chain emissions—remain insufficient to limit warming to 1.5°C. The report highlights a reliance on 'false solutions' like CCUS and carbon removals over actual emission reductions, and criticizes the leniency of validation practices by the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi). It argues that the current voluntary accountability system is impaired by corporate influence and must transition to formal accountability.

The report examines the role of sustainable debt in transitioning the agri-food sector to net-zero, highlighting the need for finance to reach smallholder farmers. It introduces new Climate Bonds Sector Criteria for Agriculture Production and Deforestation and Conversion Free (DCF) Sourcing to standardize green activities. The analysis reveals that while sovereign issuers dominate the AFOLU sustainable debt market, there is a critical need for more material KPIs beyond scope 3 GHG emissions and greater transparency in the loan market to scale impactful investments.

The report argues that Occidental Petroleum's (Oxy) climate strategy is misaligned with the 1.5°C goal of the Paris Agreement. It finds that Oxy's net-zero targets are inadequate, focusing primarily on scope 1 and 2 emissions while ignoring the vast majority of its carbon footprint in scope 3. The analysis highlights a heavy overreliance on unproven direct air capture (DAC) technology, which the report claims is used as a 'licence to pollute' and a mechanism to prolong oil and gas extraction through enhanced oil recovery (EOR). The report further asserts that Oxy's 'net-zero oil' claims are scientifically invalid and that its lobbying efforts for government subsidies for carbon removals contradict its public climate commitments.

The Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor 2024 finds that the median absolute emissions reduction commitment for 51 assessed companies is only 30% by 2030, falling short of the 43%-48% reduction required by the IPCC. The report criticizes the heavy reliance on 'questionable solutions' such as carbon offsets, insetting, and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) to mask a lack of genuine decarbonization. It specifically highlights a 'Scope 3 loophole' in the VCMI framework that could allow companies to use credits for up to 50% of their annual Scope 3 emissions. The document advocates for 'beyond value chain mitigation' (BVCM) and calls for the European Union to ban all compensation claims and for the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) to prohibit the use of carbon credits to meet targets.

The 2024 Corporate Climate Responsibility Monitor finds that while corporate climate targets are gradually improving, they remain largely insufficient to align with a 1.5°C pathway. The median 2030 emission reduction commitment for the 51 assessed companies is only 30-33% of full value chain emissions, falling short of the 43-48% required globally. The report highlights a critical lack of depth in scope 3 targets and warns that proposed flexibility mechanisms, such as the VCMI beta Scope 3 Flexibility Claim, could effectively nullify these commitments. It also identifies an over-reliance on 'false solutions' like bioenergy, carbon capture, and land-based carbon dioxide removals (CDR), particularly in the agrifood and fashion sectors. The authors argue for a transition from voluntary initiatives to formal accountability through mandatory regulation and accredited verification.

The guide establishes a methodology for assessing corporate climate responsibility across four key areas: emissions tracking and disclosure, target setting, emission reduction measures, and responsibility for unabated and residual emissions. It emphasizes alignment with 1.5°C-compatible pathways, the necessity of covering all emission scopes (including Scope 3), and the distinction between genuine emission reductions and misleading offsetting or 'insetting' claims. The document provides specific benchmarks for various industrial sectors and detailed criteria for high-integrity renewable electricity procurement and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies.

The report finds that BP's investment strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over climate solutions, with 2023 investments in oil and gas being 11.6 times higher than those in low-carbon energy. BP has revised its 2030 oil and gas production targets upward and reduced its scope 3 decarbonization targets, leading to a projected 2030 production level 26% above NZE alignment. While BP aims for 10 GW of renewable capacity by 2030, it will still produce 23 times more energy from fossil fuels than from renewables. The report also highlights BP's continued development of gas power and reliance on bioenergy and hydrogen, which may not be sustainable.

The report finds that Equinor's investment strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over renewable energy, with 2023 investments in oil and gas being 6.2 times higher than those in renewables. The analysis indicates that Equinor's 2030 production targets will be 61% higher than levels required for NZE alignment, and the company continues to develop 'climate bombs' in the Barents Sea and Vaca Muerta. Furthermore, Equinor is expanding its gas power capacity by 80% by 2030 and lacks a specific target for scope 3 emissions, which constitute 96% of its total emissions.

The report finds that Repsol's investment strategy prioritizes oil and gas and shareholder returns over renewable energy, with 2030 production targets projected to be 65% higher than those required for NZE alignment. While the company is diversifying into renewables and hydrogen, these remain marginal, with oil and gas expected to constitute over 70% of its energy mix by 2030. Additionally, the report notes that Repsol's scope 3 emission targets are less ambitious than its scope 1 and 2 targets, and its carbon intensity target for 2030 is 21.9% higher than the NZE.

The report concludes that TotalEnergies' strategy prioritizes oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over the energy transition. It finds that the company's 2030 production targets and LNG capacity expansions significantly overshoot NZE limits, while its renewable energy growth relies primarily on acquisitions rather than organic development. Furthermore, the report argues that TotalEnergies' diversification into gas power, blue hydrogen, and bioenergy is unsustainable and that its emissions targets rely heavily on unproven carbon capture and offset technologies.