Arms Control, South African Style

The document analyzes the transition of South Africa's arms control from the secretive apartheid era to a democratic framework. It details the establishment of the NCACC in 1995 following the 'Wazan debacle' and the subsequent struggle to enact the National Conventional Arms Control Bill. The author highlights a tension between the government's stated commitment to human rights and transparency and its actual practices, including arms sales to controversial regimes and executive resistance to parliamentary oversight.

• The National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) was established in August 1995 to provide political oversight of arms transfers and evaluate applications for arms-related research, manufacturing, and marketing.
• The creation of the NCACC was triggered by the 'Wazan debacle' in 1994, where Armscor was implicated in selling small arms to Yemen—a prohibited destination due to civil war—despite claims they were destined for Lebanon.
• Prior to 1994, South Africa's arms industry was characterized by institutionalized secrecy and the use of covert networks to circumvent UN arms embargoes, with Armscor serving as both the producer and the regulator of arms transfers.
• The Cameron Commission (1995) concluded that the Wazan debacle resulted from an institutional lack of responsibility regarding the end destination of exports and argued that arms exports involve 'inescapable moral choices'.
• There is a documented contradiction between South Africa's stated foreign policy of restraint and its actual export practices, with approved arms transfers to countries including Rwanda, Colombia, India, Pakistan, and Israel.
• The National Conventional Arms Control Bill aims to codify the NCACC and establish guiding principles for permits, prioritizing human rights, the avoidance of internal repression, and adherence to international law.
• A primary point of contention in the National Conventional Arms Control Bill is the level of parliamentary oversight; the executive has resisted allowing parliament to review pending permit applications, citing the separation of powers.
• The author identifies several weaknesses in the Bill, including a potential lack of independence for the inspectorate (which reports to the NCACC) and limited public access to information.
• The Bill's definition of 'conventional arms' was a source of delay, as the parliamentary committee insisted on including firearms and light weapons to ensure centralized control.

APA

Skosana, X. (2002). Arms Control, South African Style. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER62.PDF

Chicago

Skosana, Xolani. Arms Control, South African Style. Institute for Security Studies, 2002. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER62.PDF.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Skosana |first1=Xolani |title=Arms Control, South African Style |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=October 2002 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER62.PDF |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{skosana2002arms, author = {Skosana, Xolani}, title = {{Arms Control, South African Style}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2002}, month = oct, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PAPER62.PDF}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }