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The document argues that the New Market Mechanism (NMM) and the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) require a binding international governance structure to prevent double counting and ensure net atmospheric benefits. It identifies three types of double counting—unit type, double claiming, and overlapping mitigation/financial contributions—and calls for a common international transaction tracking mechanism. The author emphasizes that credits must be tied to the upholding of international human rights law and sustainable development indicators to avoid the failures observed under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

Carbon Market Watch argues that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is facing a market collapse due to low demand and an over-supply of non-additional carbon credits. The organization urges a fundamental reform of additionality requirements, the shortening of crediting periods, and the establishment of human rights standards and grievance mechanisms. It further recommends strengthening civil society participation, addressing conflicts of interest among Designated Operational Entities (DOEs), and improving the governance and codes of conduct of the CDM Executive Board.

The document discusses the outcome of the COP18 meeting in Doha concerning the approximately 13 billion tonnes of CO2-equivalent surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) from the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period (2008-2012). It identifies Russia, Ukraine, and Poland as the largest holders of these surpluses and notes that without restrictions, these units could allow countries to meet their second commitment period (2013-2020) targets without taking further action. The text outlines the various proposals from the African Group, AOSIS, Brazil, the G-77 and China, and Switzerland, as well as the internal EU compromise reached between countries seeking strict limits (Germany, UK, Denmark) and Poland.

Carbon Market Watch criticizes the development of New Market Mechanisms (NMM) and the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) following COP-17 and COP-18. The author argues that these initiatives risk increasing the supply of low-quality carbon credits in a market already severely oversupplied, where offset prices are below 0.20 EURO. The document highlights a conflict between countries seeking 'flexible' rules (such as Japan, the US, and New Zealand) and those advocating for stringent, CDM-like oversight (such as the EU) to ensure environmental integrity and avoid double counting.

The document discusses the tension between the EU's unilateral inclusion of international aviation in its Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and the need for a global agreement via ICAO. It warns against the use of low-quality offset credits, specifically industrial gas offsets and non-additional CDM credits, arguing that any global mechanism must prioritize real, permanent, and verified emissions reductions over supplementary offsets.

Carbon Market Watch outlines critical reforms needed for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) review at COP-19. The author warns that failure to address quality issues, particularly regarding additionality, could lead to an over-supply of more than 4 gigatonnes of CO2 offsets and drive prices below 1 EURO. Key recommendations include transitioning away from large-scale power supply projects, moving beyond pure offsetting to avoid double counting, shortening crediting periods to match technology lifespans, and establishing human rights standards. The document also calls for improved sustainable development monitoring, strengthened civil society participation through a CDM Ombudsman, and a restructuring of auditor payment to eliminate conflicts of interest.

The document argues that Joint Implementation (JI) requires significant reform to prevent the 'laundering' of surplus emission units and to ensure that credits represent real, additional greenhouse gas reductions. CAN-I recommends a single unified track with stringent oversight, the prohibition of using first commitment period (CP1) Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) to shadow credits during the transition to the second commitment period (CP2), and the implementation of mandatory independent audits for baselines and 'positive lists'. It further calls for a robust appeals process that allows NGOs to challenge project approvals and a mandatory 30-day public comment period for monitoring reports.

Carbon Market Watch challenges the project boundaries of a JI waste coal processing project in the Luhansk region of Ukraine, stating that the lack of specific waste heap identification and the potential for adding new facilities during the monitoring period violate the requirements for a conventional JI project.

The briefing argues that any ICAO market-based measure must rely on stringent requirements to ensure emissions reductions are real, permanent, additional, and verified. It recommends that only UNFCCC-guided offset credits be eligible, while specifically advising against the use of Joint Implementation (JI) credits, voluntary market offsets, and bilateral mechanisms due to quality and oversight concerns. Furthermore, it warns that any cap-and-trade system must avoid over-allocation and prohibits the use of surplus allowances from oversupplied schemes like the EU ETS to maintain environmental integrity.

The briefing analyzes the outcomes of the 70th CDM Executive Board meeting, highlighting a perceived failure to strengthen additionality and environmental integrity. Key criticisms include the Board's rejection of fixed crediting periods, its refusal to address perverse incentives in nitric acid plant projects, and the approval of a voluntary rather than mandatory sustainable development tool. Conversely, the document notes positive steps toward improving global and local stakeholder consultation processes.

The Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA) and the Mexican Environmental Law Center (CEMDA) report that at least 14 wind projects in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Oaxaca, have generated social and environmental costs that outweigh their benefits. The authors highlight the failure of the Mexican government to ensure free, prior, and informed consent for indigenous communities, the use of unreasonable land lease terms, and the occurrence of threats and violence against local opposition. Environmental damages cited include mangrove deforestation and the destruction of migratory bird habitats. The document calls for a human rights-based development protocol and a process to measure project externalities to ensure sustainability and community benefit.

Carbon Market Watch criticizes COP18 for failing to secure new mitigation pledges and for leaving carbon market loopholes open, despite some progress on limiting 'hot air' and restricting market access to Kyoto second period Parties.

Carbon Market Watch expresses concern that royalty payments—defined as the free supply of a portion of generated electricity (typically 13%) to state governments—are not being accounted for in the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) calculations for hydro power projects in India. The organization asserts that this practice artificially keeps the IRR below benchmarks, specifically citing Project 5788, a 15 MW Small Hydro Electric Project in the State of Orissa.

Carbon Market Watch expresses concern that royalty payments in India—often consisting of free electricity supplied to state governments—are not accounted for in IRR calculations for hydropower projects. This practice artificially keeps the IRR below benchmarks, which impacts the additionality of CDM projects, specifically citing the Grid Connected Rangit IV Hydro Power Project (Project 7591).

The document expresses concern that royalty payments—defined as the free supply of a portion of generated electricity (typically 13%) to state governments—are not accounted for in IRR calculations for CDM hydro power projects in India. This omission artificially keeps the IRR below benchmarks, as seen in Project 7269 (Small hydro power project by PHPPL).

Carbon Market Watch argues that non-additional Joint Implementation (JI) projects and the surplus of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) undermine global mitigation goals and carbon markets. The organization proposes stricter host party eligibility based on ambitious Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives (QELRO), enhanced international oversight during registration, and more rigorous baseline and additionality requirements, including mandatory reviews for the renewal of crediting periods for existing projects.

The document argues that flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, specifically the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), have failed to achieve net emission reductions due to non-additional credits and 'hot air' surpluses. It calls for a severe restriction on the trade of emission surpluses, the exclusion of fossil-fuel-based mega-projects from the CDM, and the establishment of international human rights and oversight standards for carbon projects.

The document argues that non-additional offset credits undermine climate protection and calls for the permanent cancellation of 'hot air' surplus permits, the strengthening of additionality criteria for Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and the banning of fossil fuel-based power projects from generating credits.

The document argues that current market mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, specifically the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), are failing due to the issuance of non-additional credits and the accumulation of 'hot air' (excess AAUs). It calls for a strict regulation of emission permits, the prohibition of large-scale fossil fuel energy projects from generating credits, and the establishment of an arbitration mechanism to protect human rights and social impacts in CDM projects.

Carbon Market Watch recommends that CMP8 prioritize several reforms to Joint Implementation (JI), including linking host party eligibility to ambitious quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments (QELRO), strengthening additionality and baseline setting requirements, and improving public input on projects.