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The Philippines could avoid approximately PHP 1.7 billion (USD 28 million) in fossil fuel import costs by achieving its target of 9.5 GW of solar capacity by 2030. This analysis comes amid soaring Asian energy prices caused by the Iran war, which has pushed LNG prices up 54.3% since February 2026. The report highlights that the Philippines has some of the highest electricity prices in Asia due to a heavy reliance on imports. While the Philippines is currently fast-tracking renewable energy and battery storage, the report notes that coal and gas generation are still projected to increase by 2030. Comparatively, other ASEAN nations like Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam are also implementing clean energy measures to reduce reliance on volatile imported fuels.

The report examines the systemic failure of mine closure and rehabilitation in Mpumalanga, South Africa, highlighting a dangerous reliance on third-party financial guarantees over ring-fenced cash. It identifies a significant gap where older mining rights are exempt from stricter 2015 financial provisioning regulations and notes that large-scale mines rarely receive formal closure certificates. Through a PAIA information request, the report reveals that the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources (DMPR) lacks a system to verify if provided funds are sufficient for actual rehabilitation costs. It concludes with recommendations for a regional closure framework, mandatory proactive disclosure of environmental data, and a shift toward rehabilitation trust funds to protect the public from inheriting environmental liabilities.

The Next-Generation Geothermal Research and Development Act (S.4406) aims to accelerate the commercialization of supercritical geothermal energy by expanding field testing, establishing targeted R&D, fostering public-private collaboration, and improving subsurface data access. The legislation expands the remit of the Frontier Observatory for Research in Geothermal Energy (FORGE) to include supercritical environments and creates a center of excellence to coordinate research across national labs and private stakeholders. It also mandates deep exploration boreholes and quadrennial reporting by the U.S. Geological Survey to map geothermal potential across diverse geological provinces in the U.S.

The report argues that New England's transmission costs are the highest in the U.S., driven by a lack of cohesive planning and a reliance on expensive private capital. It proposes replacing private equity and debt with low-cost, tax-exempt public financing, which could save ratepayers up to $8.3 billion on new transmission and $1.1 billion on asset condition projects. The authors suggest several implementation pathways, including integrating public financing into ISO New England's Longer-Term Transmission Planning (LTTP) process or creating new state transmission authorities.

The report finds a significant gap in methane action within the dairy and coffee sectors, with only three companies setting 2030 reduction targets and 15 failing to disclose emissions for 2024 or 2025. While members of the Dairy Methane Action Alliance (DMAA) generally outperform non-members, performance varies widely, and dairy co-operatives are noted as lagging. Danone is highlighted as a leader, having achieved a 29.8% reduction in methane emissions from fresh milk and dairy products by 2025. The report also notes that major global supermarkets are currently failing to disclose methane emissions or set targets, and warns that upcoming EU regulations like the CSRD and CSDDD will make such disclosures a legal obligation.

The report argues that public development banks (PDBs)—including national, regional, and multilateral institutions—are uniquely positioned to overcome structural and market barriers to climate risk insurance in EMDEs. It identifies key barriers such as data gaps, underdeveloped local capital bases, and fragmented regulatory frameworks. The document proposes a tiered approach where National Development Banks (NDBs) focus on local market development and project pipelines, Regional Development Banks (RDBs) coordinate risk pooling and shared data infrastructure, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) provide catalytic capital and credit enhancement. Key recommendations include the use of targeted premium subsidies with sunset clauses, the bundling of insurance with loans, and the creation of regulatory sandboxes to foster innovation in parametric insurance.

The report asserts that capital markets are essential for African economies to finance climate adaptation, infrastructure, and demographic shifts amidst declining foreign aid and FDI. It argues that while public equity markets have limited utility for smaller or frontier markets due to high costs and information asymmetries, corporate bond markets and hybrid structures—combining public disclosure with private flexibility—offer more practical pathways. The author emphasizes that macroeconomic stability and pension reforms are foundational to increasing the domestic savings base. The document recommends using guarantees, pooled investment vehicles, and project preparation platforms to increase institutional investor confidence and develop bankable projects in infrastructure, housing, and MSMEs.

The report highlights a growing gap in 2025 where global coal capacity increased by 3.5% despite a 0.6% decrease in generation, signaling a shift where coal serves as a backup rather than a primary power source. While China and India continue to expand capacity for energy security, the total number of countries proposing or building new coal plants fell to 32 in 2025. The document specifically contrasts the policies of South Korea, which has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out and joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, with Japan, which maintains a large coal fleet and focuses on abatement technologies like ammonia co-firing and CCS without a binding national phase-out date.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants are increasingly used as backup reserves rather than primary energy sources. This divergence is most acute in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling generation due to the rise of wind and solar power. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects declined from 38 to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Regionally, Latin America reported no new projects, while Russia and Kazakhstan continue to integrate coal into their long-term energy security strategies despite international financing constraints and sanctions.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, driven largely by record additions in China and India. These countries are building coal plants for system reliability and energy security, even as renewables displace coal's role in meeting demand. The report notes a geographic narrowing of coal expansion, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants, and highlights the specific challenges facing Ukraine's energy recovery following Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

The report argues that the surge in demand for critical minerals essential for the energy transition and digital economy risks amplifying existing gender inequalities. It identifies three compounding risk factors: specific environmental impacts (such as water scarcity and pollution), the high concentration of mineral reserves on Indigenous and agricultural lands, and the trend toward accelerated permitting processes. To mitigate these, the report recommends that stakeholders apply intersectional gender analysis in impact assessments, ensure inclusive consultation and free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC), and establish gender-equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms, including fair land compensation and inclusive employment practices.

The report examines the potential for the European Union to use local content requirements (LCRs) in public procurement to drive decarbonization and industrial resilience. It analyzes LCR frameworks in China, India, and Canada, noting that while these tools can create predictable demand for low-carbon industries, they risk increasing costs, reducing competition, and triggering trade retaliation. The authors argue that LCRs should only be used in strategic sectors where specific preconditions—such as high market leverage and strong climate gains—are met, and must be tied to ambitious, performance-based environmental criteria rather than origin alone. The report specifically evaluates the steel, cement, and clean technology sectors, concluding that while LCRs can support resilience, they must be carefully designed to avoid protecting high-emission producers or hindering the import of essential green intermediate goods.

Kidnapping for ransom (KFR) in Chad has evolved from sporadic rural banditry into a structured, transnational criminal economy, particularly concentrated in the 'Triangle of Death' border region between Chad, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic. The report identifies a professionalized hierarchy of actors, including 'godfathers', perpetrators, and community enablers, who exploit state fragility, porous borders, and economic marginalization. While the state relies on fragmented military responses, the report argues that KFR is sustained by a complex interplay of conflict economies, including artisanal gold mining and insurgent activities by groups like ISWAP and Boko Haram. The consequences include mass displacement, eroded trust in state institutions, and generational trauma, necessitating a multi-sectoral strategy that combines security reform with community engagement and legal updates.

The report examines the African Union's (AU) efforts to create a coherent foreign policy framework to navigate a fragmented international order, while highlighting the need for deeper economic integration similar to the EU. It details the evolving threat of Boko Haram and ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin and the emerging extremist hub in the Borgu-Kainji axis. Additionally, it argues for a youth-focused approach to combat transnational organized crime, citing the rise of cybercrime and drug trafficking in West Africa. Finally, it outlines Burundi's priorities as AU chair, emphasizing water security, youth empowerment, and the urgent need for internal financial autonomy to ensure political sovereignty.

The document analyzes the proposed changes to Mozambique's Petroleum Law, arguing that while the government aims to attract investment and economic development, the law remains vague on community rights. It emphasizes that legally binding agreements between oil companies and affected populations are only effective if communities have independent legal and technical support. The text warns that the inclusion of Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS) may be used to justify continued fossil fuel extraction without addressing the costs borne by local populations. It calls for 'real consultations' and specific, verifiable benefit-sharing mechanisms to ensure that extractive wealth does not solely benefit the elite while locals suffer land loss and pollution.

The document examines the revision of Mozambique's Petroleum Law, highlighting the risks that the new framework may prioritize investor confidence over community rights. It identifies key changes, such as the introduction of binding agreements with affected communities, human rights compliance reports, and the inclusion of Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) technology. The author argues that without specific, enforceable rules on land rights, compensation, and benefit-sharing, these legal changes may remain symbolic and fail to protect local populations from the costs of extractive development.

The document argues that major private credit rating agencies (CRAs) employ subjective, biased, and procyclical methodologies that unfairly inflate the risk premiums for African nations. This 'credit rating impasse' increases the cost of capital, hinders debt restructuring, and obstructs the deployment of climate finance. To counter this, the author supports the African Union's endorsement of the Africa Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) to be based in Mauritius. The brief recommends that African nations improve data transparency, build debt management capacity through partnerships with the IMF and AfDB, and implement legislative oversight via debt sustainability laws to improve their macroeconomic fundamentals and challenge inaccurate ratings.

The document argues that Indonesia's legal framework fails to align with OECD Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct, specifically regarding the recognition of Indigenous Peoples' land rights and the requirement for free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). It highlights how 'national strategic projects' and the 'Omnibus Law' facilitate investment at the expense of human rights, often supported by military deployment. The coalition recommends that the OECD demand a timeline for the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Bill, accelerated land recognition, and the cessation of military involvement in development projects.

The document outlines the Responsible Policy Engagement (RPE) Framework to help EU businesses align their direct and indirect advocacy with climate goals. It warns that legacy fossil fuel interests often dominate trade associations, creating a false impression of business consensus against climate policy. The guide provides a five-step process for companies—commit, engage, align trade orgs, allocate spending, and disclose—and offers specific recommendations for trade associations to be more representative and for EU policymakers to close transparency gaps, particularly within the European Council.