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The EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is designed to prevent carbon leakage and encourage global decarbonisation by imposing levies on high-emitting imports. While facing criticism from BRICS nations as a protectionist barrier, the CBAM's design allows for the deduction of carbon prices already paid in the country of origin. This has led several countries, including India, China, Brazil, and Vietnam, to strategically develop or expand domestic carbon markets or taxes to ensure that carbon revenues are retained domestically rather than paid to the EU. Modelling indicates that if domestic prices reach 50% of the EU's price, countries like India could retain EUR 676 million annually.

ASEAN requires between $4 billion and $10.7 billion in smart grid investments to support its energy transition, depending on the chosen ambition level. The report outlines three investment pathways based on international benchmarks: a low-level distribution-focused approach ($4 billion), a medium-level renewable growth approach ($6.7 billion), and a high-level regional integration approach ($10.7 billion). While Singapore serves as a governance and technical model with its Grid 2.0 strategy and Digital Twin, most ASEAN nations will require a mix of blended finance, green bonds, and regulatory reforms to fund these upgrades, with the largest investment needs concentrated in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

The report highlights the critical role of grid reliability and 'smart grids' in sustaining ASEAN's economic growth and clean energy transition. While the region has seen improvements in outage duration and frequency, challenges remain regarding transmission capacity and the integration of solar and wind power. The document warns that failure to invest in digital intelligence and infrastructure could lead to nearly $2.3 billion in annual economic losses by 2040.

The report argues that smart grids are essential for ASEAN to integrate rapidly growing solar and wind capacity while supporting industrial growth. It estimates that an investment of $4 billion to $10.7 billion is needed to modernize power systems, which could potentially unlock $2.3 billion in annual economic value by 2040 and create between 243,000 and 649,000 jobs. The document highlights the need for regional cooperation to harmonize grid codes and mobilize green finance to overcome current fragmented standards and financing gaps.

Thailand's draft revised power development plan (RPDP) targets a 51% renewable energy share by 2037, up from a previous target of 36%. Despite plans to phase out up to 8 GW of fossil fuel capacity by 2037, the RPDP still includes 6.3 GW of new gas capacity. The report warns that increasing reliance on imported liquefied natural gas (LNG)—which is projected to reach 60% of the gas mix by 2035—exposes Thailand to price volatility and geopolitical risks, as evidenced by a 141% surge in the import bill between 2021 and 2022. The document suggests that Thailand could be more aggressive in transitioning away from fossils to avoid economic vulnerability and stranded assets.

Thailand's economic strategy to become a regional hub for electric vehicles (EVs) and data centres requires a rapid transition to clean energy to attract foreign investment and meet international low-carbon standards. The energy sector, which accounted for 69% of total emissions in 2019, is central to Thailand's goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30-40% by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. Projections indicate that EVs could account for 20% of total electricity demand by 2037, while data centre demand is expected to grow at an 8% CAGR from 2025 to 2027, potentially adding 10 TWh by 2037. To support this, the Thai government has introduced a direct power purchase agreement (DPPA) pilot project specifically for data centres of at least 50 MW, allowing them to bypass the single-buyer system and purchase renewable energy directly.

The World Resources Institute opposes the European Commission's proposal to postpone the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) until late December 2026, arguing that such a delay undermines the law's credibility and global climate goals. The statement emphasizes that necessary implementation tools are already available and that delaying enforcement penalizes businesses and countries that have already invested in compliance. It further warns against weakening the regulation by introducing 'no-risk' country categories, which could create loopholes for laundering deforestation-linked products into the EU market.

China's massive scale in producing solar, wind, batteries, and electric vehicles has significantly lowered global costs, with solar module prices falling over 70% between 2022 and mid-2025. This manufacturing capacity allows China to potentially supply the entire world's solar needs for 2030 as defined by the IEA. These affordable technologies are facilitating an 'energy leapfrog' in emerging markets across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where some countries now have higher solar shares in power generation than the US. Consequently, China's own fossil fuel demand is approaching a plateau, and the global demand for fossil fuels is projected to be in structural decline by 2030.

The document examines food price volatility in South Africa, attributing it to climate change, global shocks, and corporate market concentration. It proposes a phased implementation of public buffer stocks—beginning with white maize and expanding to wheat and indigenous grains—to protect vulnerable households and support smallholder farmers. The authors suggest that such a system, if governed transparently and linked to agroecological practices, could eventually integrate into a regional SADC mechanism to strengthen food sovereignty across Southern Africa.

The report examines the intersection of Japan's energy policy and national security, arguing that a faster shift to renewables—potentially reaching 70% of electricity generation by 2035—would mitigate risks associated with fragile fossil fuel supply chains and geopolitical instability. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in clean energy supply chains and cybersecurity risks, the authors contend these are manageable compared to the vulnerabilities of continued fossil fuel dependence. The document recommends greater inter-ministerial coordination between energy, defense, and diplomatic agencies to prioritize renewables as a national security imperative.

The report identifies a critical gap in food loss and waste (FLW) research in Southeast Asia, noting an over-reliance on technocratic efficiency and a lack of focus on power structures and gender equity. Through case studies in Bali (coffee), regional small-scale fisheries, and Bangkok (urban agriculture), the authors find that socio-institutional innovations—such as social forestry and collective action—are generally more effective than standalone technologies like biogas digesters or solar dryers, which often suffer from poor maintenance and limited local uptake. The report argues that FLW is deeply linked to gender and social inclusion (GESI) gaps, as women often dominate critical loss points in the value chain but lack the resources and decision-making power to implement improvements. It recommends a rights-based, participatory approach aligned with agroecology and the City-Region Food Systems (CRFS) framework to achieve a just food systems transformation.

The report analyzes the tension between national cybersecurity measures—such as data localization, technical standards, and technology bans—and the goal of open digital trade. It finds that while cybersecurity is essential for trust in the digital economy, divergent domestic regulations create market fragmentation and trade barriers. The document evaluates the lack of specific cybersecurity rules in WTO treaties, the emergence of 'soft' aspirational provisions in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Digital Economy Agreements (DEAs), and the significant 'cyber capacity' gap facing developing countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). It concludes with recommendations for evidence-based domestic frameworks and enhanced international technical assistance to bridge the digital divide.

The document analyzes the institutional strain on BRICS caused by its expansion, noting that while the bloc's global influence has grown, its consensus-based governance struggles with divergent member interests. It evaluates Brazil's 2025 presidency, which attempted to prioritize institutional development but saw most structural reforms deferred in the Rio Declaration. The authors contrast the informal nature of the broader bloc with the formal success of the New Development Bank (NDB) and propose six targeted, low-bureaucracy improvements—including a shared document repository and standardized onboarding—to improve operational effectiveness without sacrificing the group's flexible identity.

Since April 2025, the United States has imposed high tariffs on several ASEAN nations, leading these countries to prioritize negotiation and diversification over retaliation. While Vietnam and Thailand faced the highest tariffs (up to 46% and 36% respectively), most members are balancing individual bilateral talks with a coordinated regional response led by Malaysia as the 2025 ASEAN chair. Strategies include increasing U.S. imports of energy and aircraft, leveraging the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and implementing domestic stimulus packages, such as Thailand's USD 15 billion fund, to protect local industries.

The document outlines the operationalization of Indonesia's Sustainable Finance Committee (SFC) under Law No. 4/2023. It proposes a three-tier governance structure involving the Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia, and the Financial Services Authority (OJK) to bridge institutional silos and align national climate targets with financial market mechanisms. The paper emphasizes the need for a formal Government Regulation to ensure the SFC's authority, the creation of a centralized data platform for ESG transparency, and the use of sectoral coalitions to co-create bankable financial solutions for priority sectors like energy and transport.

The briefing warns that 63 oil and gas fields in development could emit 2,300 kilotonnes of methane annually by 2030, a volume comparable to current fossil fuel production emissions in Europe. It highlights a critical gap where high-emitting projects in countries exporting to the EU will reach peak capacity before EU methane regulations take full effect in 2027 and 2030. The report notes significant data transparency failures among top operators and argues that continued investment in new infrastructure undermines the Global Methane Pledge and overall climate mitigation efforts.

The report examines the limitations of rigid debt rules in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), proposing a transition to a 'constrained discretion regime'. It argues that current rules-based approaches often lead to complexity and unenforceability, particularly when multiple fiscal rules are layered incrementally. The authors recommend replacing rigid ceilings with flexible 'debt anchors' embedded in a broader institutional framework featuring independent fiscal councils, transparent disclosure rules, and a clear distinction between long-term sustainability goals and short-term budgetary instruments.

The document argues that while Africa holds approximately 30% of the world's critical mineral reserves, the surge in demand for green minerals risks exacerbating inequalities and environmental degradation without strong governance. It advocates for a transition from rigid to progressive taxation, the development of domestic value chains (such as battery and EV component manufacturing), and the strategic reinvestment of mineral rents into climate resilience initiatives and local community development to ensure a just transition.

The report finds that while energy transition policies in China and Southeast Asia acknowledge justice indicators in some form, the overall representation is low, with all countries scoring below 50% of the maximum possible score. Environmental, restorative, and distributional justice are particularly underrepresented, while procedural justice and energy access score relatively higher. The study highlights a significant gap between policy goals and actual implementation, especially regarding land rights and labour protections for fossil fuel workers.

The Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) is a Brazilian-led initiative designed as an investment fund to provide financial incentives for tropical forest nations to protect their forest cover. By pooling public and private capital—with a target of $125 billion—the fund intends to generate annual payments of up to $4 billion, distributed at a rate of $4 per hectare of standing forest. While the TFFF aims to support Indigenous Peoples and local communities with a proposed 20% allocation of national payments, Global Witness emphasizes the need for direct fund access, legal land tenure, and stricter financial regulations to prevent private capital from continuing to fund deforestation.