Search Climate Insights Directory

The paper analyzes German foreign policy in Afghanistan post-9/11, rejecting the idea that it was solely driven by a 'culture of restraint' or operational adaptation. Instead, it proposes a 'two-level game' framework where Berlin navigated demands from NATO allies (particularly the US) and domestic public opposition. The author identifies four phases: an initial 'high risk' response to 9/11, a 'risk-minimization' defensive phase (2002-2006), an 'offensive risk-minimization' phase (2007-2011) characterized by symbolic COIN operations and increased aid, and a final 'zero risk' decision to withdraw by 2014 following US policy shifts.

The author applies the 'non-offensive defence' (NOD) framework to sub-Saharan Africa, finding that most states lack the logistics, equipment, and troop density to launch large-scale offensives. This creates a 'zone of mutual defensive superiority' by default, though the author warns this is coupled with a dangerous inability to protect citizens from internal repression or external predators. The paper suggests that instead of individual state armaments, the region should pursue a 'division of labour' for power projection through multilateral organisations like the African Union.

The document analyzes the Rhodesian Security Forces' strategy of conducting cross-border raids to disrupt ZANLA and ZAPU insurgent bases and logistics. It details operations in Mozambique, where the focus shifted from inflicting casualties to logistical disruption as ZANLA adopted dispersed camp structures; in Zambia, where physical barriers and political constraints limited early actions before escalating to pre-emptive strikes against ZPRA; and in Botswana and Angola, which served as transit and training hubs. The text concludes that while external operations were a military necessity, they were constrained by limited aircraft, the political cost of white casualties, and the inability of Rhodesian weaponry to defeat hardened insurgent bunkers.