Search Climate Insights Directory

A coalition of international and Japanese environmental organizations criticizes the April 1, 2021, revisions to Japan's biomass power generation guidelines under the feed-in-tariff. The statement argues that the guidelines lack essential lifecycle greenhouse gas emission limits and fail to implement rigorous sustainability standards for woody biomass. It specifically calls for the removal of palm oil from the feed-in-tariff, citing contradictions in the 'inedible byproducts' rule and the inability of RSPO or RSB certifications to resolve food-fuel competition. The authors also highlight transparency gaps in certification and the negative impact of extending compliance deadlines for sustainability certificates.

The document argues that Japan's large-scale biomass power generation, supported by the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) program, is not carbon neutral and causes deforestation and biodiversity loss in exporting regions like North America. It calls for a shift toward small-scale, local biomass systems and the exclusion of projects causing forest degradation from the FIT program.

The document analyses the scope and direction of energy transition policies in 34 African countries, evaluating them against dimensions of energy justice. It finds a general shift toward market-oriented regimes using auction instruments and feed-in tariffs, but warns that an overemphasis on bankability can sideline development goals. The brief identifies several 'good practice' countries and recommends that AU-EU cooperation integrate energy justice criteria, support regional partners, and facilitate policy learning from African successes.

The document argues that public funds alone cannot meet Africa's growing energy demands, which require an estimated $120 billion annual investment until 2040. It advocates for 'green financing'—blending public and private capital—to overcome high infrastructure costs and investment risks. Using Kenya's experience, the brief details how instruments like Partial Risk Guarantees, concessional loans, and Feed-in Tariffs have attracted private investment for wind, solar, and geothermal projects. It specifically recommends that the EU and development partners provide technical assistance and risk-mitigation products to create enabling environments for private sector energy investments across the continent.

The document analyzes energy transition policies in 34 African countries, categorizing them as direct, integrative, or enabling. It identifies a trend toward market-oriented regimes using auction instruments and de-risking tools, while highlighting that only a few countries—including South Africa, Rwanda, Kenya, Mauritius, Ethiopia, and Egypt—effectively integrate energy justice (distributive, recognitional, and procedural) into their frameworks. The authors warn against over-reliance on market forces and recommend that AU-EU cooperation prioritize energy justice criteria, capacity building, and regional partnerships to ensure a just transition.

The document argues that solar PV is a financially viable option for South African businesses, capable of reducing electricity costs by approximately 15% with payback periods between 3 and 12 years. It highlights that larger systems benefit from economies of scale, with capital costs for systems over 500 kWp falling below R10k per kWp. The brief also details various financial incentives, including tax benefits (12i and 12b) and VAT deductibility, and notes that the Western Cape is a leader in implementing regulations and feed-in tariffs for Small Scale Embedded Generation (SSEG).

Rwanda has significantly improved its electricity access and investment landscape through robust policy frameworks, including the expansion of off-grid solutions and the restructuring of utilities. While the country has seen rapid progress in electrification rates and the attraction of private investment, it still faces challenges in energy efficiency, gender mainstreaming, and the inclusion of informal settlers in its energy plans.

The report criticizes Sumitomo Corporation for its continued investment in coal-fired power plants and its role as a leading importer of wood pellets for biomass energy. It argues that these activities drive deforestation in the US, Canada, and Vietnam, and cause severe air pollution and human rights violations in Southeast Asia. The document calls for Sumitomo to commit to a full exit from coal by 2030 and adopt a 'zero deforestation' policy for its biomass supply chain.

Indonesia is currently off target for its 2025 renewable energy goals, with installed capacity at 9.4 GW by the end of 2018, failing to meet the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources' target of 15.5 GW. The report identifies a 'trilemma' where the government struggles to simultaneously keep electricity tariffs low, maintain low subsidy costs, and meet renewable targets. To address this, the authors recommend a moratorium on new coal plants, a massive scale-up of rooftop solar, a shift from biofuels to bioenergy, and a revamp of the pricing mechanism to reflect full economic costs rather than just the local average generation cost (BPP).

The document assesses biogas as a feasible alternative energy option to help Indonesia meet its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets. It identifies a lack of government priority as a barrier to even development and proposes two pathways: low-investment household-scale installations and high-investment large-scale electricity production. To accelerate the transition, the authors recommend formulating clear renewable energy targets, strengthening management institutions, and introducing financial incentives like feed-in tariffs.

The document assesses the viability of biogas in Indonesia through two pathways: a low-cost household-scale option for cooking and lighting, and a high-investment large-scale option for electricity production. While biogas offers significant GHG mitigation potential—estimated at 6.4 million tons CO2/year for small digesters and 2.6 GW for large-scale production—its development is hindered by a lack of government priority, high initial investment costs, and competing fossil fuel subsidies. The report identifies critical risks including inadequate monitoring of household systems, bureaucratic distribution, and the unreliability of biogas-fuelled power plants. It recommends that the Indonesian government formulate clear renewable energy targets, strengthen monitoring standards, and introduce favorable feed-in tariffs to incentivize private investment.

The report analyzes the legal landscape for RES prosumers and renewable energy communities (REComs) in the EU and nine Member States: Belgium/Flanders, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It finds a significant gap between recent EU-level efforts to promote active citizen participation—such as the RED II and the draft recast Electricity Directive—and the diverse, often restrictive, national laws. While some countries like Germany and France have more advanced frameworks, others like Portugal and Belgium/Flanders face substantial regulatory barriers, including the lack of legal definitions for energy communities and restrictions on peer-to-peer energy sharing. The report concludes that EU legislation is likely to drive national policy changes toward more progressive, citizen-centered energy models.

The document details the transition of South African municipal electricity distribution from a monopoly to a distributed generation model, focusing on the adoption of rooftop solar PV. It highlights the role of the City of Cape Town as a pioneer in developing SSEG policies and tariffs, supported by GreenCape and the Western Cape Government. The study identifies six levers to drive this transition, including technical support, regulatory certainty, and new finance models, to prevent the 'utility death spiral' where municipalities lose revenue as customers switch to renewable energy. By October 2018, 22 of 25 electricity-distributing municipalities in the Western Cape allowed SSEG, with 18 having NERSA-approved feed-in tariffs.

The Allianz Climate and Energy Monitor 2018 evaluates G20 nations on their investment attractiveness for renewable energy and their long-term decarbonization strategies. France is ranked as the most attractive destination, while Russia ranks last. The report finds that most G20 countries lack binding long-term strategies and sufficient renewable energy targets to meet the Paris Agreement goals, although some previous stragglers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey are improving their policy environments.

The report analyzes Indonesia's public finance levers for clean energy, finding that while IDR 12.4 trillion was provided between 2012 and 2016, this is insufficient to meet the 2025 target of 23% renewable energy in the primary energy mix. It identifies key barriers to private investment, including high financing costs and a lack of long-term debt, and argues that capital injections into local development financial institutions (DFIs) like SMI and the use of guarantees are more effective at leveraging private capital than direct budget appropriations. The report recommends adjusting tariff structures to ensure project viability and expanding the role of DFIs to bridge financing gaps.

The document examines the evolving landscape of corporate renewable energy procurement in China, highlighting a shift from government-led feed-in-tariffs (FiT) toward a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) and a national Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) market. While on-site solar and direct investments are currently the most viable paths for corporations, the report notes that large-scale transaction mechanisms remain limited and dependent on provincial-level implementation. It identifies key drivers for corporate adoption, such as supply chain sustainability and market leadership, and details the barriers to interprovincial and intraprovincial direct power purchase agreements.

The author suggests that the Talanoa Dialogue should be used as a platform for countries to share and replicate successful low-carbon policies. Based on a specific scenario, replicating successful policies in sectors covering 65% of global emissions could reduce emissions by approximately 10 GtCO2e by 2030 compared to current policies, effectively halving the reductions needed to keep temperature rise below 2 °C.

The report analyzes the role of economic instruments in mobilizing private investment for clean energy in Indonesia, Mexico, and India. It examines specific mechanisms such as Indonesia's fossil fuel subsidy reforms, Mexico's Clean Energy Certificates (CELs), and India's Goods and Services Tax (GST), highlighting how these policies can either facilitate or obstruct the transition to renewable energy.

The report analyzes the relationship between renewable energy (RE) and macroeconomic factors in India, finding that RE growth is positively associated with GDP, interest rates (call rates), and remunerative tariffs, while negatively correlated with fiscal deficits, energy imports, and unemployment. Using an ARDL model, the authors project three scenarios (business as usual, optimistic, and pessimistic) for RE capacity through 2042. They conclude that India's target of 175 GW by 2022 is overly ambitious and likely to be achieved between 2027 and 2033. The report also estimates that an optimistic scenario could add up to 4.52 million jobs by 2042 and improve India's Energy Security Index (ESI) from 0.41 to 0.58.

Taiwan has introduced a renewable energy credit (T-REC) system to enable private and foreign companies to procure renewable energy, breaking the long-standing monopoly of the state-owned utility, Taipower. This initiative supports Taiwan's goal to phase out nuclear power by 2025 and increase renewable capacity to 1012.5 GW by 2030. The T-REC framework offers four procurement routes, ranging from direct power purchase agreements (PPAs) to the purchase of certificates alone. While the market is currently a 'sellers market' due to high feed-in tariff (FIT) rates, the system provides a mechanism for global companies to manage supply chain sustainability.