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Global climate finance for agrifood systems reached USD 94.9 billion in 2021/22, representing 7.2% of total global climate finance. While flows have increased since 2019/20, the report finds that investment is critically misaligned, with a massive funding gap of USD 1.1 trillion annually required through 2030 to align the sector with climate goals. Growth is heavily concentrated in domestic public investment in China and Europe, while private capital remains largely absent in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Mitigation finance is dominated by energy-related projects like agrivoltaics, while adaptation finance remains heavily reliant on public grants. The report calls for a strategic mix of financial instruments and policy reforms to unlock capital for high-impact solutions such as soil carbon management and nature-based solutions.

The report exposes how 400 banks and 400 investors provided billions in support for LNG expansion between 2021 and 2024, despite IEA warnings that no new export facilities are necessary for a 1.5C pathway. It highlights a significant gap between the net-zero pledges of financial institutions and their actual lending and investment practices, noting that most top funders lack effective LNG-specific policies. The document details the climate risks of methane leakage and the social impacts of LNG projects, while calling for a complete end to financial services for new LNG export and import terminals.

The report examines the role of Italian financial institutions in funding the global expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG). It finds that between 2021 and 2023, 12 Italian banks provided US$6 billion to the top 150 LNG developers, with Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit accounting for over 85% of this total. The document highlights a gap between these banks' net-zero pledges and their continued financing of LNG projects, including support for Eni and Enel. It warns that this support risks creating stranded assets and locking in long-term fossil fuel reliance, particularly in Europe where gas consumption is declining.

The report details how 18 South Korean investment banking institutions provided US$7.4 billion to LNG expansion between 2021 and 2023. It specifically highlights DB Financial, Kyobo Life Insurance, and KDB Financial Group as the primary contributors, accounting for 44% of this total. The document argues that this support fuels a climate disaster by locking in long-term fossil fuel dependence and increasing the risk of stranded assets, particularly through the financing of the Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS).

Between 2021 and 2023, bioeconomy finance in Brazil averaged US$ 3.213 billion per year, heavily concentrated in planted forests and bioenergy. While private domestic sources provided 69% of funding, biodiversity-based products and the Northern region remain significantly underfunded compared to industrial crops and other regions.

Between 2021 and 2023, Brazil's bioeconomy received an average of R$ 16.6 billion annually, with 74% of funds concentrated in planted forests and bioenergy/biofuels. While domestic private sources provided 69% of the total, significant gaps exist in funding for native forests and biodiversity products, particularly in the North region. Innovative instruments like thematic bonds and CBIOs drive the majority of the funding, but these are limited to the most industrial bioeconomy sectors.

Tracked urban climate finance reached USD 831 billion in 2021/2022, more than doubling since 2017/2018. However, this remains severely insufficient compared to estimated annual mitigation needs of USD 4.3 trillion by 2030. Finance is heavily concentrated in developed economies and China, with critical gaps in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. While mitigation flows are dominated by transport and buildings, adaptation finance is significantly lower at USD 10 billion, primarily focused on water and wastewater. The report advocates for a '4C Urban Climate Finance Agenda'—Commitment, Collaboration, Capacity, and Capital Mobilization—to bridge the investment gap.

The report finds limited existing climate cooperation between MDBs and NDBs and highlights a divergence in their progress toward Paris alignment. While MDBs generally have more standardized climate targets and energy policies, NDBs show greater variability and often align their goals with national determined contributions (NDCs). The authors identify operational barriers to on-lending, such as currency risks and institutional capacity gaps, and recommend optimizing operating models, clarifying climate mandates, and sharing expertise to scale global climate investment.

Climate finance for small-scale agrifood systems was USD 5.53 billion in 2019/20, representing only 0.8% of total global climate finance and 19% of agrifood-specific flows. This reflects a 44% decline from the 2017/18 period, driven by reduced commitments from governments and development finance institutions. Funding is dominated by public sources (96%) and primarily delivered via grants and concessional debt, with a critical lack of equity investment. Geographically, Sub-Saharan Africa received the largest share (34%), while South Asia and the MENA region remain significantly underserved despite high climate vulnerability. The report argues that current funding is starkly inadequate compared to the estimated annual general financing needs of smallholder farmers (USD 170 billion) and agri-SMEs (USD 106 billion).

The report finds that while CETP signatories have made significant progress in restricting fossil fuel finance, they have lagged in scaling up clean energy support. In 2022, signatories shifted USD 6.5 billion out of fossil fuels but only USD 5.2 billion into clean energy. Most high-income signatories lack concrete, publicly available targets and strategies to 'fully prioritize' clean energy, and financing remains heavily concentrated in upper- and middle-income countries, with no low-income countries among the top 20 recipients between 2020 and 2022.

The report details the environmental and social impacts of the Obi Island Nickel Industrial Estate, operated by Trimegah Bangun Persada (TBP), and traces the indirect funding from the IFC via banks like OCBC NISP, DBS Bank, and KEB Hana. It highlights severe pollution, biodiversity loss, and the use of captive coal power plants that contradict the IFC's climate commitments.

The report details the environmental and social degradation of Obi Island caused by the nickel industrial park operated by Trimegah Bangun Persada (TBP) and its subsidiaries. It specifically criticizes the IFC for providing funding to financial intermediaries—OCBC NISP, DBS Bank Ltd, and KEB Hana—which in turn finance TBP's operations. The author highlights that these operations rely on captive coal-fired power plants, which the report claims contradicts the IFC's Paris Agreement alignment and its own Performance Standards. Documented impacts include heavy metal contamination of marine biota, drinking water pollution exceeding Indonesian safety standards, high rates of Acute Respiratory Infection in children, and the displacement of local communities.

In 2019/2020, Nigeria received an average of USD 1.9 billion annually in climate finance, representing only 11% of the USD 17.7 billion needed to meet its conditional NDC target. Public finance dominated the landscape, accounting for 77% of flows, primarily through concessional debt. Mitigation finance (USD 1.1 billion) outweighed adaptation finance (USD 663 million), despite the country's high vulnerability to climate risks. Energy systems received the largest share of investment (41%), with a strong focus on solar technologies, while sectors like waste and industrial processes remained severely underfunded. The report highlights a significant contradiction between climate finance goals and continued heavy investment in fossil fuels, noting that a single LNG project received USD 2.77 billion—more than the total tracked climate finance for the period.

Tracked green finance in India averaged INR 309 thousand crores (~USD 44 billion) per annum in FY 2019-20, which is less than 25% of the annual amount required to meet the country's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). While flows increased by 150% from FY2017/18 to FY2019/20, the report highlights a critical shortfall in adaptation funding and a heavy reliance on public sector finance for clean transportation. The study recommends the development of a green taxonomy, improved data disclosure, and the scaling of capital markets to mobilize the trillions of dollars needed for India's 2030 and 2070 Net-Zero goals.

The report estimates that an average of USD 384 billion was invested annually in urban climate finance during 2017-2018, a figure significantly lower than the estimated annual need of USD 4.5 to 5.4 trillion for low-emission and resilient urban infrastructure. Mitigation efforts, particularly in sustainable transport and green buildings, dominate the landscape, while adaptation finance remains severely underfunded, representing only 9% of tracked project-level data. The analysis highlights a geographic imbalance, with the majority of finance flowing to China and developed economies, while regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia remain critically underfunded. Key barriers to scaling this finance include low creditworthiness of city governments, a lack of bankable projects, and institutional restrictions on local borrowing.

The annex evaluates the gap between the economic mitigation potential of forests and the quantitative targets set in NDCs for 32 high-potential countries. It identifies a global annual finance need for forest protection and restoration ranging from USD 45 billion to USD 460 billion, while noting that current 'green finance' flows are significantly lower than 'grey finance' flows directed toward sectors like agriculture.

The analysis finds that 2018 U.S. light vehicle investments are critically misaligned with Paris Agreement goals, particularly in the private sector. While government spending shows better alignment, overall progress is hindered by the 'lock-in' effect of the existing fleet and the dominance of internal combustion engine vehicles. The report emphasizes that achieving climate targets requires higher fuel efficiency standards, mass EV adoption, and a transition to a low-carbon power sector.

The report analyzes the tracking of 'high-emissions finance'—defined as primary investment in assets with a material contribution to global GHG emissions—focusing on the power sector in 2017 and 2018. Using project-level datasets, the authors tracked USD 40.8 billion in annual average commitments, representing roughly one-third of the total fossil fuel power investment estimated by the IEA. The analysis reveals that public institutions, particularly export credit agencies and state-owned banks, and private commercial banks are major sources of this finance. Significant data gaps exist because investments made through corporate balance sheets are not captured in project-level data, particularly in Europe and China. The report recommends that public authorities mandate the disclosure of capital expenditures for high-emissions assets and establish technical emission thresholds to deter harmful investments.

The report alleges that Maxland (PNG) Limited is using a rubber plantation project on Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, as a cover for illegal logging. Global Witness claims the company has bypassed provincial approvals, ignored landowner consent, and failed to plant the promised rubber trees while exporting millions of dollars in timber to China and Japan. The investigation links the operation to the Joinland Group and identifies several international financial institutions in Malaysia, Singapore, Norway, and the US that provide funding or investment to the entities involved.

Between 2010 and 2015, US$ 1,477 million in climate finance was committed to Caribbean SIDS, representing approximately 6% of total reported aid flows. The analysis reveals a heavy reliance on bilateral sources (85%), with a significant concentration of funds in a few countries and sectors. While 48% of finance targeted mitigation and 32% adaptation, the report highlights a critical gap in funding for resilience-essential sectors like health and education. Furthermore, a low regional disbursement ratio of 39% suggests significant implementation challenges compared to non-climate aid.