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The report evaluates the UK's open register of beneficial owners, finding that while 87% of companies comply, significant loopholes allow thousands to hide real ownership through 'no PSC' statements, ineligible foreign corporate entities, and circular ownership structures. It argues that Companies House lacks the resources and mandate to verify data or sanction non-compliance, and recommends the adoption of unique identifiers and automated red-flagging systems to detect financial crime.

Global Witness reports that Western companies traded 533 million barrels of Russian oil and oil products in the year following the invasion of Ukraine, representing nearly 25% of Russia's total sea-borne exports. While trade shifted toward India, China, and Turkey, Western entities—particularly traders like Vitol and Gunvor, and Greek-owned tankers—remained significant enablers. Western-owned tankers carried over 897 million barrels, with 83% of that volume handled by Greek-owned vessels.

A joint investigation by Global Witness and Radio Free Europe (RFE) identifies a supply chain connecting Wintershall Dea's gas condensate production in Western Siberia to the Salavat refinery, which in turn supplies diesel to companies with Russian military contracts. While the report notes it is not possible to determine if a specific barrel of diesel contains Wintershall's condensate, it highlights that the refinery's output reaches suppliers for the Federal Guard Service (FSO) and other military units. The report criticizes Wintershall for its continued shareholding in these ventures and its pursuit of German government compensation despite these connections.

The document warns that the global food price surge, driven by climate events and the invasion of Ukraine, is being used by industry actors and politicians to push for the deregulation of forests to increase agricultural production. It argues that deforestation actually undermines food security by disrupting weather cycles and increasing climate shocks, citing examples of crop losses in Brazil and Canada. The author urges the UK, EU, and forest-rich nations to maintain and strengthen due diligence requirements to prevent businesses from profiting from deforestation.

Global Witness reports that BASF's subsidiary, Wintershall Dea, continued extracting and transporting Russian gas in 2022 despite BASF's public commitment to wind down non-food businesses in Russia. The brief estimates that Russian gas transported by Wintershall across Germany in early 2022 was worth over €14 billion and that the subsidiary earned €400 million from Siberian fields between January and March 2022. It highlights BASF CEO Martin Brudermüller's lobbying to maintain these supplies to avoid economic crisis, while noting that Wintershall's partnership with Gazprom has increased Russia's leverage over Germany's energy security.

Global Witness criticizes a draft US-Ukraine deal proposed by Donald Trump, which would grant the US control over half of Ukraine's revenues from new oil, gas, and mining projects via a US-controlled 'Reconstruction Investment Fund'. The analysis suggests this puts $353 billion of oil and gas revenue at risk and allows the US to restrict Ukraine's mineral exports to other countries. The document argues that such an arrangement prioritizes US 'war debt' recovery over Ukrainian public services and pushes the country toward fossil fuel dependency instead of a sustainable, green reconstruction.

The statement by Svitlana Romanko asserts that fossil fuel revenues directly fund the Russian invasion of Ukraine and that global dependence on these fuels empowers authoritarian regimes and exacerbates the climate crisis. It calls for an immediate embargo on Russian fossil fuels, divestment from related infrastructure, and the adoption of a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty to transition to clean energy.

Global Witness highlights that despite Shell's public claims of exiting Russia and writing down its assets, the company may receive over $1 billion from a bid by Novatek for its stake in the Sakhalin-II project. The author contends that 'writing down' assets is a meaningless accounting measure that does not end legal ownership. The document calls for Shell to donate these funds to Ukraine, noting that such a payout would cover more than 10% of the direct damage caused by Russia to Ukraine's energy infrastructure.

Global Witness reports that between February 24 and March 21, 2022, over 360 ships carrying approximately 39.3 million barrels of crude oil, 7.52 million barrels of fuel oil, 473,000 tonnes of LNG, and 2.82 million tonnes of coal from Russian ports were insured by members of the International Group of P&I Clubs (IGP&I). The document asserts that this insurance, required by EU law and international conventions, facilitates the trade of 'conflict fuel' that funds Russia's war in Ukraine. While the IGP&I acknowledges that collective withdrawal of cover could have an 'immediate effect' on volumes, it claims this would only cause a 'limited short-term hiatus' as owners might seek alternative insurance. Only one club, Gard, responded to inquiries about excluding such shipowners, arguing that withdrawing protection could expose 'innocent third parties to risks'.

Ukrainian, British, and European NGOs are calling on the US Congress to close a 'refining loophole' that allows Russian oil to enter the US market after being refined in third countries, primarily India. The NGOs argue that the US should ban refined products from any refinery that has imported Russian crude oil within the previous six months to reduce Russian export revenues and limit Russia's ability to fund its war in Ukraine.

The briefing argues that European and U.S. energy companies provided nearly USD 100 billion to the Russian government through oil and gas projects from 2014 to 2021. Using Rystad Energy data, the report identifies BP as the largest contributor, accounting for 80% of the total. The authors contend that these investments provided critical technological expertise and capital to Vladimir Putin's regime, persisting from the 2014 Crimea annexation until the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Global Witness reports that despite a 13% drop in Russian crude exports over five weeks, significant loopholes in UK and US sanctions allow Russian oil to enter these markets via blending and refining. Specifically, the 'CPC Blend' allows Russian-Kazakh mixtures to reach the UK, while Russian crude refined in India is imported into the US as gasoline. Additionally, the document criticizes Germany for allowing Siemens to export banned technology for Nord Stream 1 maintenance and notes the use of ship-to-ship transfers off the Suffolk coast to obscure oil origins.

Global Witness reports that while the US and UK have banned Russian-origin nickel, the EU has not, creating a loophole where Russian nickel is refined in Finland and then legally exported to the US. The report highlights the environmental degradation and human rights abuses linked to Norilsk Nickel's operations in the Arctic, the company's ties to the Russian military-industrial complex, and the challenges of conducting corporate due diligence in a repressive political environment. It recommends that the EU implement targeted sanctions on Russian nickel, maintain strict thresholds for the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), and prioritize circular economy strategies to reduce dependency on Russian minerals.

The document contends that US sanctions on Russian fossil fuels are undermined by a 'substantial transformation' loophole. While E.O. 14066 bans Russian oil, it excludes goods that have been 'substantially transformed into a foreign-made product', such as crude oil refined into gasoline in other countries. The author highlights that India and the Netherlands export refined fuels to the US that may contain Russian-origin oil, thereby continuing to fund Russia's war in Ukraine. Global Witness calls for the US, UK, and EU to ban all refined fuels that may have been produced using Russian crude.

The document examines the role of Russian fossil fuel exports in funding the war in Ukraine and critiques the reluctance of European governments to implement full embargoes. It highlights the discrepancy between corporate rhetoric and continued business operations in Russia, termed 'peace-washing', and argues against replacing Russian imports with other fossil fuel sources due to human rights concerns and climate commitments. Instead, it promotes a transition to renewables, citing that global electricity needs could be met by renewables by 2035.

Global Witness reports that while the US has banned direct imports of Russian fossil fuels, it continues to import refined petroleum products from India that are derived from Russian crude. Analysis of trade data from the first five months of 2023 shows that the US imported 12.6 million barrels of refined products from India, with a high concentration coming from the Sikka port in Gujarat, which imports significant quantities of Russian crude. The author contends that banning imports from refineries using Russian crude would squeeze Kremlin revenues without significantly impacting US fuel prices, and urges a transition to renewable energy over increased domestic oil production.

The author argues that international trade policy is shifting from a focus on economic efficiency and liberalization toward a 'multifunctional' approach. This new paradigm integrates goals such as climate action, labor rights, and national security as primary objectives rather than externalities. The transition faces national challenges, including the need to balance incommensurable goals and break institutional silos, and international challenges, such as friction with existing WTO rules and a growing divide between developed and developing nations' priorities.

The author argues that a paradigm shift is occurring in international trade, moving away from the 'establishment' view of globalization as a tool for economic efficiency toward a 'multi-purpose trade policy.' This new approach integrates objectives like sustainability, resilience, and security directly into trade goals. However, this shift creates significant national challenges—including the difficulty of balancing incommensurable goals and overcoming institutional silos—and international tensions, as states increasingly prioritize unilateral action over World Trade Organization (WTO) norms. While developed nations like the US and EU lead this trend, developing nations remain skeptical of certain goals, such as labor standards, while viewing others, like food security, as long-standing priorities.

The research paper analyzes technological sanctions against Russia, highlighting the shift from vague 2014 restrictions to the extensive 2022 controls, including the 'Foreign Direct Product Rule'. It argues that while these sanctions disrupt both military capabilities and civilian industries like automotive and aviation, they are not yet sufficient to stop the Russian war machine in the short term. The author evaluates Russia's attempts to mitigate these effects through technological sovereignty, pivoting to Chinese suppliers, and parallel imports, concluding that these strategies are largely insufficient due to deep-seated dependencies on Western technology.

The report highlights the critical role of national oil companies (NOCs) in the global energy transition, noting they produce half of the world's oil and gas and control two-thirds of reserves. It argues that investors are significantly exposed to NOC risks—through direct ownership, bonds, and banking relationships—and should use this leverage to demand climate disclosures, apply ESG frameworks, and stop financing new oil and gas expansion.