Search Climate Insights Directory

The report examines the risks of AI integration in the ASEAN power sector, highlighting data limitations, regulatory uncertainty, and cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It argues that while AI is a 'low-hanging fruit' for accelerating the energy transition, its success depends on strengthening data foundations, updating grid codes, and building AI-ready workforces through phased roll-outs and 'AI sandboxes'.

The document examines the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in overcoming the technical challenges of integrating variable renewable energy (VRE) in Southeast Asia. It highlights five commercially proven AI applications: improving forecast accuracy to reduce reserve needs, enabling predictive maintenance to extend asset life, optimising dispatch to lower balancing costs, providing real-time control for grid security, and supporting dynamic line rating (DLR) to increase transmission capacity. The report provides global case studies—including examples from Google DeepMind, Siemens, and various utilities in the US, UK, and Belgium—to demonstrate how AI can reduce operational costs, curtailment, and carbon footprints while enhancing the reliability of power grids facing high VRE penetration.

The report argues that AI can significantly accelerate the energy transition in ASEAN by managing the complexity of rising variable renewable energy (VRE) shares. It identifies five key AI applications—forecasting, predictive maintenance, dispatch optimisation, real-time control, and dynamic line rating—that can reduce operational costs and emissions. While ASEAN shows strong digital readiness, current AI adoption is fragmented and pilot-based. The report estimates that widespread AI adoption could save up to $67 billion and reduce nearly 400 million tonnes of CO2 by 2035, provided that regulatory, data, and cybersecurity challenges are addressed.

This report finds that widespread AI adoption in ASEAN power systems could deliver up to $67 billion in cumulative cost savings and reduce nearly 400 million tonnes of CO2 by 2035.

The document examines the progress of carbon pricing in three Southeast Asian nations. Indonesia has an advanced regulatory framework and a functioning carbon exchange (IDXCarbon) but struggles with low trading volumes and high emission allowances. The Philippines is in the early stages of designing an emissions trading system (ETS) and exploring voluntary markets. Viet Nam is piloting an ETS for power, steel, and cement sectors, driven by its 2050 net-zero commitment and the impact of the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).

The Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) 2025 results report details the organization's progress in driving sustainable development through scientific research, capacity building, and policy engagement. Key achievements include the development of the 2025 Production Gap Report, the creation of the Integrated Guide for Business Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollutant Emission Assessment, and the support of Kazakhstan's NDC 3.0. SEI also highlights its 'One-SEI' programs, which foster cross-centre collaboration on themes such as sustainable transport, food systems, and finance. Organizationally, SEI reports a 52% reduction in air travel emissions per employee since 2017 and an increase in peer-reviewed journal outputs by 30% over 2024.

The global pipeline for wind and utility-scale solar projects grew by 11% in 2025, reaching 4.9 TW. While China and India lead in construction and prospective capacity, G7 nations show stagnant growth in their pipelines, creating a gap in meeting the COP28 goal to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030.

The analysis finds a very weak correlation between a country's institutional readiness and its citizens' perceived personal preparedness for extreme weather. While some countries like Vietnam show high levels of both, others like Armenia have high institutional readiness but low personal preparedness, and the Philippines shows high personal preparedness despite lower institutional readiness. The study emphasizes that climate resilience requires tailored strategies based on these distinct gaps, noting that 48 of the 68 examined countries rank in the bottom half of global institutional readiness.

The paper examines the disconnect between trade and climate policies, which hinders the distribution of adaptation technologies to the Global South. It defines adaptation technology through three pillars—hardware, software, and orgware—and emphasizes that these tools are highly site-specific. The author identifies three primary challenges: a shallow understanding of adaptation among trade policy-makers, trade barriers such as high tariffs, and siloed discussions between the WTO and UNFCCC. To resolve this, the document recommends involving trade experts in National Adaptation Plan (NAP) and Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) processes, reducing trade barriers, leveraging regional agreements, and supporting South-South cooperation.

The document examines the trend of ASEAN countries increasing LNG import infrastructure, with planned investments of USD 20.4 billion. It argues that LNG fails to provide true energy security due to its sensitivity to geopolitical shocks, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and tensions in the Middle East, and competition for supply with Europe. The author suggests that Southeast Asian nations should instead prioritize domestic renewable energy, leverage their own solar manufacturing capacity, and accelerate the ASEAN Power Grid to enhance resilience and reduce import dependency.

The Global South Debt Strategy and Civil Society FfD4 Coordination meetings in Manila focused on strengthening collective advocacy for a UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt and the cancellation of unsustainable and illegitimate debt. Participants identified Paragraph 50(f) of the FfD4 Outcome Document as a strategic window to address structural gaps in the international debt architecture over the next two years. Agreed strategies include intensifying grassroots mobilization targeting Ministries of Finance and Parliaments, and building cross-movement alliances linking debt advocacy with climate, tax, and trade union justice. The coordination mechanism will target global spaces such as the UN General Assembly, COP31, and IMF/WB Annual Meetings to position debt justice within a geopolitical context of war and aid retrenchment, with AFRODAD leading the African framing on debt cancellation.

The document advocates for a transformative approach to climate adaptation that moves beyond infrastructure to include 'communication justice'. It highlights the role of constructive journalism in combating 'climate fatigue' and the potential of AI to improve disaster prediction and information dissemination. The author criticises global agendas, such as those for COP30, for overlooking the role of independent journalism and public engagement. The statement calls for coordinated collaboration between governments, the private sector, and local communities to close digital divides and ensure that the voices of the most vulnerable are integrated into national development plans.

The document translates the ICJ's 2025 Advisory Opinion on climate change into practical legal tools for climate litigation. It details State obligations under international treaties (UNFCCC, Paris Agreement) and customary law, emphasizing a 'rigorous' due diligence standard to limit global warming to 1.5°C. The guide covers specific litigation areas including government framework cases, adaptation, reparations, the right to a healthy environment, corporate conduct, climate finance, speculative interventions (like geoengineering), and regulatory backsliding, providing key quotes and illustrative case examples for each.

The document translates the ICJ's 2025 advisory opinion into practical tools for climate litigation, focusing on government framework cases, adaptation, remedies, the right to a healthy environment, corporate conduct, climate finance, speculative interventions, and regulatory rollbacks. It emphasizes that States have binding obligations to limit warming to 1.5°C, act with 'stringent' due diligence based on the best available science (IPCC), and protect human rights. The notes detail how these findings can be used to challenge inadequate NDCs, hold corporations accountable for emissions, and oppose the dismantling of environmental protections.

The document analyzes the implications of the ICJ's advisory opinion on States' obligations to prevent environmental harm, specifically focusing on the cessation of fossil fuel subsidies and the regulation of private finance. It argues that States may commit internationally wrongful acts by continuing to fund fossil fuel production or failing to regulate private financiers. Additionally, it outlines binding obligations for developed States to provide financial assistance to developing countries for climate adaptation and mitigation under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. The briefing concludes by categorizing various types of climate litigation—including cases against public agencies, central banks, and private financial institutions—where these legal findings are applicable.

The document distills the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 2025 advisory opinion to assist practitioners in seeking climate-related remedies. It establishes that State responsibility for climate harm is governed by customary international law and can trigger a full range of legal consequences, including cessation, non-repetition, and reparation (restitution, compensation, and satisfaction). The note clarifies that a plurality of contributors does not exempt individual States from responsibility and that scientific evidence allows for the determination of each State's total contribution to global emissions. It further outlines how these findings apply to human rights cases, corporate accountability litigation, and inter-State proceedings.

The document distills key findings from the ICJ's July 2025 advisory opinion, establishing the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as a binding norm of international law and a precondition for other human rights. It outlines State obligations to protect the climate system, the material scope of wrongful acts—including omissions related to fossil fuel subsidies and licenses—and the legal consequences of breaches, such as full reparation. The briefing also categorizes types of climate litigation, such as cases treating the right to a healthy environment as an autonomous right or linking it to the rights of nature, to illustrate how the ICJ's reasoning can be applied in domestic and international courts.

The report argues that fossil fuel supermajors use the voluntary carbon market (VCM) as a strategic pillar to maintain a green image while continuing carbon-intensive operations. It details how these companies and trade associations like IETA and API lobby for weaker credit quality standards and increased flexibility in offsetting Scope 3 emissions. The document specifically critiques the governance of the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market (ICVCM) and the Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative (VCMI), alleging that the inclusion of industry representatives in decision-making roles creates significant conflicts of interest that risk diluting integrity standards.

The global pipeline for wind and utility-scale solar reached 4.9 TW in 2025, an 11% increase, though growth has slowed compared to 2024. China dominates the landscape, with over 1.6 TW of operating capacity and 1.5 TW in its prospective pipeline. In contrast, G7 countries account for only 11% of prospective capacity additions, with their pipeline remaining largely stagnant at approximately 520 GW since 2023. Distributed solar represents about 42% of global solar capacity but remains highly concentrated in a few countries, with China leading at 489 GW. The report concludes that current pipelines are insufficient to meet the COP28 goal of tripling renewable energy by 2030, with a projected deficit of 1 TW for wind and 1.6 TW for utility-scale solar.

ASEAN requires an estimated US$281 billion annually by 2035 for its energy transition, necessitating a strategic blend of bilateral financing from China, Japan, and the US. While China provides scale and speed through asset-led infrastructure, Japan focuses on system-level upgrades and concessionality, and the US employs blended finance to mobilise private capital. The report argues that ASEAN countries are transitioning from being mere deployment markets to becoming manufacturing hubs for EVs, solar PV, and critical minerals. It recommends that the 2026 ASEAN Summit be used to align these national industrial strategies into coordinated regional value chains to avoid duplication and attract diverse global capital.