Climate Change and the India-Pakistan Rivalry

The document argues that while climate change is unlikely to be the proximate cause of war between India and Pakistan, it acts as a risk multiplier by increasing the volatility of river flows in the Indus River Basin (IRB). This volatility heightens mutual distrust regarding dam operations and water manipulation, placing unprecedented stress on the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The author suggests that the IWT's framework of partitioning water is inadequate for modern climate challenges and recommends a shift toward joint sustainable management to prevent natural calamities from triggering armed conflict in a nuclear-armed region.

• Climate change is increasing the volatility of water flows in the Indus River Basin (IRB), specifically through more intense rainfall and a higher frequency of Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs), which increases the risk of severe flooding in Kashmir and surrounding areas.
• The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is under significant stress because it is based on the partition of water resources rather than joint management, making it ill-equipped to handle the unpredictability induced by climate change.
• Environmental degradation and siltation are forcing dam designs that allow for 'drawdown flushing' below the Dead Storage Level (DSL), which creates a 'dual use' dilemma: India needs these designs to combat silt, but Pakistan fears they will be used to manipulate downstream flows to cause floods or droughts.
• While India has the theoretical capacity to weaponize water by expanding storage on western rivers or maximizing use of eastern rivers, practical constraints—including prohibitive engineering costs for diversion, legal limitations from the Court of Arbitration, and local protests in Kashmir—limit these options.
• The strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, including joint hydropower projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) such as the Dasu and Diamer-Bhasha dams, increases regional tensions and raises sovereignty concerns for India.
• A natural calamity in the IRB, such as a major flood, could serve as a conflict trigger if Pakistan perceives the event as a result of deliberate Indian manipulation of upstream dams, potentially escalating into an armed clash between nuclear powers.

APA

Shidore, S. (2020). Climate Change and the India-Pakistan Rivalry. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ShidoreJan23ClimatePakistan.pdf

Chicago

Shidore, Sarang. Climate Change and the India-Pakistan Rivalry. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2020. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ShidoreJan23ClimatePakistan.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Shidore |first1=Sarang |title=Climate Change and the India-Pakistan Rivalry |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=23 January 2020 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ShidoreJan23ClimatePakistan.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{shidore2020climate, author = {Shidore, Sarang}, title = {{Climate Change and the India-Pakistan Rivalry}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2020}, month = jan, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ShidoreJan23ClimatePakistan.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }