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This briefing by the Institute for Security Studies analyzes the security challenges and potential scenarios surrounding the January 9, 2011, referendum on South Sudan's right to secede from Sudan. It examines the political dynamics between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), the risks of a return to war, and the roles of regional and international actors in maintaining stability during the transition.

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  • The referendum process is hindered by significant disputes over voter eligibility, registration procedures, and border demarcation. While the SPLM argues that demarcation can follow the vote, the NCP has claimed it must be completed beforehand, which would make the scheduled January 9, 2011, date technically impossible.
  • The Abyei region is a critical flashpoint with a high possibility of armed conflict. Deadlocks exist over the appointment of the referendum commission and voter eligibility, specifically whether the Misseriya population should be included alongside the Ngok Dinka.
  • Economic mutual dependence, primarily centered on oil, acts as a deterrent to full-scale war. South Sudan holds 75% of the proven 6 billion barrels of oil reserves, but the north controls the pipelines and the port at Port Sudan; consequently, 98% of the Government of Southern Sudan's budget and 60% of Khartoum's budget rely on oil revenues.
  • The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) may lack the internal will to fight a new war because its rank and file are not predominantly Arab, consisting largely of fighters from Darfur and the south.
  • Regional actors have varying interests: Uganda and Eritrea are viewed as more likely to support the south militarily if war breaks out, while Ethiopia and Egypt are concerned with stability, refugee influxes, and water security regarding the Nile.
  • China is a major stakeholder due to its extensive investments in oil infrastructure and its role as Khartoum's largest ally, supplying up to 90% of its small arms. Beijing's primary interest is peace to protect its energy security and assets.
  • The United States has proposed a package to break the diplomatic logjam, including a multi-year revenue sharing agreement, the demarcation of 80% of the border, and the removal of the north from the list of state sponsors of terrorism if the referendum proceeds smoothly.

Cite the original document

APA
Khabure, L. (2011). Post-referendum security scenarios for South Sudan. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2011_10JanSudan.pdf
Chicago
Khabure, Louise. Post-referendum security scenarios for South Sudan. Institute for Security Studies, 2011. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2011_10JanSudan.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Khabure |first1=Louise |title=Post-referendum security scenarios for South Sudan |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=8 January 2011 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2011_10JanSudan.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{khabure2011postreferendum, author = {Khabure, Louise}, title = {{Post-referendum security scenarios for South Sudan}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2011}, month = jan, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2011_10JanSudan.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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