THE ADAPTATION FUND, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM AND REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION FUND: SOME NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

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The document examines the governance of climate finance in developing countries, highlighting systemic failures in accountability, stakeholder representation, and benefit sharing. It argues that climate finance is often driven by donor priorities rather than local needs, leading to conflicts of interest and the marginalization of indigenous and local communities.

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  • Climate finance governance often follows a 'pyramid' structure where accountability is directed upward toward donors rather than downward toward the affected communities, failing to ensure that initiatives are socially sanctioned or ecologically viable.
  • The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has been found to benefit wealthy families and conglomerates in the Philippines, creating a political constituency that opposes regulations and may invest in 'dirty technologies' while receiving credits for projects that exacerbate climate change.
  • In Thailand and South Africa, the Designated National Authority (DNA) for the CDM lacks representation from civil society, local communities, and environmental or health experts, and often performs conflicting roles as both promoter and regulator.
  • REDD initiatives in Brazil and Tanzania have raised concerns regarding the loss of livelihood and land access for local and future generations, with monetary stipends failing to equate to the value of lost forest use.
  • Bilateral funding for climate action is often poorly defined and may be used as a 'pathfinder' to advance private sector interests, which can lead to the displacement of people and limited access to natural resources, as seen in Tanzania.
  • Senegal's experience with the Adaptation Fund's direct access modality reveals institutional weaknesses, including human resource deficits and potential conflicts of interest when a single individual holds multiple coordinating roles.

Cite the original document

APA
Whande, W., & Reddy, T. (2011). THE ADAPTATION FUND, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM AND REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION FUND: SOME NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL EXPERIENCES. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/No25June2011.pdf
Chicago
Whande, Webster, and Trusha Reddy. THE ADAPTATION FUND, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM AND REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION FUND: SOME NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL EXPERIENCES. Institute for Security Studies, 2011. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/No25June2011.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Whande |first1=Webster |last2=Reddy |first2=Trusha |title=THE ADAPTATION FUND, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM AND REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION FUND: SOME NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL EXPERIENCES |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=June 2011 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/No25June2011.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{whande2011adaptation, author = {Whande, Webster and Reddy, Trusha}, title = {{THE ADAPTATION FUND, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM AND REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION FUND: SOME NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL EXPERIENCES}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2011}, month = jun, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/No25June2011.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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