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The author contends that Africa's 14 regional economic communities are largely ineffective due to a lack of funding, staff, and political commitment. Using the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a primary example, the text highlights how vague strategic documents like the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) fail to assign clear responsibility for implementation. The author suggests that national leaders may prefer weak regional bodies to avoid conflict and concludes that these organisations must adopt the same transparency and accountability standards required of national governments to eliminate inefficiency and corruption.

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) urges the Canadian government to move beyond closed-circuit television and adopt a policy of requesting web-cast hearings for all WTO dispute settlements. CIEL argues that current access to hearings in Geneva is limited to those with substantial financial resources, effectively excluding civil society and citizens from the Global South. The document asserts that the WTO already possesses the technical capacity for web-casting and that such a move would improve the credibility and efficiency of the dispute settlement process without interfering with panel proceedings.

The Center for International Environmental Law and the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy urge the USTR to advocate for the web-casting of WTO dispute settlement hearings, arguing that current closed-circuit television access in Geneva excludes civil society and citizens from the Global South due to travel costs.

The Center for International Environmental Law and WWF European Policy Office urge the European Commission to move beyond closed-circuit television and adopt a policy of web-casting WTO dispute settlement hearings to ensure global public access, particularly for citizens in the Global South.

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) has requested that the WTO Panel in the Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres case consult with parties to allow the first panel hearing to be web-cast. CIEL argues that such transparency is essential for cases involving public health, safety, and the environment, citing a precedent from the Beef Hormones dispute where a hearing was open via closed-circuit television in September 2005. The organization emphasizes that internet access would specifically benefit citizens from developing countries who cannot travel to Geneva.

The paper examines the 'democratic deficit' in international dispute settlement, focusing on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and investor-state arbitration. It argues that these processes often lack transparency and public participation despite their significant impact on domestic public policy, human rights, and the environment. While the WTO has made some progress in publishing reports and accepting amicus curiae briefs, it still maintains confidential submissions and closed hearings. Investor-state arbitration is described as even more secretive, often based on private commercial models where the public may not even know a proceeding has begun. The author calls for reforms to these rules to ensure that decisions affecting the public are subject to public scrutiny.

The IISD argues that the investor-state arbitration system must transition from a private commercial model to a more judicial approach based on democratic principles of legitimacy, independence, and transparency. The document specifically advocates for the full publication of all awards, the opening of hearings to the public, and the establishment of a fully independent appellate mechanism. A central concern is the conflict of interest inherent in the current system, where practicing lawyers serve as arbitrators and the ICSID remains structurally dependent on the World Bank Group.

The document criticizes the European Investment Bank (EIB) for a lack of transparency in its project financing, specifically regarding the timing and detail of information disclosure. While the EIB adopted a new Transparency Policy on June 15, 2004, NGOs argue that the bank continues to prioritize commercial confidentiality over the public's right to know, often releasing Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) only after project approval. The text contrasts the EIB's restrictive approach with the more open standards of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and outlines specific demands for the EIB to publish project documentation 120 days before Council decisions.

The document describes the European Investment Bank (EIB) as a public bank that operates like a private one, providing long-term financing to support EU objectives. It details the EIB's governance structure, including the Board of Governors, the Board of Directors, and the Management Committee. The text argues that the EIB lacks sufficient oversight, transparency, and adherence to current EU environmental regulations, particularly in its projects outside the EU. It also highlights the EIB's reliance on private banking partnerships and its complex legal relationship with EU oversight bodies like OLAF and the European Court of Auditors.

The document criticizes the European Investment Bank (EIB) for its restrictive information policies, which often prioritize commercial confidentiality over public access to project details. While noting a 2004 transparency declaration, the authors argue that critical documents like Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are frequently unavailable before loan approval, preventing effective public consultation. The text contrasts the EIB's practices unfavorably with those of the World Bank and EBRD and outlines specific NGO demands for systemic transparency reforms.

The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) has formally critiqued a draft report from the Department of State Subcommittee on Investment, claiming it unfairly favors the investment community. CIEL identifies specific inaccuracies, such as the false claim that environmental and labor groups oppose any limitation on governmental authority to regulate, and notes a lack of mention regarding transparency and public participation in dispute settlement. The organization urges a revision of the report to ensure it is balanced and neutral before finalization.

CIEL identifies systemic failures in the IDB's Independent Investigation Mechanism (IIM), citing the Yacyreta, Cañabrava, and Termoeléctrica del Golfo cases as evidence of lack of transparency, unpredictable timelines, and inadequate remedies. The document argues that the IIM lacks an independent permanent secretariat and sufficient political commitment to accountability. Comparing the IIM to the World Bank's Inspection Panel and the Asian Development Bank's mechanisms, CIEL highlights the IIM's failure to provide public notice or clear schedules for pending claims. CIEL calls for a fundamental reform of the IIM through a transparent and participatory process to restore the IDB's credibility and ensure project-affected peoples' grievances are redressed.

The document analyzes the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), a plurilateral agreement based on non-discrimination and transparency. It highlights the conflict of interest governments face as both rule-makers and purchasers, and discusses how the GPA interacts with environmental criteria. The author notes that while the GPA allows for some exceptions to protect health and safety, it lacks a specific exception for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. For developing countries, the briefing suggests that accession to the GPA depends on a mercantilist assessment of national interest, though they remain affected by the standards set by signatory governments.

A coalition of NGOs argues that the WTO's use of exclusive, invitation-only meetings—such as the mini-ministerial in Australia and 'Green Room' meetings—undermines democratic principles and pressures developing countries to accept terms favorable to developed nations. The statement demands a transition to transparent, inclusive consensus-building mechanisms and a neutral WTO Secretariat.

The document analyzes the transition of South Africa's arms control from the secretive apartheid era to a democratic framework. It details the establishment of the NCACC in 1995 following the 'Wazan debacle' and the subsequent struggle to enact the National Conventional Arms Control Bill. The author highlights a tension between the government's stated commitment to human rights and transparency and its actual practices, including arms sales to controversial regimes and executive resistance to parliamentary oversight.

On August 5, 2002, a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal issued an interim ruling in the Methanex vs. United States case, determining that it lacked jurisdiction over the original claims because there was no "legally significant connection" between California's MTBE ban and Methanex, which only supplied a component (methanol) for the regulated product. The tribunal rejected the notion that indirect economic impacts are sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Article 1101. However, it left open a narrow path for jurisdiction if Methanex can prove a specific "intent" to discriminate against the company in favor of a domestic competitor. The author notes that while the ruling does not exempt public welfare measures from challenge, it limits the range of potential claimants by excluding those only indirectly affected.

The document analyzes a July 31, 2001, agreement by the Trade Ministers of Canada, the United States, and Mexico to interpret Chapter 11 of NAFTA. It highlights a commitment to public transparency of tribunal documents, though it notes a critical exception for information withheld under arbitral rules. It also discusses the clarification of Article 1105, which aligns the 'minimum standard of treatment' with customary international law to prevent firms from litigating any international law obligation. The briefing concludes that while these steps are positive, significant issues remain unaddressed, particularly regarding expropriation (Article 1110), performance requirements (Article 1106), and national treatment (Article 1102).

This document consists of the practice note, chronology, and heads of argument filed by Arcelormittal South Africa Ltd (AMSA) in the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa. AMSA is appealing a High Court judgment that ordered it to disclose environmental records to the Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance (VEJA) under the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA). AMSA argues that VEJA failed to meet the 'need to know' threshold required for requests to private bodies and that there is no legal right for a private NGO to act as a regulatory 'watch-dog' to monitor a private company's environmental compliance.

The report finds that both public and private bodies in South Africa frequently fail to provide basic environmental information, often using PAIA as a tool to avoid transparency. While provincial and municipal bodies performed better, national departments—particularly the Department of Mineral Resources—demonstrated a culture of secrecy and non-compliance. The report recommends expanding voluntary disclosure and establishing an Information Commissioner to reduce the reliance on expensive court proceedings.

The report finds that South African environmental laws generally lack mandatory disclosure requirements for licences and compliance data, relying instead on the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA). This contrasts with jurisdictions like Australia and Canada, where public registries are more common. Analysis of multinational companies shows they typically disclose information only where legally required. The report recommends making disclosure mandatory for all licence holders and establishing central online public registries.