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Climate finance for emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) surpassed USD 1 trillion in 2023, with 80% mobilized domestically. Mitigation finance dominates, accounting for 92% of flows (USD 979 billion), while adaptation finance reached USD 48 billion. China is the primary driver, providing 64% of total EMDE flows. Significant gaps remain, with annual mitigation needs estimated at USD 3.86 trillion. The report recommends strengthening domestic enabling environments, improving the quality of international finance, and increasing data transparency to scale investment.

The document critiques debt-for-nature swaps (DNS) as a 'green trap' that prioritizes creditor profits over biodiversity and sovereignty. It asserts that these mechanisms reinforce a cycle of extractivism and austerity in the Global South, where governments are forced to prioritize debt servicing over social and ecological investments. The author calls for the cancellation of illegitimate debts and a radical overhaul of the global financial architecture based on justice and reparation.

The document critiques debt-for-nature swaps (CDN), asserting they function as a 'green trap' that reinforces financial dependence and extractivism in the Global South. It claims these mechanisms transfer control of national territories and policies to foreign NGOs and private actors while providing minimal conservation funding. The text argues that the current international financial architecture forces indebted nations into a cycle of austerity and extractivism to service debts, and calls for the cancellation of illegitimate debts and the recognition of the North's ecological debt to the South.

The document critiques debt-for-nature swaps (EDN), asserting they are a 'green' facade for an unjust financial system. It argues that these mechanisms reinforce financial dependence, facilitate the privatization of common goods, and shift control of territories to foreign NGOs and private actors. The text highlights a 'vicious circle' where debt repayment forces countries toward extractivism and austerity, while modern EDN structures—often involving 'blue' or 'green' bonds—replace old debts with more opaque loans from international entities.

The report examines the role of securitisation in developing African capital markets, noting that while South Africa has a mature market, other sub-Saharan regions remain nascent. It identifies significant barriers, including fragmented legal and tax frameworks, a lack of a 'ratings culture', and limited understanding among financial institutions. Despite these challenges, the study finds a substantial supply of securitisable assets in banking, microfinance, and fintech sectors. It recommends a holistic regulatory approach, the use of anchor investors from DFIs and MDBs, and the adoption of scalable structures like warehouse facilities to mobilise private capital and bridge the private credit gap.

Ten years after the Paris Agreement, French banks and insurers continue to heavily finance fossil fuel expansion, with some increasing their support for oil and gas extraction. The report argues that 'green finance' and ESG labels are largely greenwashing, as they fail to redirect capital away from climaticide activities. It further criticizes the French and European governments for favoring voluntary industry commitments over binding regulations and for weakening key directives like the CSRD and CSDDD under pressure from financial lobbies.

The report outlines the design of a proposed Country Platform for Nigeria's energy transition, arguing that the framework must be state-owned, politically anchored, and integrated with national development goals rather than being a donor-driven replica of other JETPs. It identifies critical needs for high-level presidential leadership, vertical coordination with oil-producing states, and the resolution of institutional bottlenecks that hinder the disbursement of climate finance. The proposed platform emphasizes a 'people-centred transition' that prioritizes job creation, energy access, and social protection for displaced workers, while strategically navigating global geopolitical pressures such as the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

The EU has introduced Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships (CTIPs) to diversify supply chains and foster clean energy cooperation, starting with South Africa. To be effective, CTIPs must move beyond existing frameworks by providing predictable demand, mobilising private finance through innovative instruments, and ensuring transparent, coordinated governance to avoid being perceived as mere compliance tools.

The framework, co-produced with COSATU, argues that South Africa's transition must be treated as a public good to avoid the risks of private financing, such as increased inequality and higher energy costs. It advocates for an 'eco-socialism' approach and suggests specific financial mechanisms, including a Climate Response Fund and the reorientation of Development Finance Institutions, to ensure the transition creates jobs and reduces poverty.

The document examines how Brazil and South Africa use carbon pricing, green bonds, green taxonomies, and central bank regulations to fund their transitions to net zero by 2050. It highlights the inadequacy of current international climate finance, noting that developing countries pay significantly more for multilateral development bank finance and that most climate funding arrives as loans rather than grants. The brief details South Africa's carbon tax and Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), and Brazil's voluntary carbon market and sovereign sustainable bonds. It argues that BRICS nations should use peer learning to scale these tools and collectively advocate for the restructuring of the World Bank and IMF to ensure more affordable and equitable finance for the Global South.

The report examines the financial and regulatory incentives needed to accelerate the decarbonisation of China's steel industry. It highlights a significant investment gap, noting that while pilot regions like Hebei have introduced sector-specific taxonomies and transition plan templates, national-level frameworks remain underdeveloped. The document argues that current incentives are insufficient for steelmakers due to high upfront costs and for financial institutions due to a lack of unified identification standards. It recommends expanding public subsidies, refining the capacity replacement policy to include carbon intensity criteria, and creating demand-side incentives for purchasers of low-carbon steel.

The report analyzes climate finance flows in Southeast Asia, finding a heavy reliance on international capital despite growing domestic interest. It focuses on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, identifying that while corporates are the primary local investors, institutional and financial institutions remain underutilized due to risk perceptions and loan tenor mismatches. The document argues that blended finance—through guarantees, technical assistance, and project aggregation—can catalyze local investment in nature-based solutions, adaptation, and utility-scale renewables.

The document argues that Africa's energy transition is occurring along two simultaneous tracks: centralised infrastructure and decentralised, bottom-up systems. It contends that current climate finance is too narrow, focusing almost exclusively on sovereign borrowers and large projects while ignoring the retail layer of the transition. To address this, the author proposes a dual mandate that combines infrastructure finance with consumer and trade finance. The document suggests that National Development Banks (NDBs) should act as refinancers and risk aggregators to provide local-currency credit, blended guarantees, and capital recycling mechanisms to support households, MSMEs, and informal trade networks.

The Climate Bonds Standard version 4.3 provides a science-based framework for certifying climate-aligned investments. It covers four primary certification paths: Use of Proceeds (UoP) debt instruments, specific assets, non-financial legal entities, and sustainability-linked debt (SLD). The standard mandates independent verification by approved verifiers and requires adherence to sector-specific criteria. For entity and SLD certifications, the framework emphasizes absolute transition pathways over relative benchmarking, requiring ambitious climate mitigation performance targets (CMPTs) and robust transition plans. Additionally, the standard includes a specialized certification for agri-food entities focusing on deforestation- and conversion-free sourcing.

The document outlines a certification framework for climate resilience investments under the Climate Bonds Resilience Taxonomy (CBRT). It introduces interim criteria that bypass draft technical screening criteria until they are validated by Technical Working Groups. To be certifiable, investments must demonstrate a substantial contribution to climate resilience, manage maladaptation risks, and do no significant harm to climate mitigation objectives. The framework distinguishes between different investment types—Adapted Activities, Adapting Measures, Enabling Activities, and Enabling Measures—with specific evidence requirements for each, particularly regarding investment-level assessments and the use of science-based climate projections.

The report argues that existing financing for South Africa's just transition, such as the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP), prioritises private profit over social justice and is insufficient in scale. It proposes a cohesive framework anchored in worker demands and a new macroeconomic structure. Key recommendations include the creation of a Climate Response Fund (CRF) funded by carbon taxes and fuel levies, a shift toward 'promotional' monetary policy by the South African Reserve Bank to incentivise green lending, and the recapitalisation of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to provide long-term, patient capital for public goods.

The report argues that South Africa's current Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) relies too heavily on private finance and de-risking, which may increase energy costs and fail to ensure a socially just transition. It proposes a cohesive framework based on worker demands, featuring a Climate Response Fund (CRF) funded by carbon taxes and fuel levies, a promotional monetary policy to direct credit toward green industrialisation, and the reform of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) like the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to provide long-term, patient capital.

The document argues that G20 climate finance often prioritizes private profit over public welfare, trapping vulnerable nations in debt through loan-based funding and 'de-risking' strategies. It calls for a shift toward grant-based funding and public investment based on the 'polluter pays' principle to ensure a just energy transition.

The Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly Climate Adaptation Plan (CCMA-CAP) provides a comprehensive roadmap for building resilience against climate hazards such as tidal flooding, coastal erosion, and extreme heat. Based on a vulnerability assessment, the plan prioritizes interventions across eight sectors, including water, health, agriculture, and tourism. It introduces a multi-criteria decision-making approach to rank adaptation options and proposes a diverse funding strategy involving government, international, and private sources, supported by a detailed monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) framework.

The Climate Adaptation Plan for the Kassena Nankana Municipality provides a roadmap for addressing climate vulnerabilities in Northern Ghana. It identifies key risks—including temperature rises of 1.5C to 2.5C and erratic rainfall—and proposes prioritized interventions across agriculture, water, health, gender, and infrastructure. The plan emphasizes a blended financing approach and a participatory monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) framework to ensure sustainable and inclusive implementation.